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ABSTRACT 
This thesis provides a new account of the strikes in Poland between July and August 1980 
that led to the formation of Solidarność (Solidarity), the first ‘independent, self-governing 
trade union’ to exist under Communism. Although primarily focussed on the role of civil 
resistance in Poland, as the first stand-alone account of the strikes to appear in English since 
the mid-1980s, this thesis has a number of innovations. Firstly, it provides a day-by-day 
account of the August strikes which seeks to emphasise the immediacy, uncertainty and 
complexity of events from the perspective of both domestic and international actors. 
Secondly, with the existing literature dominated by the superpower responses, it integrates 
Eastern Bloc and West European responses into events. Thirdly, the previously unexplored 
role of Poland’s negotiations with Western commercial banks during the summer is also 
discussed. These along with Poland’s economic ‘crisis’ are seen as being of equal 
importance to the non-violent ‘breakthrough’ achieved by Polish workers in shaping the 
outcome of events.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Human affairs must be dealt with humanely, not with violence. Tensions, 
rivalries and conflicts must be settled by reasonable negotiations and not 
by force. Opposing ideologies must confront each other in a climate of 
dialogue and free discussion. The legitimate interests of particular groups 
must also take into account the legitimate interests of the other groups 
involved and of the demands of the higher common good. Recourse to 
arms cannot be considered the right means for settling conflicts. 
Inalienable human rights must be safeguarded in every circumstance. It is 
not permissible to kill in order to impose a solution.
1
 
 
Although the words of John Paul II were directed towards international statesmen as ‘a few 
elementary but firm principles’ for moving away from violence towards peace, they were 
equally applicable to relations between workers and the state in Poland. Worker-state 
confrontations in 1956, 1970 and 1976 had all involved the use of violence. So too student 
protests in 1968.
2
 By contrast the worker-state confrontation during the summer of 1980 
concluded peacefully. While workers made use of non-violent means of resistance, primarily 
in the form of strikes, the state also refrained from violence despite plans for a crackdown 
being made. Negotiations proved to be the favoured means of conflict resolution by both 
sides, most notably on the Baltic coast where the signing of agreements at Szczecin and 
Gdańsk led to the formation of the first ‘independent, self-governing trade union’ to exist 
under Communism: Solidarność (Solidarity). This thesis explores the role of civil resistance 
in the emergence of Solidarity. Was the success of worker protests in the summer of 1980 
due to favourable circumstances in the overall power situation, both domestic and 
                                                          
1
 ‘To Reach Peace, Teach Peace’, Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II For The Celebration of the Day of 
Peace, 1 January 1979.  < http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-
ii_mes_19781221_xii-world-day-for-peace.html> [August 2015] Note: This quotation has been amended to 
read ‘Inalienable human rights’ rather than ‘The inalienable human rights’.  
2
 See: P. Machcewicz, Rebellious Satellite: Poland 1956 (Stanford CA, 2009); J. Eisler, Marzec 1968 (Warsaw, 
1991); J. Eisler, Grudzień 1970: Geneza, Przebieg, Konsekwencje (Warsaw, 2012); P. Sasanka, Czerwiec 1976: 
Geneza, Przebieg, Konsekwencje (Warsaw, 2006). 
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international? How important were the methods of non-violence used as opposed to the 
conditions within which they operated?
3
  
In seeking to answer this question a new case study of the strikes in Poland in July 
and August 1980 that integrates both domestic and international responses to events has 
been prepared. Given the wealth of new material available on the strikes and the length of 
time since a new synthesis of the strikes based on archival research has appeared in English, 
its construction was guided by a simpler question: What actually happened during the 
summer of 1980? Overall it makes clear that while the use of non-violent means of 
resistance was vital in the achievement of a peaceful ‘breakthrough’ by Polish workers, it 
was Poland’s economic ‘crisis’ coupled with a desperate need for new loans from Western 
banks, internal divisions within the Party, and a reluctance to use force based on past 
experience and a fear of the consequences that were the main factors in providing the 
opportunity for Solidarity to emerge peacefully.
4
 International restraint was also crucial in 
this regard. Despite extensive media coverage and government attention, neither East nor 
West interfered or intervened. Continued Western support for the Polish authorities, as much 
as Soviet non-intervention, was vital to the peaceful development of events. 
Literature Review 
In the early- to mid-1980s an extensive literature on Solidarity developed, including Jerzy 
Holzer’s first history of Solidarity and numerous accounts by Western and Polish 
journalists.
5
 A handful of works exploring the use of non-violent resistance by Polish 
                                                          
3
 Adapted from ‘Initial Questions’ in A. Roberts and T. Garton Ash (eds.), Civil Resistance and Power Politics: 
The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present (Oxford, 2009), pp.xx-xxi. 
4
 On the terms ‘crisis’ and ‘breakthrough’, see: A. Kutylowski, ‘Non-violence in the Polish breakthrough: An 
Introduction’, Journal of Peace Research, 19:2 (1982), pp. 103-106 (pp.103-104). 
5
 See: N. Ascherson, The Polish August (Harmondsworth, 1981); T. Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: 
Solidarity 1980-1982 (London, 1983); W. Giełżyński and L. Stefański, Gdańsk Sierpień 80 (Warsaw, 1981); J. 
Holzer, “Solidarność” 1980-1981: Geneza i Historia (Warsaw, 1983); A. Kemp-Welch (ed.), The Birth of 
Solidarity: The Gdańsk Negotiations (London and Basingstoke, 1983); S. Persky, At the Lenin Shipyard: Poland 
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workers also appeared.
6
 This was followed by a significant lull. Despite the increasing 
availability of primary sources from Soviet and Eastern bloc archives following the collapse 
of Communism, by the mid-1990s Mark Kramer was noting a decline in interest in the 
subject. He declared the ‘need for a new synthesis’ of events.7  Since the appearance of 
Kramer’s article, the Polish language literature on the Solidarity-era has expanded 
considerably. Notable works by Andrzej Paczkowski concerning the Party’s preparations for 
martial law and a multi-volume work edited by Łukasz Kamiński and Grzegorz Waligóra 
primarily exploring Solidarity on a regional basis have been published, along with a 
comprehensive new history by Andrzej Friszke.
8
  
By contrast work on Solidarity and the Party in English has been limited. Two recent 
works are notable for their use of interviews with Solidarity activists unavailable elsewhere, 
but make no use of archival sources.
9
 In terms of the study of non-violence meanwhile, the 
most recent account also fails to make use of archival material.
10
 Only Anthony Kemp-
Welch’s Poland under Communism provides a new account based on the holdings of Polish 
and international archives as well as Polish secondary sources.
11
 However, due to the 
appearance of a number of significant new works in Polish and the availability of new 
archival releases since its publication, as well as the restrictions placed on any account of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
and the Rise of the Solidarity Trade Union (Vancouver, 1982); J-Y. Potel, The Summer Before The Frost 
(London, 1982); M. Szejnert and T. Zalewski, Szczecin. Grudzień-Sierpień-Grudzień (Warsaw, 1984). 
6
 R. Polet, The Polish Summer: Workers’ victories and popular non-violent civilian defence (London, 1981); J. 
Zielonka, ‘Strengths and Weaknesses of Nonviolent Action: The Polish Case’, Orbis, Spring 1986, pp. 91-110 
7
 M. Kramer, ‘The 1980-1981 Polish Crisis: The Need for a New Synthesis,’ Cold War International History 
Project (CWIHP) Bulletin, 6/7 (1995), pp.276 and 294. 
8
 A. Paczkowski, Droga do ”mniejszego zła”. Strategia i taktyka obozu władzy lipiec 1980 – styczeń 1982 
(Kraków, 2002); Ł. Kamiński and G. Waligóra (eds.), NSZZ Solidarność 1980-1989. Tom 2-6. (Warsaw, 2010); A. 
Friszke, Rewolucja Solidarności 1980-1981 (Kraków, 2014). 
9
 M. Szporer, Solidarity: The Great Workers Strike of 1980 (Lanham MD, 2012); J.M. Bloom, Seeing Through 
the Eyes of the Polish Revolution: Solidarity and the Struggle Against Communism in Poland (Chicago IL, 
2013). 
10
 A. Smolar, ‘Towards “Self-limiting Revolution’: Poland 1970-89’, in: A. Roberts and T. Garton Ash (eds.), 
Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present (Oxford, 
2009), pp.127-143. 
11
 A. Kemp-Welch, Poland under Communism: A Cold War History (Cambridge, 2008), pp.229-331. 
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the strikes included as part of a broader work on Polish history, the ‘need for a new 
synthesis’ arguably still remains. As well as the need to fill the significant gap between the 
Polish and English-language literature that exists in relation to the Party’s plans for a 
crackdown and the activities of the security services, for example, there is also the need to 
adopt a less Gdańsk-centric approach to the strikes. Due to the presence of Western 
journalists at the Lenin Shipyard strike, most accounts remain focussed on Gdańsk. Strikes 
at Lublin and Szczecin, as well as those elsewhere, remain largely unexplored. They 
arguably deserve greater recognition. As this thesis shows, doing so helps to reveal far more 
about the links between the domestic and international context in which events took place, 
particularly with regard to the role of the Party’s pursuit of new loans from the West in 
shaping their response to events.  
Although the international response to events has been detailed more extensively as 
a result of work by the Cold War International History Project, the role of commercial banks 
in Eastern Europe is just one aspect that has been overlooked. As with Cold War literature 
in general, accounts of the Polish crisis have been dominated by the superpowers. The role 
of Western and to a lesser extent Eastern Europe remains comparatively unexplored.
12
 This 
                                                          
12
 For a discussion of the superpower dominated approach to the Cold War in Europe and the need to bring 
European actors into the fold, see: F. Bozo, M-P Rey, N. Piers Ludlow and L Nuti, ‘Introduction’, in: F. Bozo et 
al., Europe and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal, (Routledge: Abingdon, 2008), pp.1-8 (p.3). On U.S. 
and Soviet responses, see: T. Cynkin, Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis (London, 1988); M. 
Kramer ‘Poland, 1980-1981. Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis’, Cold War International History Project 
(CWIHP) Bulletin, Issue 5, (Spring 1995), pp.1 and 116-139; M. Kramer, ‘“In Case Military Assistance Is 
Provided to Poland”: Soviet Preparations for Military Contingencies, August 1980’, Cold War International 
History Project (CWIHP) Bulletin 11 (Winter 1998), pp.102-109; M. Kramer, Soviet Deliberations during the 
Polish Crisis, 1980-1981, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 1 (Washington DC, 1999); 
M. Kramer, The Kuklinski Files and the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981: An Analysis of the Newly Released 
Documents on Ryszard Kuklinski, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 59 (Washington 
DC, 2009); D.J. MacEachin, U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, (University Park PA, 2002); V. 
Mastny, The Soviet Non-invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War, Cold War International 
History Project Working Paper No.23 (Washington DC, 1998); A. Paczkowski, ‘Playground of Superpowers, 
Poland 1980-1989: A View From Inside’, in: O. Njølstad (ed.), The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict 
Escalation to Conflict Transformation (London and New York, 2004), pp.372-401; S.I. Ploss, Moscow and the 
Polish Crisis: An Interpretation of Soviet Policies and Intentions (Boulder and London, 1986); A. Rachwald, In 
Search of Poland: The Superpowers’ Response to Solidarity, 1980-1989 (Stanford CA, 1990). On East and West 
European responses, see: J. Baev, ‘Bulgaria and the Political Crises in Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland 
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represents a significant gap in the literature, particularly with regard to France and West 
Germany. As is made clear in conversations between Polish First Secretary Edward Gierek 
and his Czechoslovak and East German counterparts on the eve of Solidarity, France and 
West Germany remained the most important Western partners for Poland (over and above 
the United States) even during the crisis of détente that followed the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.
13
 French and West German responses are amongst those to be integrated into 
the account of Poland’s strikes, therefore.  
   The widespread absence of West European actors in accounts of Polish events 
relates to a more specific gap in the literature: the Western economic response. Despite 
Richard Portes’ identification of ‘economic means’ as the West’s main source of influence 
over events in a 1981 Chatham House paper, it remains unexplored to this day.
14
 Although 
this could be treated as a separate issue to the use of non-violence by Polish workers, its 
influence on events requires exploring in relation to the Party’s response. As Aleksander 
Smolar has argued: 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(1980/81)’, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Bulletin, 11 (1998), pp.96-101; P. Jaworski and Ł. 
Kamiński (eds.), Świat wobec Solidarności 1980-1989 (Warsaw, 2013); A. Kobus, Czechosłowacja wobec 
narodzin, rozwoju i delegalizacji “Solidarności” (1980-1982) (Toruń, 2006); M. Kubina, ‘Moscow’s Man in the 
SED Politburo and the Crisis in Poland in Autumn 1980’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11 
(Winter 1998), pp.90-95; P. Opriş, ‘The Polish crisis and its impact on the Romanian economy in the early 
1980s’, in: L. Nuti (ed.), The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985 (London and 
New York, 2009), pp.202-213; P. Pleskot, Kłopotliwa Panna “S”: Postawy polityczne Zachodu wobec 
“Solidarności” na tle stosunków z PRL (1980 – 1989) (Warsaw, 2013); J. Rychlik, ‘Społeczeństwo 
czechosłowackie i Komunistyczna Partia Czechosłowacji a wydarzenia w Polsce w latach 1980-1981’, in: P. 
Blažek, P. Jaworski and Ł. Kamiński (eds.), Między Przymuszową Przyjaźnią a Prawdziwą Solidarnością. Czesi-
Polacy-Słowacy. Część II (Warsaw, 2009), pp.207-220; H. Sjursen, The United States, Western Europe and the 
Polish Crisis: International Relations in the Second Cold War (Basingstoke, 2003); M. Świder, Z Perspektywy 
Bonn: Przemiany polityczne w Polsce w latach 1980-1989, (Toruń, 2011); J. Tischler, ‘The Hungarian 
Leadership and the Polish Crisis of 1980- 1981’, Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11 (Winter 
1998), pp.77-89; O. Tůma, ‘The Czechoslovak Communist Regime and the Polish Crisis 1980-1981’, Cold War 
International History Project Bulletin 11 (Winter 1998), pp.60-76. 
13
 See: AAN, KC PZPR Biuro Polityczne, V/156, 248-257, Protokół Nr 164 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego w 
dniu 30 stycznia 1980 r.  Załącznik Nr 2: ‘Informacja o przyjacielskim spotkaniu roboczym I sekretarza KC PZPR 
tow. Edward Gierka z Sekretarzem Generalnym KC KPCz Prezydentem CSRS tow. Gustavem Husakiem /Praga, 
28.I.1980 r./, pp.3-5; AAN, KC PZPR Biuro Polityczne, V/157, 305-315, Protokół Nr 2 z posiedzenia Biura 
Politycznego w dniu 11 marca 1980 r.  Załącznik Nr 2 (11.III.1980r.): ‘Informacja o przyjacielskim spotkaniu 
roboczym I sekretarza KC PZPR Edwarda Gierka z Sekretarzem Generalnym KC NPSJ, Przewodniczącym Rady 
Państwa NRD tow. Erich Honeckerem /Arłamów, 2-4.03.1980/’, pp.3-5.   
14
 R. Portes, The Polish Crisis: Western Economic Policy Options (London, 1981), p.3. 
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In a situation of increasing integration into world markets, the Polish 
authorities became more sensitive to the pressures of the developed and 
democratic world. Maintaining a positive image of the regime was a 
necessary concession in order to facilitate increasingly complicated and 
difficult talks about the rescheduling of a rapidly growing foreign debt.
15
 
 
There is therefore a need to explore the extent to which Poland’s economic relations with 
the West influenced the Party’s response to the strikes. There is an additional need to 
explore the extent to which these relationships influenced the West. After all, as Portes had 
earlier argued, ‘Interdependence Is A Two-Way Street.’16 Poland’s economic problems had 
potential ramifications for a West experiencing major economic difficulties of its own and 
vice versa. This was not only the case for Western governments, but also for Poland’s other 
Western partner: commercial banks.  
Given the severity of Poland’s debt crisis at the time, the Poles could not survive 
without new loans. Not only did Poland’s relationships with Western banks shape the 
Party’s economic reforms, thus triggering social unrest in the first instance, they arguably 
also shaped the Party’s response to events. With the outcome of negotiations uncertain and 
the Western media watching, they could neither reverse the introduction of austerity nor 
crackdown against the strikes. Inaction against the strikes was not an option, however. In 
addition to potentially jeopardising their ability to secure agreements for the loans, social 
unrest also presented a threat to the Party and brought with it the prospect of Warsaw Pact 
intervention. This in turn risked the end of the East-West détente that had facilitated 
Poland’s economic dependence on the West in the first place. Already under strain 
                                                          
15
 Smolar, p.134. 
16
 See: R. Portes, ‘East Europe’s Debt to the West: Interdependence Is A Two-Way Street’, Foreign Affairs, 
55:4 (1977), pp.751-782 
12 
 
following NATO’s ‘dual-track’ decision and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, détente 
(and with it arms control) would arguably not survive another blow.
17
  
Approach and Sources 
In one of the best known accounts of the Solidarity-era, Timothy Garton Ash recalls the 
discrepancy between the memory and reality of events in Gdańsk: 
Above all I remember a sense of being carried along on some mighty 
river, which led, majestically and inevitably, to the estuary of the Gdańsk 
Agreement, and thence to the sea of Solidarity. This memory only shows 
how deceptive memory can be. For there was nothing inevitable about the 
outcome of the August strikes. The progress of the Lenin Shipyard 
occupation (like the authorities’ response) was the result of countless 
arguments, individual decisions, chance and moments of sheer 
confusion.
18
 
While Garton Ash was successful in conveying the atmosphere at the Lenin Shipyard, 
particularly when making use of a ‘diary’ format in order to provide ‘clarity and immediacy’ 
to events, due to the unavailability of archival sources from the Party and international 
actors at the time a certain amount of the complexity and confusion surrounding events was 
arguably (and inevitably) lost. Given that the rapidly changing nature of events, along with 
the interaction between the domestic and international context surrounding the strikes, was a 
significant part of what made this period a ‘crisis’, the absence of such complexity arguably 
represents a significant barrier to understanding events for those who did not live through 
them. As such a sense of the dynamics, complexity and uncertainty of events arguably 
requires capturing.  
                                                          
17
 While it is not possible to provide an overview of the international context into which Polish events 
emerged, for contrasting accounts of détente and its decline see: M. Bowker, ‘Brezhnev and Superpower 
Relations’, in: E. Bacon and M. Sandle (eds.), Brezhnev Reconsidered (Houndsmills and New York, 2002), 
pp.90-109;  J.M. Hanhimäki, The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and The Transformation of 
the Cold War (Washington DC, 2013); L. Nuti (ed.), The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to 
Gorbachev, 1975-1985 (London and New York, 2009); O.A. Westad (ed.), The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American 
Relations during the Carter Years (Oslo, 1997). 
18
 T. Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity 1980-1982 (London, 1983), pp.37-38. 
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In order to do so, an overlapping narrative involving domestic and international 
actors has been produced. As well as helping to convey the rapidly shifting context in which 
the strikes took place and to understand different perspectives as events unfolded, the 
advantage of such an approach to the study of civil resistance and social movements is well 
captured by Marshall Ganz:  
The telling of the layered stories of people, timing, choices, and events is 
an effort to portray the intricacies of a social movement as it unfolded with 
its many moving parts that created new opportunities, challenges, and 
outcomes with which purposeful actors interacted.
19
 
 
Given the rapidly shifting nature of events during periods of unrest, such an approach is 
important in gaining an understanding of events. Combined with the widespread availability 
of sources concerning both domestic and international actors, such an approach allows for a 
new understanding of the interaction between non-violent resistance and the context in 
which it took place. In the case of the Lenin Shipyard strike it is possible to do this in a day-
by-day form from multiple perspectives, something which is arguably not usually possible 
when constructing narratives of either violent or non-violent resistance. These have 
traditionally focussed only on the perspective of those protesting. 
A variety of sources from Polish and English language archives are employed in the 
construction of this multi-perspective narrative. In terms of Poland, these include the files of 
the Polish United Workers’ Party held at the Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN – Archive of 
Modern Records) in Warsaw as well as the published transcripts of strike negotiations at 
Gdańsk and Szczecin, the latter previously unused in the English language literature.20 
Published collections of documents concerning the Politburo, Solidarity, and the Polish 
                                                          
19
 M. Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, and Strategy in the California Farm 
Worker Movement (New York, 2010), p.21. 
20
 See: A. Drzycimski and T. Skutnik (eds.), Zapis rokowań gdańskich. Sierpień 1980 (Paris, 1986); A. Kemp-
Welch, (ed.), The Birth of Solidarity: The Gdańsk Negotiations (London and Basingstoke, 1983); A. Głowacki, 
(ed.), Rozmowy Komisji Rządowej pod przewodnictwem Kazimierza Barcikowskiego z Międzyzakładowym 
Komitetem Strajkowym w Szczecinie w dniach 21-30 sierpnia 1980r. według transmisji radiowęzła Stoczni im. 
A. Warskiego w Szczecinie (Szczecin, 1989) 
14 
 
security services, amongst others, have also been used.
21
 With regards to the international 
response, Soviet sources available in translation from the Cold War International History 
Project and a Polish language collection of Eastern bloc sources have all been used.
22
 In 
addition to this, a large number of Western sources have also been used. These include often 
previously unused archival sources available digitally from the CIA, the Department of 
State, and NATO.
23
 Newly released British Government files held at the National Archives 
(TNA) at Kew, including those of the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO), have also been used. As well as providing new insights into the British 
response to events, they also provide extensive details of Poland’s negotiations with 
commercial banks.  
Background: Poland’s Debt Crisis and the Commercial Banks 
Due to the previously unexplored nature of Poland’s negotiations with Western banks, an 
overview of Poland’s relations with commercial banks on the eve of the strikes is arguably 
required prior to the narrative of the strikes that makes up the main body of this thesis. As a 
secret report delivered to Gierek by Politburo member Stefan Olszowski in January 1980 
made clear, during the previous year Poland had experienced a significant worsening of its 
balance of payments situation with regard to capitalist countries in the West. By the end of 
                                                          
21
 See, for example: Z. Włodek (ed.), Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a “Solidarność” 1980-1981 
(London, 1992); A. Drzycimski and T. Skutnik (eds.), Zapis Wydarzeń. Gdańsk – Sierpień 1980. Dokumenty 
(Warsaw, 1999); P. Raina  and M. Zbrozek (eds.), Operacja “Lato-80”. Preludium stanu wojennego. 
Dokumenty MSW 1980-1981 (Pelplin, 2003). 
22
 See, for example: M. Kramer, ‘“In Case Military Assistance Is Provided to Poland”: Soviet Preparations for 
Military Contingencies, August 1980’, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Bulletin 11 (Winter 
1998), pp.102-109; Ł. Kamiński, (ed.), Przed i Po 13 Grudnia: Państwa Bloku Wschodniego Wobec Kryzysu w 
PRL 1980 – 1982: Tom 1 (Warsaw, 2006). 
23
 See: Central Intelligence Agency Freedom of Information Act (CIA FOIA) Electronic Reading Room 
<http://www.foia.cia.gov> [Note: Initially downloaded in June 2010, at the time of writing it no longer 
appears possible to access the CIA documents cited in this work online.]; Department of State Freedom of 
Information Act (DOS FOIA) Electronic Reading Room <https://foia.state.gov/Search/Search.aspx> [August 
2015];  NATO Archives: Documents Relating to Events in Poland (1980-1984) 
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/81233.htm> [August 2015] 
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1979 Poland’s debt had increased by more than $4 billion to stand at a level of 
approximately $24 billion. Amongst other problems, the cost of servicing these debts was 
causing damage to ‘the internal balance of the economy’, particularly in the light of a fall in 
national income in 1979.
24
 It was a fall which was both the first to occur in Poland since the 
end of the Second World War and the first recorded by any COMECON member since a 
similar decrease had taken place in Czechoslovakia prior to the Prague Spring.
25
  
Although not stated in percentage terms as a result of the short-term credits on which 
Poland had become dependent in the late 1970s requiring repayment alongside older long- 
and medium-term credits, almost one hundred percent of Poland’s income from exports was 
needed to service the nation’s debts.26 To put this in perspective, the manageable safe level 
of debt according to the IMF is 40 percent.
27
 Poland was on the brink of economic collapse. 
Economic reforms, including the introduction of austerity measures, and new loans were 
required. So too was popular support. The latter would be most difficult to generate, 
particularly given that planned austerity measures included meat price increases, 
traditionally a trigger for worker protests. The domestic context into which these changes 
were to be introduced also appears to have been ripe for social unrest. Alongside a 
significant proportion of Poland’s population being made up of 15-29 year olds, significant 
crises of optimism in the future and faith in the Party were also evident.
28
 Perhaps 
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surprisingly the Party did not anticipate any unrest due to the reforms (see Chapter Two). 
All other indicators suggest that domestic problems were assured.  
Poland also faced significant problems in generating the economic support required 
for their reforms. Despite Polish requests, the Soviet Union was proving far from supportive 
in economic terms. To give some indication of the lack of Soviet support for Poland, 
following a request for new financial credits worth $700 – 800 million, they were ultimately 
granted only $75 million in new credits plus $219 million in debt rescheduling. Soviet 
priorities lay elsewhere.
29
 Poland’s Western ‘partners’ rather than her ‘friends’ would 
provide the majority of Poland’s economic support. While a successful approach to the 
French for help had been made in December 1979,
30
 Cold War tensions had increased since 
then and the emergence of social discontent was only likely to further complicate Poland’s 
drive for much needed loans. Three sets of negotiations concerning loans began prior to the 
introduction of price increases in July 1980. These involved a predominantly Anglo-
American consortium over a $500 million loan, a West German consortium for a loan of 
$570 million, and an Austrian consortium operating on behalf of Vienna in a $300 million 
loan deal relating to future coal deliveries.   
Although the Poles initially hoped to have the Anglo-American loan completed by 
the end of June, negotiations were still ongoing as the strikes began. Further talks were 
scheduled to take place in London on 3 July 1980.  Significant concessions had already been 
granted to the banks by this time: they were to have increased influence and insight into 
Poland’s economic affairs. As the British account of one meeting records, ‘the whole 
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operation was unique for a Socialist state – the banks were effectively doing “an IMF job” 
on the Polish economy and the authorities seemed to acquiesce in this given their need to 
raise the new loan.’31 Indeed the Poles later provided an ‘agreement to have regular 
consultations with the consortium of bankers about future progress on economic reform in 
Poland.’32 This was unprecedented and provides some indication of how desperate Poland 
was for new loans. 
 With regard to the West German loan, Bonn was refusing to provide the banks with 
official guarantees while simultaneously informing them ‘that it has a considerable political 
interest in supplying credit to Poland.’33 By mid-June the banks were still holding firm in 
their dealings with Bonn in demanding such guarantees, however.
34
 The Austrian loan was 
also problematic. While the Poles had already secured a $200 million loan from Vienna, a 
further $300 million for use in the development of the Polish coal industry was sought. 
While the relevant agreements would be signed, they would only become binding once the 
Austrian parliament approved the deal in the autumn. In the interim half would be provided 
by an Austrian banking consortium. Subject to the provision of a government statement 
confirming that the Austrian parliament would be directed to approve the credit, the banks 
would deposit $150 million with the Poles for a period of 3 months (longer if necessary). 
The sum was expected to be deposited on 4 July 1980.
35
 All three negotiations were ongoing 
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therefore, as austerity and with it social unrest emerged as a major feature of Polish life in 
the summer of 1980. It was from this unrest that Solidarity was born.  
  
19 
 
CHAPTER TWO: AUSTERITY POLAND AND LUBLIN’S JULY 
Even before the price increases and toughening of work discipline were implemented in July 
worker disquiet stemming from talk of proposed changes to work norms had led to the delay 
of reforms at some enterprises until September.
36
 The avoidance of more widespread tension 
regarding the forthcoming changes in meat prices appears to have stemmed primarily from 
workers lack of awareness of them. Although a lengthy propaganda campaign trumpeting 
the need for increases as part of a program of economic reform had been conducted, no 
specific date was announced for the changes.
37
 They took the general public by surprise. As 
Anthony Kemp-Welch has noted: 
Better cuts of meat and meat products simply began to appear at higher 
prices, which had sometimes doubled. The public thus encountered them 
by chance. Driving from Łódź to Warsaw, one could find state shops 
selling the same cuts of meat at four different prices – a novelty for the 
planned economy. At Huta Warszawa, the works canteen alternated the 
new and old prices, sometimes several times a day.
38
 
The quiet manner in which they were introduced, along with the fact that the changes were 
relatively minor compared to 1970 and 1976, all demonstrate the caution with which the 
Party was approaching reforms in spite of their necessity. The fact that all decisions as to 
when the changes should be introduced were to be taken at the local rather than the national 
level also suggests a desire on the part of the leadership to distance itself from any unrest 
triggered by the reforms. Overall, there appears to have been a belief that, as Edward 
Babiuch had informed the U.S. in May 1980, ‘the “public psychology” in Poland would 
permit prices to be increased, albeit quietly’.39 Events in July 1980 demonstrated otherwise, 
however. Although only 2 percent of meat sales were affected, the fact that prices of some 
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cuts of meat had increased by 90 – 100 percent without warning had a profound impact on 
the “public psychology”. Lack of information regarding the changes was a major cause of 
problems. A number of the initial strikes occurred as workers simply sought further 
details.
40
 Unlike the protests of 1970 and 1976 however, the response of Polish workers was 
entirely non-violent. Polish workers began to make significant gains. Events were shaped as 
much by domestic and international factors as non-violence, however. 
Initial Stoppages 
According to reports compiled by the Interior Ministry (MSW), the first stoppages took 
place on 1 July when 270 workers on the first shift at the WSK aircraft factory in Mielec in 
south-eastern Poland, as well as 220 workers on the first shift at the “POMET” metallurgical 
works in Poznań, refused to work.41 Although such strikes were similar in scale to those that 
occurred regularly in Poland, a departmental strike at the “Ursus” tractor factory deserves 
attention. Although small in scale, as the scene of major protests and repressions in 1976 it 
was an enterprise that attracted Western media interest. It also symbolised how much 
protests had changed. While the strike in 1976 had been relatively disorganised, in 1980 a 
strike committee (later renamed a workers’ commission) was established to formulate 
demands and negotiate with management.
42
 These were significant acts. Despite the 
economic nature of the strikes, the nature of Communism was such that the founding of a 
strike committee, as well as the demand for workers’ security to be guaranteed in writing, at 
strikes such as “Ursus” made them political.43  
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Workers did not challenge the Party directly, however. As “Ursus” demonstrated, 
they had learnt from previous confrontations. They were disciplined and cautious. The 
demands for written security guarantees, for example, demonstrated an awareness of the 
need to protect themselves from post-strike repressions as experienced in 1976. Additionally 
workers who in 1976 had blockaded local railway lines took care not to inconvenience the 
local community or cause damage. The foundry and combined heat-and-power plant were 
kept running due to the economic cost of putting out the furnaces and the fact that the plant 
supplied electricity both to “Ursus” and the surrounding area.44 As is evident from strikes 
later that summer, such behaviour had the dual advantage of making it easier to gain local 
support and more difficult for the Party to discredit the workers. 
Not only was the strike at “Ursus” better organised, it was also better publicised. The 
Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR), founded in response to the post-1976 repressions at 
Radom and “Ursus”, was already established as an information centre. When the strikes 
broke out information was passed from workers to KOR. According to security service (SB) 
reports, by late afternoon on 2 July a worker from “Ursus” had already contacted Jacek 
Kuroń to inform him of the strike and their demands. Andrzej Gwiazda, a worker active 
with the opposition in Gdańsk meanwhile, had telephoned to inform Kuroń of a strike at the 
“POLMO” car parts factory in Tczew.45 Unlike 1976, there was a well-established, pre-
existing network for the transmission of information between workers and intellectuals. It 
was a network trusted not only by Polish workers, but also Western journalists. 
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 The first public manifestation of KOR’s activity that summer was the release of a 
statement on 2 July at a time of total silence from the Party and the official press. KOR 
confirmed the introduction of price increases; described what was happening in striking 
enterprises; and called for the authorities to make all information about the price increases 
and the food supply available to the public.
46
 As such it provided the public with 
information that was denied to them by the official press, but which they could have learnt 
from the media in any normal European country. KOR’s statement also addressed the issue 
of provocation during periods of worker unrest. The authorities were warned not to engage 
in it, while the workers were warned ‘against those forms of protest which may be utilised 
by the authorities to provoke riots.’47 In keeping with KOR’s long-standing tradition of non-
violence, it was made clear that they wanted no use of violence by either side. Favouring 
peaceful means of conflict resolution, they also stated the need for workers to engage in 
negotiations with the authorities using democratically elected ‘independent workers’ 
representatives’ to organise, present and negotiate their demands.48 In contrast to 1970 when 
the Polish intelligentsia had, in Leszek Kołakowski’s words, shown a ‘regrettable passivity’ 
during strikes on the Baltic coast, even during the earliest strikes in 1980 it was apparent 
that workers enjoyed the support of intellectuals.
49
 They would not be acting alone. Nor 
would they be encouraged to take to the streets. KOR was a voice for dialogue and non-
violence.  
KOR’s significance as an information centre was boosted by the Western media, 
which served to amplify KOR’s domestic and international influence. Such ties existed in a 
number of forms. Firstly, KOR had natural links with émigré Poles from the opposition 
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milieu, many of whom had gone into exile in the aftermath of 1968. By the evening of 2 
July Kuroń had already passed news of the strikes to Eugeniusz Smolar in London, for 
example. He maintained regular contact with Smolar and his brother Aleksander in Paris.
50
 
Secondly, KOR enjoyed good relations with Western correspondents in Warsaw. In 
particular, information about events at “Ursus” was of importance for Western journalists 
with Kuroń considering KOR’s ability to obtain news about the strike as something of a test 
case of KOR’s credibility.51 The passage of information between KOR and foreign 
correspondents was not a one-way street, however. Foreign correspondents also passed 
information to KOR concerning official briefings given to the Western media.
52
 There was 
mutual trust between the two sides. Thirdly, KOR was a trusted source of information for 
Radio Free Europe (RFE). The editor of RFE’s Polish section was known to favour KOR 
over nationalistic opposition groups such as the Confederation of Independent Poland 
(KPN) due in part to the ‘factual and interesting’ nature of KOR’s bulletins.53 The pre-
existing relationships and trust between KOR and Western journalists was as vital as their 
relationship with Polish workers. By 3 July these relationships were already paying 
dividends. RFE made its first broadcast on this date. Other news agencies also began to file 
reports.
54
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The Party began to acknowledge the introduction of meat price increases on 2 July 
when the deputy chairman of “Społem” (the Consumer Co-operatives’ Union) appeared on 
television to officially confirm the price increases. His announcement failed to satisfy the 
public. Confusion still reigned regarding the changes. The statement was broadcast again 
that evening in response to public enquiries.
55
 It was only the following day that the matter 
was fully clarified in a statement from the official Polish news agency. Having outlined the 
nature of the changes, the statement noted that savings made as a result of them were to ‘be 
earmarked for improving the lot of the lowest-paid, large families and pensioners.’56 It was a 
statement that echoed the findings of a survey conducted by the Party’s Institute of Basic 
Problems of Marxism-Leninism (IPPML) in the aftermath of 1976. According to the 
IPPML’s research, the public indicated greater willingness to support price increases if the 
savings were used to increase wages and benefits such as pensions.
57
 This points to the 
continued caution of the leadership in implementing the reforms and their apparent 
determination to avoid the mistakes of 1976’s attempted alterations.58 They were keen to 
distance themselves from any associated problems. 
Given the limited scale of the strikes, their resolution was left to enterprise 
management. The “Ursus” strike provides a useful example of the methods employed. 
Members of management and the Party aktyw spoke directly to workers, encouraging them 
to return to work. Additional appeals were made to the ‘Party consciousness’ of Party 
members on strike. Threats were also evident. Workers faced disciplinary action for 
participating in the stoppages. Enterprise management was also determined to stop news of 
the strike from spreading and triggering strikes elsewhere. So too was the Party. The official 
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media was silent on the strikes. As in 1976 telephones at the enterprise were disconnected 
and the gates closed. Negotiations were entered into with the workers’ commission, 
however.
59
 
At the national level two broader trends appear to explain the authorities’ restrained 
response. Firstly, a combination of compensatory wage increases of between 5 – 10 per cent 
and media silence was sufficient to resolve strikes. Such a tactic was to be expected. The use 
of economic means accompanied by media silence was Moscow’s established method for 
containing and resolving strikes.
60
 Such methods would not be questioned by the Soviet 
Union, therefore. Secondly, due to their non-violent response the workers had not provided 
an excuse for a crackdown. Even the MSW noted the ‘peaceful character’ of the strike at 
“Ursus”.61 The caution inherent in the Party’s response appears to have been linked to the 
workers’ non-violent actions. According to the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, the Party were 
‘disposed to wait the workers out, so long as their reaction to the price rises remains non-
violent and does not spill outside plant premises.’62 As long as the workers refrained from 
violence a crackdown could be avoided. Dissent was not tolerated, however. Opposition 
activists, such as Andrzej Gwiazda and Joanna Duda-Gwiazda, continued to be arrested for 
the distribution of opposition leaflets.
63
  
It was not only the Party exercising restraint however, but also the United States. On 
3 July the Secretary of State Edmund Muskie received assurances from the Board for 
International Broadcasting (BIB) that Radio Free Europe would ‘be exercising special care 
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in adhering to program policy guidelines, particularly to hard source rule.’64 Although the 
U.S. was ultimately criticised by the Polish authorities for RFE’s coverage of the strikes, 
Washington was keen not to be accused of interfering in the internal affairs of a state with 
which it enjoyed good relations.
65
 While there was a clear chance that ‘political upheaval’ 
could emerge in the future, for the time being monitoring events was sufficient.
66
  
In Europe both friends and partners continued relations with Poland as usual. In 
early July, for example, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ) visited Paris to 
discuss Giscard d’Estaing’s planned visit to Poland in September 1980.67 A visit to Poland 
by the Czechoslovak Minister for National Defence also took place as planned from 7 July 
1980.
68
 Indeed there appears to have been little concern amongst Poland’s allies at this 
stage. According to Bulgarian Communist Party documents quoted by Jordan Baev, for 
example, Polish dissidents were dismissed as ‘an insignificant group of people isolated from 
society’ prior to the Bulgarian Prime Minister Stanko Todorov’s visit to Poland later that 
month. It was also claimed that in Poland ‘[t]he people are in a state of sound moral and 
political unity … Poland is a strong socialist unit….’69  
More promising still were renewed high-level contacts between West Germany and 
the Soviet Union following the meeting of Helmut Schmidt and Leonid Brezhnev in 
Moscow. This was welcomed by the Polish authorities as a positive step in securing détente 
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and aiding the improvement of the general climate of international affairs.
70
 Whilst 
discussions had mostly concerned issues such as Afghanistan and arms control, Schmidt’s 
visit also marked the beginning of negotiations for West German participation in what 
‘would be the largest East-West trade agreement in history’: the construction of a Soviet gas 
pipeline running from Western Siberia to Western Europe. Of great importance for Moscow, 
negotiations continued in Bonn during July. A number of other Western states and 
companies were also involved in the project.
71
 While East-West relations post-Afghanistan 
were undeniably under strain therefore, no further destabilisation took place. This was to the 
benefit of all Poles. As Adam Bromke reported on the eve of the strikes, ‘the deteriorating 
climate in East-West relations’ was of great concern in Poland: 
They suffered so much during World War II that they abhor the very 
thought of another conflict in Europe. They are also painfully aware that 
the breakdown of détente may lead to a closing of ranks in the Soviet bloc 
and the isolation of Poland from the West. All this at a time when the 
domestic Polish scene is already fraught with considerable danger.
72
 
 
A further deterioration in East-West relations would have done nothing to help Poland. Any 
steps towards improving or stabilising the situation were to be welcomed. 
Western Governments/Western Banks 
While worker unrest and international instability would do nothing to improve Poland’s 
economic situation, even without taking such factors into consideration Poland’s financial 
outlook was bleak.
73
 It was not expected to improve any time soon. This was a matter of 
some importance not only for domestic, but also for international reasons. A report under 
preparation by Britain’s Joint Intelligence Committee, for example, explored the issue of 
Polish debt rescheduling as well as its economic consequences for the UK. If Poland chose 
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to request Western assistance and a ‘moratorium’ were called on Poland’s officially 
guaranteed debt, it was estimated that Britain would experience losses ‘of up to £150 - £200 
million a year’. It was anticipated, however, that Poland would attempt ‘to muddle through’ 
rather than seek such an agreement with the West or ask Moscow to ‘bail her out’.74 Britain 
was not alone in facing such risks at a time of severe domestic economic constraint. France, 
West Germany, the United States, Austria and Italy were also at risk. An agreement had 
already been reached on the fringes of the G-7 in June to adopt a multilateral response to 
any Polish approaches for new government guaranteed credits unless they were ‘tied to 
specific projects’.75 Poland was facing tough times. In spite of the strikes, it was Poland’s 
economic crisis and the absence of a plan to emerge from it that was being highlighted by 
France.
76
 
 It was with her other Western partners that Poland was most closely involved, 
however. The Austrian, West German and Anglo-American deals all required completion. 
None of them appear to have been nearing this point in spite of earlier hopes and 
expectations, however. Although the signing of the Austrian loan was recorded in RFE 
reports and discussed at Politburo on 1 July, the Austrian banks had not transferred funds to 
Bank Handlowy by the anticipated 4 July completion date.
77
 Reports on the West German 
loan were also unpromising. The deal remained subject to intense negotiation between the 
West German government and bankers. The Poles were due in Bonn and Frankfurt during 
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the week beginning 7 July for further negotiations.
78
 Polish dealings with the Anglo-
American banking consortium were also proving difficult. Although the Polish authorities 
had presented the banks with improved balance of payments forecasts for 1980 and 1981 at 
the London meeting on 3 July, there was still no agreement on the loan. As a result, the 
Poles had agreed to ‘reconsider their position’. A telex was sent to over fifty banks to 
arrange a follow-up session that would take place in London on 10 July. It was anticipated 
that the Polish side would ‘press the banks to commit themselves’ during the meeting and 
‘that, given some hard selling, they might achieve a package of up to […] $300 million’.79 
While an agreement was likely in the near future, Poland’s short-term economic future was 
far from assured. Mid-July was likely to be a crucial moment in Poland’s economic relations 
with the West. As the Bank of England observed, ‘much will clearly depend on the outcome 
of this week’s meeting of bankers in London.’80  
While continued strikes were only likely to complicate the negotiations further, the 
Party was unlikely to rescind the price increases responsible for the unrest due to the 
importance of the reforms for the banks. As a CIA report concluded: 
The uncertain situation may delay final action on a major balance-of-
payments loan to Poland, discussed by Western bankers […]. If Warsaw 
keeps the situation under control, however, the bankers may be 
encouraged to proceed, especially since the introduction of price increases 
is a sign that Warsaw has begun to carry out at least one aspect of a 
stabilization program.
81
 
 
Given the close interaction between the economic reforms, the loan agreements and the 
worker unrest, it no doubt came as a relief that by the end of the first working week in July 
the strikes had died down. This did not mean that they were over, however. As one Western 
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journalist noted, the Friday in question preceded the one Saturday a month when industrial 
enterprises shut down. It was therefore ‘something of a holiday for many employees’ as they 
would call in sick or not work a full day so as to enjoy a longer break over the weekend.
82
 
There was still the possibility that strikes would return at the start of the following week, a 
likelihood increased by the fact that the authorities had not yet fully implemented all of the 
price increases. According to CIA reports, although they had not been forced to reverse the 
rises, they had delayed them in 25 per cent of the regions.
83
 Enterprises could still emerge 
on strike once they were introduced.  
Lublin Rising 
On 8 July a new strike broke out at the WSK aircraft factory in Świdnik, near 
Lublin. It marked the beginning of the first major strike wave that summer, which would 
culminate in the total paralysis of the south-eastern city of Lublin. Although the Świdnik 
strike can be seen as something of a watershed in retrospect, the cause of the strike was no 
different to the earliest strikes that July: the introduction of higher meat prices. Finding that 
prices at the enterprise canteen had increased without a compensatory rise in wages, workers 
downed tools. By 12.30 the entire factory had halted work.
84
 By 14.00 Warsaw had been 
informed.
85
 As the strike escalated, so did the workers’ demands. Whilst in initial talks with 
heads of production and the Party aktyw workers demanded only a meeting with 
management and the abolition of the increases, by the end of the day they had presented 35 
demands.
86
 Among them was a demand that proved increasingly popular elsewhere: for 
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workers to receive family allowances at the same level as those received by the police.
87
 
Despite talks that included not only workers’ representatives and management, but also 
senior members of the regional Party committee, the Świdnik strike continued the following 
day.
88
 It was not the only enterprise on strike in the region. MSW reports list strikes at a 
number of enterprises on 9 July, including at the “Agromet” agricultural machinery factory 
in Lublin where a three hour stoppage took place.
89
 While the “Agromet” strike was short-
lived, the WSK strike remained unresolved. Even the appearance of Aleksander Kopec, 
Minister for the Engineering Industry, was not enough to bring it to an end. The workers 
refused to listen to him calling for Gierek instead.
90
  
Gierek was in Warsaw addressing the Party’s economic leadership on Poland’s 
performance in the first half of the year, however. He presented a positive view of Poland’s 
economic progress. Meat sales were not discussed. Strikes also went unmentioned. He 
confirmed that there would be no change in economic policy, but promised improvements 
with regard to a number of welfare related issues the following year. These included 
increases in family allowances and pensions, along with greater help for single mothers. He 
also hinted that wages for those on the lowest salaries would improve.
91
 Gierek’s hopes of 
being able to buy off Polish workers proved misplaced, however. The Party’s policies and 
promises meant little to workers. Even economists and Party members were critical.
92
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There was also only limited support from Poland’s partners. At their meeting with 
bankers in London on 10 July the Poles were shocked to gain promises totalling only $150 - 
$160 million. This was insufficient to guarantee the participation of a number of banks who 
had agreed to become involved if Poland could raise $300 million and further efforts were 
undertaken to persuade British banks to play a greater role as a result. Prospects for the 
West German loan had improved, however. The major West German banks were reportedly 
pushing for completion of the loan with a view to signing ‘on 17 July’.93 On 11 July 
meanwhile Zbigniew Brzezinski reportedly assured Rakowski that Gierek and Babiuch 
could rely on the continued ‘help’ of the U.S.94 Such support was vital for the Poles. Due to 
another bad harvest they required further agricultural credits of $60 million (1980) and $670 
million (1981).
95
 
Tension Mounts 
On 10 July a dramatic escalation in the number of strikes across Poland began to take place, 
particularly in Lublin. While the strike at WSK Świdnik continued, a number of new strikes 
broke out in the city itself. “Agromet” was amongst those halting work again, this time on a 
much larger scale.
96
 The MSW upgraded its description of the strikes from ‘Interruptions in 
Work and Expressions of Disquiet’ to the more serious ‘Social Unrest and Conflicts in the 
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Workplaces’.97 Strikes spread throughout the region. On 11 July, for example, 1000 workers 
on the first shift at the FSC lorry factory refused to work. They were joined by 600 workers 
on the second shift. The workers called not just for pay increases and an end to commercial 
shops, but for better social conditions and an improvement in the supply of meat.
98
 The 
strike at WSK Świdnik ended, however. A nine point written agreement was signed between 
striking workers and the Polish authorities (reportedly the first such agreement that 
summer). The Minister for Internal Affairs warned of the detrimental impact of the 
agreement on other enterprises as news of it spread, however.
99
 The situation was far from 
under control. 
On 11 July an emergency meeting of the Politburo took place. Despite the severity 
of the problems, Politburo members failed to come up with any solutions. Gierek argued 
that there was a need to ‘take all measures to quickly restore the normal rhythm of work’ in 
striking enterprises, but noted that given Poland’s economic problems it was proving 
difficult to meet the increasing number of demands being made. He also repeated the points 
from his earlier television address and outlined the need for higher prices, placing 
responsibility for explaining them onto enterprise management teams.
100
 All over the 
country however, Polish workers were not responding to such efforts. Indeed, management 
teams were being forced into increasingly desperate measures to break the strikes. For 
example, that weekend management at one Lublin enterprise carried out activities on the 
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shop floor overnight in an attempt to fool the first shift on Monday into believing that 
workers had gone to work as usual on the final shift on Saturday.
101
 
The rest of the Politburo were little better than Gierek. They provided support for the 
policy of price increases and recognised the need to curtail the stoppages, but few 
suggestions as to how to halt them. Prime Minister Edward Babiuch suggested using the 
Party aktyw to defend the new policy, while Stanisław Kania (responsible for national 
security) stressed that time was of the essence. He provided no specific solutions.
102
 
Unwilling to take direct responsibility for the problems facing Poland, the Politburo 
continued to pass the buck to enterprise management. Managers of larger enterprises were 
flown to Warsaw and told ‘to buy “social peace”’ – preferably at limited cost.103 Such costs 
were not limited to wage increases, however. In some cases refrigerators of meat were taken 
to striking enterprises in an effort to buy off the workers. Although dubbed by Daniel Singer 
‘the strangest of strategic reserves’, it provides another example of the use of Soviet 
methods. Indeed Moscow had made use of this method to quell large scale industrial unrest 
as recently as May.
104
 Such methods proved insufficient, however. Although KOR reported 
the successful conclusion of thirty-three different strikes with an average wage improvement 
of 10 per cent, there were more than twenty enterprises on strike in Lublin alone.
105
 
On 11 July KOR issued its second public statement that summer.
106
 As well as 
repeating the key points from their earlier appeal, KOR also examined the problem of 
economic inefficiency within the Polish system. They outlined a number of steps needed to 
save Poland from disaster. Unlike the Party’s public statements, KOR’s drew attention to 
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the fact that the country’s problems did not lie solely in the economy, but also in agriculture 
and the lack of accurate information available to society. KOR also adopted a fairer and 
more egalitarian approach to food shortages than the authorities did. While the price 
increases introduced by the authorities through the transfer of meat to commercial shops 
meant that certain cuts of meat would be accessible only to higher earners, KOR’s proposal 
for ‘general rationing’ meant that all would have equal access to meat. The burden would be 
shared equally (an outcome far more in keeping with socialist ideals of equality than those 
achieved through the Party’s reforms).  
It was arguably the need for dialogue between society and the state, emphasised in 
the statement’s final point that was most important. Once again KOR stressed the need for 
the non-violent resolution of the worker-state confrontation. They wanted no repeat of 
recent history. They made clear that not only was the onus on the Party not to use violence, 
but also to respect the ‘fundamental human rights’ to which they had committed themselves 
in international agreements. Respect for such rights was vital and would ‘favour an 
agreement concerning the most urgent economic, political and social reforms.’107 This 
appeal to the Party’s legal commitments was typical of the approach pioneered by KOR 
during the late 1970s. So too was KOR’s declaration that above all self-organisation, 
including the creation of ‘independent trade unions’, was essential for the well-being of 
Polish society.
108
 In keeping with the opposition’s political thinking during the 1970s, it 
exploited the notion that under a system which sought total control, autonomous social 
action was in itself a form of political action. The self-organisation of workers was one such 
example of this. Lublin remained at its heart. The FSC lorry factory had taken the place of 
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WSK Świdnik as the main enterprise on strike. By 12 July the entire workforce was refusing 
to work.
109
  
The Reality of Life 
In spite of the problems sweeping Poland, the authorities were doing their best to hide them. 
No official admission that strikes were taking place was made, though officials admitted to 
foreign journalists that “discussions” were taking place in some factories.110 The full extent 
of Poland’s problems even appears to have been hidden from their allies. Following his visit 
to Poland on 14-15 July, for example, Stanko Todorov praised Warsaw’s response to ‘their 
current economic problems’. They were ‘approaching the complicated problems with a 
sense of realism and [were] taking active steps to overcome them, taking into consideration 
the working people’s feelings.’111 It was a statement at odds with the reality of Polish life. In 
addition to the strikes, problems were becoming ever more evident in the form of out-of-the-
ordinary food shortages. Not only meat products, but also fruit and dairy products such as 
milk, cheese and butter were in short supply. Even in Warsaw, where shops were generally 
well-stocked, supplies were poor. Regular shops selling meat often had none to sell. On 
some days nor did the commercial shops. It was a similar story throughout Poland. There 
was also ‘a perplexing shortage’ of apples and other fruits. Although thought to be 
temporary, the U.S. believed that the severity of these shortages had contributed to labour 
unrest. It was an additional problem for Gierek and his team to resolve.
112
  
The urgency with which they needed to resolve such problems soon increased. The 
combination of meat price increases and food shortages was beginning to bite, increasing 
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the risk of broader social unrest. A manager of a commercial shop in Warsaw, for example, 
noted that institutions such as pre-schools and hospitals were no longer able to provide ‘an 
adequate diet’ because of the increases.113 Administrative officials at the University of 
Warsaw were so concerned by the poor quality of food in the university’s dining rooms that 
they asked the U.S. Embassy if they could provide ‘special food allocations’ for American 
students and professors on exchange. They feared they would leave and the exchange 
programme put at risk if the situation were not resolved.
114
 The regime was struggling to 
fulfil the basic needs of an increasing number of citizens. The British predicted that ‘real 
headaches’ were in store for them if no improvement in meat supplies was achieved.115 
Poland faced significant difficulties. Continued economic support was needed. The only 
promising sign was that on the basis of improved figures for the first six months of 1980 the 
Anglo-American loan deal was now to be pursued ‘on “a best-efforts basis”’ with Poland 
expected to secure in excess of $200 million.
116
 Poland’s other problems continued to 
mount, however. By 16 July more than 8000 workers in 27 enterprises were on strike in 
Lublin and the surrounding area alone.
117
  
The Railway Workers’ Strike 
That morning a strike broke out amongst railway workers in a number of departments at 
Lublin’s state railways (PKP). By the following day the strike encompassed the entire 
railway hub. Once again the strike took the form of an unusual style of stay-in or occupation 
strike. The majority of workers remained on the premises for their shift before being 
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replaced by the next one, which would then emerge on strike. Only the strike committee 
along with about fifty percent of those on strike remained at the hub for the duration.
118
 
Although this meant fewer workers occupying the railway hub at any one time than in a 
fully-fledged occupation strike, it ultimately made no difference to the strength or 
effectiveness of the strike. This is because the nature of the enterprise targeted by the strike, 
as well as the skills of those working there, were more significant than the numbers of those 
withdrawing their labour (a fact suggested by the Party’s response).  
The PKP’s strike committee formulated a total of 14 demands, which the MSW 
recorded as relating to wages and ‘social conditions’. A number of their demands were more 
significant, however. Alongside calls for a pay rise of 1300 złotys, the introduction of work 
free Saturdays, and parity of family allowances with those obtained by the police and the 
army, the railway workers also made one political demand: the ability to elect new 
representatives to the official trade unions.
119
 Though not a call for the independent trade 
unions desired by KOR, it was a significant demand. Not only was it a demand made in 
Szczecin a decade earlier, but it openly reflected the workers’ unhappiness with the official 
trade unions. They had been conspicuous by their absence that summer. They had not 
defended the workers at all. 
It was not the political nature of this demand that drew the Party’s attention to the 
railway strike however, but one of the workers’ actions: the decision to block the railway 
line at Lublin with 70 locomotives.
120
 With Lublin located only 50 miles from the Soviet 
border it was a significant act of nonviolence affecting not only domestic passengers, but 
also the Soviet Union and East Germany. This was a point not lost on Gierek. As he later 
                                                          
118
 M. Choma, ‘Strajk lubelskich kolejarzy w lipcu 1980 r.’, Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej, 12 (23), 
grudzień 2002, pp.21-27 (p.23). 
119
 See: Ibid., p.23; M. Dąbrowski, Lubelski Lipiec 1980 (Lublin, 2000), pp.120-121; Dubiński , p.101.  
120
 See: Dąbrowski, p.123; Dubiński , p.101. 
39 
 
acknowledged, it was a route of great significance for Moscow as it was a vital supply line 
to Soviet troops stationed in East Germany. Soviet goods were also exported to East 
Germany along this route.
121
 It was an act not only of domestic, but also international 
consequence. As such it was likely to aggravate Poland’s relations with her allies, 
generating pressure on the Polish leadership to act. Quite simply, ‘the stoppage looked like 
thumbing their noses at the mighty neighbour.’122  
There was no immediate response from the Polish leadership, however. Although 
MSW reports recorded “breaks in work” at some 40 enterprises in the region on 17 July, 
including on Lublin’s railways, Gierek made no mention of the strikes during his speech at a 
youth rally in nearby Chełm that day.123 The official press too had yet to comment: a sign 
that the Party still wished to prevent contagion. The focus of the media was on generating 
public acceptance of the Party’s economic reforms instead.124 Nonetheless news of the 
strikes continued to spread. On the one hand this was simply due to the difficulty of keeping 
news of a railway strike hidden from passengers. Travelling from Warsaw to Lublin, for 
example, passengers were alerted to the fact that something was wrong when they had to 
take a replacement bus service for the rest of their journey from a village close to Lublin. 
One passenger recalled hearing of the strike when he boarded the bus.
125
 On the other hand, 
it was due to the continued role of KOR in collecting information which was then broadcast 
back to Poland via Western media such as RFE.
126
  
As with other regional strikes, KOR established a team to collect information in 
Lublin. Led by Wojciech Onyszkiewicz and assisted by a team of activists involved locally 
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with KPN, it played an important role in Lublin.
127
 Unlike elsewhere however, information 
gathering in the Lublin region proved far more difficult for KOR. The group lacked a 
significant foothold in the region.
128
 With pre-existing links largely absent, simply making 
contact with workers in Lublin and gaining their trust was a major task. Although contacts 
were finally made, it was far from straightforward. A significant barrier of fear had to be 
overcome in approaching workers afraid of provocations. Even at the Lublin PKP, where 
two strike leaders had limited prior contact with the opposition and underground press, 
making such contacts was far from easy.
129
 It was not only KOR that experienced such 
difficulties, however. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw dispatched a team of three officials to 
Lublin to gather information, but they returned without success. Western embassies 
remained dependent on the Western press for much of their information. The Western press 
in turn remained dependent on KOR.
130
 KOR did not publicise all of the information it 
collected, however. A later incident concerning the desecration of a Soviet monument in 
Chełm was apparently not reported for fear of being seen as an ‘anti-Soviet provocation’.131 
KOR was well aware of the geopolitical realities and limits within which they had to 
operate.  
Scabs 
On 18 July a dramatic escalation of the strikes in Lublin occurred. Municipal transport 
workers along with those of the Polish long-distance bus service went on strike. They were 
not alone. The MSW estimated that an additional 41 workplaces were striking in Lublin and 
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the surrounding area. Approximately 18,000 workers were on strike.
132
 Though not 
coordinated, the sheer number of workers and enterprises on strike meant that Lublin now 
presented a more significant challenge than before. In effect, there was a general strike in 
the city. Nonviolent resistance had reached new heights. The Party did not allow the 
escalation to go unchallenged. Blacklegs were employed in an attempt to break the strike at 
the Lublin PKP. Railway workers from elsewhere were sent in to replace not only the 
workers, but also the skills and knowledge they had withdrawn as a result of the strike. It 
was not simply a matter of the authorities sending “bodies” in to end the strike. They needed 
to replace the striking workers with people who could actually do the job. Unskilled 
replacements would not be sufficient to restore order to the line. The attempt to break the 
strike proved unsuccessful, however. Following an appeal from the strike committee, the 
blacklegs refused to take up work.
133
  
The strike committee’s success in persuading blacklegs not to break the strike should 
not be interpreted as a sign of solidarity amongst workers, however. There was evident 
tension between the Lublin railway workers and those elsewhere. Calls for other railway 
workers to support them were turned down. Railway workers had never been on strike 
before and those from Chełm reportedly declared, ‘we are like doctors – we cannot go on 
strike.’134 The comparison inherent in this statement between the importance of public 
transport and the importance of healthcare is an important one. Another contentious strike 
was that of workers at a hospital clinic. Kitchen staff went on strike and nurses went to buy 
food with their own money before preparing it for their patients.
135
 Strike actions that 
hindered medical care or the manufacture of medication at a time of acute shortages were 
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criticised in the official press.
136
 Even Kuroń noted that the hospital strike struggled for 
social approval.
137
 Some structures of power were too important to society as a whole to be 
targeted. Doing so not only caused unnecessary suffering for the most vulnerable members 
of society, but also acted as a provocation. Keeping health services running was essential, 
therefore. The railways were more contentious. In spite of the arguments of their colleagues 
elsewhere in the region, railway workers at Lublin continued their action. They denounced 
their colleagues from Chełm as ‘scabs’.138 Solidarity, whilst evident between groups of 
workers and the opposition, was still far from assured amongst workers themselves. 
A significant shift in the Party’s response was also detectable in the official press. In 
his diary entry for 13 July Stanisław Jadczak, a local journalist, noted that the language in 
the official press remained ‘the language of camouflage’.139 On 18 July a change took place. 
An appeal co-authored by two Central Committee members from Warsaw ended the Party’s 
silence on the strikes. For the first time the local Party leadership rather than management 
publicly addressed the situation. A breakthrough had taken place. Though only published 
locally in an effort to contain news of the strikes, the appeal provided the first direct 
acknowledgement that widespread ‘breaks in work’ were causing difficulties in the day-to-
day lives of Lublin’s inhabitants. This was a fact already evident to Lublin’s residents for 
well-over a week, but which had only begun to be acknowledged in the local press the day 
before.
140
  
The appeal called ‘for peaceful and prudent conduct’ in Lublin. Disruptions to 
deliveries of ‘milk for children, bread for people, supplies for hospitals’ were highlighted, as 
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were those in transport which caused problems for children and workers travelling to 
summer camps and holidays. While accepting the ‘justified’ and ‘urgent’ nature of the 
workers’ demands and suggesting that they were open to dialogue, there was little to suggest 
that such prospects were genuine. The Party remained as distant as ever and there was an 
absence of any sense that the Party was responsible for the problems facing Lublin’s 
citizens. Responsibility for resolving the problems seemed to lie with the city’s residents 
alone. The authorities appealed to their ‘hearts and minds’ to undertake all possible efforts 
to restore daily life in Lublin to its usual rhythm. They also called upon the area’s renowned 
‘patriotism, dedication and devotion’ qualities which had been demonstrated time and again 
during the most troublesome moments of Poland’s recent history.141 Not only were such 
qualities needed once again, but with the annual celebration to mark the formation of the 
Committee of National Liberation in Poland at Lublin on 22 July 1944 forthcoming, it is 
possible that there was an added need for Lublin to rediscover her earlier, more virtuous 
qualities.  
 The Party did not limit its response to efforts at strike-breaking and appeals. Steps 
were also taken to ease problems with food supplies caused by Poland’s wider problems and 
strikes at Lublin’s bakery and dairy. The police and army were sent in to deliver bread, 
butter and milk from elsewhere. By the afternoon many shops still lacked staple items. 
Others had resorted to rationing butter. Hot water shortages were also evident due to strike 
action at the city’s power station.142 Though Poland’s problems were already severe as a 
result of the Party’s long-term mismanagement, it had to take action to prevent the social 
situation, and with it the strikes, from worsening. The use of the army to deliver food under 
such circumstances raises an interesting point in this regard. Though as 1970 (but not 1976) 
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demonstrated, the Polish army could be used as part of a crackdown during periods of social 
unrest, events in Lublin demonstrated that they could also serve a humanitarian purpose. 
Unlike the Party, the army was well respected.
143
 
‘Friends’ and ‘Partners’ 
The international dimension of the railway blockade continued to trouble the Politburo. 
They feared it might trigger pressure from Moscow. Gierek denounced the blockade as ‘a 
strategic strike’. If it continued, the Politburo ‘should expect some questions from the Soviet 
comrades.’144 Gierek’s comments regarding the ‘strategic’ nature of the strike raise the issue 
of whether it was the scale of the strikes, as well as the concentration of these strikes in one 
particular region, or the structure of power targeted by the railway blockade that contributed 
most to the effectiveness of non-violence in Lublin. While the importance of the widespread 
nature of the strikes should not be underestimated, it seems that the structure of power 
targeted by non-violence was of particular significance. As Gierek’s comments indicate, it 
was the international importance of this particular structure that elevated the strike above 
others in Poland that summer. By chance rather than strategy, the railway workers had hit 
upon one of the authorities’ weak spots. The other strikes made it both more difficult and 
more pressing to resolve.  
It was clear that calls to mobilise the Party aktyw were inadequate. As Jerzy 
Łukaszewicz noted at Politburo, ‘The party does not exist in the institutes which went on 
strike.’ Despite his later denunciation of the railway strike, Gierek did not appear to have a 
solution in mind, however. Having made his usual call to ‘increase economic efficiency’ 
and warned of the dangers of acquiescing to ‘excessive demands’, Gierek discussed the 
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possibility of placing the railways under military control. He considered the use of the 
military problematic, however. Enforcing such a ‘militarization’ would not only be difficult, 
but would also ‘have very serious implications.’ He proposed an appeal to the people of 
Lublin instead. Alongside a proposal for the formation of a commission headed by Deputy 
Prime Minister Mieczysław Jagielski to negotiate with workers in Lublin, which at 
Stanisław Kania’s suggestion was to be ‘a government one’, it was this suggestion that was 
ultimately adopted.
145
 The leadership continued to distance itself from the strikes and sought 
only peaceful means to resolve them. It was not entirely clear why. 
One possible reason lies in the statement published by the Politburo in Lublin’s 
official press. Along with the announcement of the Jagielski commission, the statement 
ended with the reiteration of the Politburo’s standard line: the need for a return to normal 
working practices and the promise of future improvements in welfare. The opening 
paragraph of the statement was of greater significance, however: 
The Politburo expressed deep dissatisfaction at stoppages in production 
and municipal enterprises as well as in Lublin’s railway hub, and also the 
general situation in the city. This situation undermines the good name of 
our country, disturbs the confidence in Poland of her partners and may 
arouse the anxiety of her friends. The atmosphere of tension is convenient 
for hostile Poles, it creates a dangerous political provocation.
146
  
While the release of the statement in Lublin demonstrated the Party’s continued desire to 
restrict information concerning strikes in an effort to prevent contagion, the statement also 
revealed much about the Politburo’s concerns at this time. In domestic terms it singled out 
both the railway workers and the ‘hostile Poles’ in KOR as the most troublesome elements 
to be tackled. In international terms it referenced problems both East and West. During the 
meeting of the Politburo the Minister of Defence Wojciech Jaruzelski announced the need to 
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inform the workers ‘what kinds of threats to the nation are created by stoppages.’147 The 
declaration that the situation ‘may arouse the anxiety of her friends’ seems to follow on 
from this. It drew the attention of Western governments at the time and of historians since 
being seen as a thinly veiled threat of possible Soviet intervention in Poland or, as Andrzej 
Friszke recently argued, as a reminder that Polish affairs were not solely their own.
148
 While 
the threat of Soviet intervention at this time was an empty one, the focus of Western 
governments on this threat was more significant. They overlooked the far more important 
reference in the statement to the West’s role in Polish affairs. 
The Need to Look Closer to Home 
On 18 July the Department of State requested further information on the Lublin strikes from 
the embassy in Warsaw.
149
 On 20 July the CIA issued an Alert Memorandum to the 
President.
150
 Warsaw was struggling to control worker unrest in Lublin. Previous 
settlements were ‘coming unglued’. The CIA was ‘increasingly concerned that the strikes 
could degenerate into a violent confrontation with the regime.’ They warned that: 
Festering labor unrest could degenerate rapidly into violence […] and the 
regime could be obliged to introduce force. If the Polish leadership proved 
incapable of restoring order in a situation that had deteriorated into violent 
confrontation, we believe the Soviets would, as a last resort, intervene.
151
  
 
Despite the fear of violence evident in the memorandum, the use of repressive measures by 
both the Polish leadership and the Soviet Union was deemed unlikely. Although repressive 
measures were an option, the ‘conciliatory approach’ appeared to enjoy the support of the 
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Party. There were no signs of preparations for a crackdown. It was anticipated that Gierek 
would be ‘extremely cautious and […] seek to avoid the use of force.’ He was well aware 
that its use in December 1970 had led to the downfall of his predecessor.
152
 
 Soviet intervention was also deemed unlikely. There was a belief that Moscow 
would not do so while the Olympic Games were underway and while détente with Western 
Europe was a priority. They would leave things to Gierek.
153
 With the exception of 
Afghanistan as a restraining factor, the Alert Memorandum expressed views similar to those 
found in an earlier memorandum for Brzezinski: ‘the Soviets’ hands are tied to a great 
extent, and in the face of any unrest in Poland, they will try to avoid military action if at all 
possible (at least until after the Olympics).’154 There were no signs of a Soviet military 
build-up in Poland or in the borderlands. The media was also silent.
155
 Pravda’s coverage of 
Poland concerned only the economy.
156
 There was no cause for alarm. A later conversation 
between Schaufele and Jerzy Dąbrowski, an executive secretary to Cardinal Wyszyński, 
indicated that the Church held similar views. By issuing their statement at a time when 
Polish workers were maintaining their ‘calm and self-disciplined manner’ the authorities 
were simply highlighting their own anxiety. Moscow would only intervene as ‘a last 
resort’.157 Unless the workers resorted to violence, even a domestic crackdown was unlikely.  
Given universal agreement that the Soviet Union would not intervene, the 
Politburo’s claim that the strikes damaged both Poland’s ‘good name’ and ‘the confidence 
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in Poland of her partners’ is more significant. Although overlooked in both contemporary 
and historical analysis, it indicates concern that the strikes were damaging Warsaw’s efforts 
to secure loans from her Western partners. Given Poland’s economic plight and that none of 
the loan agreements had been completed, such concerns may have been justified. The use of 
the word ‘may’ before the threat of Soviet intervention, but not before the statement 
regarding the damage being done to Poland in the eyes of ‘her partners’ certainly seems to 
suggest a sense of certainty that Poland’s loan prospects were being hindered by the strikes. 
The West does not appear to have detected this reference to the role of commercial banks in 
the Party’s statement, however. This suggests not only a lack of awareness of the West’s 
influence over events, but also raises the question of whether the actions of Western banks 
would support or undermine the foreign policies of Western governments towards Poland.  
Lublin Falling  
By the time talks between workers and Jagielski took place on 19 July, the security services 
had taken their first action against the opposition. On 18 July students from the Catholic 
University of Lublin (KUL), the only independent Catholic university in the Soviet bloc, 
were detained as a result of their role in gathering information on the strikes.
158
 While this 
was the first major action against those co-operating with the Warsaw opposition that 
summer, KOR remained untouched. The SB had already begun contemplating an escalation 
of their activities against KOR, however. According to Andrzej Friszke, the Polish security 
services had begun to work on a plan to investigate the activities of the opposition some ten 
days earlier. It would not be implemented that month, however.
159
 In Lublin meanwhile, 
Wojciech Onyszkiewicz and Jerzy Zieleński (a KOR associate) managed to evade arrest. 
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They defied a number of attempts to detain them due to assistance from locals.
160
 The 
harassment of local opposition members with threatening telephone calls continued, 
however.
161
 Minor symbolic displays of support for the strikes in other regions, such as the 
flying of a flag in Polish colours marked “Lublin”, were also targeted.162 
No action was taken against the workers, however. The security services engaged 
primarily in the collection of information and attempts to end the strikes through talks with 
workers. The size of the strikes had caught them off guard. There was a risk that the use of 
repressive means against the strikes would backfire.
163
 Such fears appear justified. 
According to MSW reports, some 42 workplaces and approximately 20,000 workers were 
on strike in the region on 19 July.
164
 Faced with such widespread opposition, there was a 
clear risk that repressive actions against workers could work against the Party. Given the 
Party’s belief that the ‘confidence’ of Poland’s ‘partners’ had already been affected, they 
may also have believed that a crackdown would cause further problems with the West. They 
relied on talks instead.  
By 6pm on 19 July the Jagielski Commission had negotiated an end to the Lublin 
railway workers’ strike. Although not all demands were met, an agreement was signed 
demonstrating significant gains by the workers. Amongst the more notable concessions 
made were an agreement for a printed apology from Sztandar Ludu for comments it had 
made about the strike and the right for workers to put forward their own candidates for 
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official trade union elections.
165
 The significance of the latter point has been questioned by 
some as striking workers at Szczecin a decade earlier had gained the same agreement only 
to see the Party restore their control by removing the newly elected members.
166
 While only 
time would tell whether the Lublin agreement suffered the same fate, for the workers it was 
seen as ‘a step on the road to independent trade unions’.167 Perhaps more importantly, as one 
strike leader noted, ‘finally we had the courage […] to do something.’168 They had broken 
through the apathy that afflicted much of Poland’s workforce and begun to organise. The 
Lublin strike ‘created an essential breakthrough in the life of the country. Workers, young 
students, intellectuals stood next to one another.’169 Peasant self-defence groups had also 
come out in support of the workers.
170
 Solidarity was already in evidence.  
Aftermath 
By 24 July Lublin’s strike wave was over. There were no signs that peace had been restored 
to Poland, however. Though not as severe, strikes continued elsewhere. A report by a 
Western businessman who visited Stalowa Wola’s construction machinery factory shows 
quite how tense the situation remained. With strikes reported in some parts of the building 
and workers engaged in low level acts of non-violence, such as ‘humming patriotic songs’, 
the authorities appeared worried. A large police and troop presence was reported. 
Businessmen from the U.S., Great Britain and New Zealand were ‘subject to militia 
surveillance’ while the ‘nervous and embarrassed’ management tried to hide the strikes from 
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their guests.
171
 Once again it seems as though the strategic significance of the enterprise was 
at the heart of the authorities’ concern. The West had a significant stake in the enterprise. 
Along with the importance of the ‘tanks, munitions and weapons’ reportedly manufactured 
elsewhere on the site, the factory’s manufacture of goods such as bulldozers and machinery 
for the laying of gas and oil pipelines was ‘regarded as one of Poland’s outstanding 
industrial cooperation projects with a Western country.’172 This, along with the proximity of 
the strike to the Polish-Soviet border, lent the strike both a domestic and an international 
edge. Again the enterprise’s Western economic links were of concern. The U.S. was later 
informed that exports to them would be damaged by the strike.
173
 Damage was also 
reputational. It was difficult to persuade the West that Poland was a reliable partner when 
workers were continually striking. It was already proving difficult enough to do so for 
economic reasons. Poland had overdue payments of £1.2 million to British exporters 
alone.
174
  
There was some reason for optimism, however. On 24 July Edward Babiuch 
announced that Poland had received payment of $150 million from the Austrians during 18 
– 22 July.175 Although late, the payment was significant. As early as May it had been 
claimed that unless Poland received the money in June, they were done for.
176
 The loan was 
only temporary, however. A favourable decision from the Austrian parliament was still 
required to secure it more permanently. Negotiations with the Anglo-American consortium 
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and West German banks remained uncertain. Following a meeting in London (22 July) it 
seemed likely that Bank Handlowy would secure $300 million from the Anglo-American 
consortium by 15 August, but the West German loan appeared to have run into trouble.
177
 
Deutsche Bank was reported to have withdrawn from the consortium ‘pending further talks 
with Bonn.’178 There was a risk it would not be completed before September with knock on 
effects for the Anglo-American loan. A clause in the deal reportedly meant that Poland 
would be unable to receive any money until the German deal had been signed.
179
 In 
combination with their economic problems, further worker unrest was unlikely to help 
Poland’s case. 
With the strike wave reportedly at an end however, Gierek left for a three week 
holiday in the Crimea and met Brezhnev on 31 July. According to Gierek they had ‘a fairly 
unpleasant conversation’ about the strikes during which Brezhnev conveyed his displeasure 
at Lublin’s railway blockade.180 Brezhnev was unimpressed. He later complained: ‘All we 
ever heard was: “Nothing is going on, no opposition exists, the Polish government and Party 
are in control of the situation.”’ The communiqué issued after the meeting indicated 
differences of opinion. While it was normally declared that there had been a ‘complete 
identity of views on all issues’, this time it was replaced with the more restrained ‘complete 
mutual understanding’.181 Despite Brezhnev’s annoyance with Gierek, Moscow remained 
silent. Their only public sign of displeasure took the form of a diplomatic ‘slight’. They 
downgraded ‘the usual Politburo-level attendance’ at a Polish national day reception in 
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Moscow.
182
 Moscow’s concern was with Soviet not Polish workers. On 22 July an article 
was passed for publication, which drew attention to the responsibility of Party officials for 
defending the rights of workers and criticised managers who violated them.
183
  
As July drew to an end, economic problems remained most pressing for Warsaw. 
Although Gierek denied any problems with managing Poland’s debt when challenged by 
Brezhnev,
184
 Poland’s economic circumstances were less stable than Gierek suggested. 
July’s strikes had resulted in significant economic damage through a combination of pay 
increases and lost production. It was estimated that the strikes had cost some $1.7 billion in 
annual wage increases, while the Polish Minister of Foreign Trade had ‘abandoned all hope’ 
of creating a hard-currency trade account surplus.
185
 Reports also made clear the pressure 
Poland was under from banks. One of the banks’ main suggestions for reform since 1979 
had been, ‘A drastic reduction of multi-billion zloty price subsidies and the raising of 
prices’. The authorities had assured bankers they would implement this reform. They 
believed that the “public psychology” would allow for the subtle introduction of such 
increases.
186
 Although their assessment proved inaccurate, by the end of July the Party had 
succeeded where they had previously failed. Faced with popular unrest they had pushed 
through the increases; fulfilling one of the bankers’ main proposals. Given the economic and 
social costs incurred, it is hard not to agree with Schaufele’s description of this ‘victory’ as 
seeming ‘pyrrhic indeed.’ It was unlikely to have improved the likelihood of being granted 
new loans.
187
 Despite the emptiness of their ‘victory’, the Party needed to maintain 
economic progress if they were to persuade their partners of Poland’s reliability. Reforms 
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were only likely to trigger more unrest, however. They would need to appease both partners 
and workers in order to resolve the crisis. They also had friends to consider.  
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CHAPTER THREE: AUGUST 1980 
Although not on the same scale as Lublin, strikes continued throughout early August. A 
total of 45 stoppages in over 20 provinces took place.
188
 There was no change in the tactics 
of either the workers or the state. Alongside wage increases, the media remained the primary 
means by which the Party attempted to control events. Such efforts enjoyed limited success. 
The promotion of official trade unions in Łódź, for example, was a failure. The city became 
a major strike centre in early August.
189
 Despite continued unrest, workers were not subject 
to repression. By contrast opposition activists continued to be harassed and detained by the 
security services. Most notably KOR activist and Robotnik editor Jan Lityński was detained 
along with two other activists in Warsaw. According to MSW reports, they were held in 
order to prevent a meeting with workers from “Ursus” taking place.190 There was a 
continued desire to prevent contact between workers and the opposition. A KOR declaration 
on 8 August 1980 detailed the efforts of the authorities ‘to destroy the people who collect 
and distribute information about the strikes.’191  
The potential for further unrest was considerable. In addition to social problems, the 
Party faced extensive problems in agriculture. With agricultural production and food 
supplies already a problem, continuing bad weather during the summer was a significant 
source of trouble. Over the course of July and early August farmland in over 20 regions had 
been flooded as a result of torrential rain.
192
 The harvest was under threat and as early as 
mid-July some farmers had been forced to sell or slaughter animals due to insufficient feed. 
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It is indicative of Poland’s circumstances that one farmer saw ‘some compensation’ from 
the increased availability of meat caused by ‘distress slaughtering but still complained that 
at the store he can buy nothing.’193 The situation was unlikely to improve. The impact of bad 
weather on Poland’s food supply held not only further social problems in store, but would 
also exacerbate Poland’s economic difficulties. Further austerity or further borrowing would 
be needed.  
Reports from Western embassies painted a desperate picture of Poland, including 
‘fears of future famine’ amongst peasants in the countryside.194 The U.S. Embassy captured 
a similar mood of pessimism in a report of an interview with a worker from Lublin: 
The workers’ mood is gloomy, bordering on desperation because they can 
see no way out of Poland’s economic impasse. They are very much aware 
of the huge foreign debt Poland has amassed during the Seventies and they 
fear the country’s leadership has mortgaged the future. However, the 
benefits which foreign credits have brought to Poland are “invisible” to the 
average worker […] who wonders where all that money was really spent. 
 
Unless there was a radical economic improvement, ‘large-scale unrest’ could emerge again. 
The worker, who had approached the embassy to request that America ‘“use its influence” 
to improve the situation in Poland […] asked apparently facetiously, whether the U.S. would 
be willing to help by supplying arms.’195 It is not clear whether the worker was asking such 
questions on his own initiative or where he obtained his information on Poland’s foreign 
debt and credits.  
Despite this limitation, the telegram provides a clear indication of the U.S. line 
towards events. The embassy noted their continued economic support for Poland and the 
                                                          
193
 DOS FOIA: Telegram from Warsaw to State, ‘Polish Meat Price Rises and Reaction: Sitrep July 14’, 15 July 
1980. Document No. 80WARSAW006998. 
194
 TNA: PRO: FCO 28/4160, f12: Letter from Joy (Warsaw) to Mallaby (EESD, FCO), 1 August 1980. 
195
 DOS FOIA: Telegram from Warsaw to State, ‘Lublin Worker Depicts Dark Mood Among His Fellows’, 1 
August 1980. Document No. 80WARSAW007540. 
57 
 
‘limited’ nature of their ability to shape Poland’s ‘internal policies’.196 There were no 
displays of support for the workers. Given the fragility of international stability and also that 
it was ‘impossible to judge how widespread the sentiments expressed by this young worker 
[were] among the general population’197 it is difficult to see how they could have adopted an 
alternate line. Perhaps more importantly the U.S. appears to have viewed the economy, not 
worker unrest, as Poland’s major problem. The CIA, for example, assessed that Gierek’s 
‘main challenge’ over the coming months would ‘be to convince the people to accept 
austerity as the only realistic course.’ He was likely to turn to the Church and appeals to 
patriotism to aid him.
198
 The French meanwhile were questioning how much longer the 
Party could avoid undertaking a “renewal”.199 For Gierek, neither domestic nor international 
instability were likely to improve things.      
Gdańsk 
Plans for a strike at the Lenin Shipyard began to be developed at the start of August by 
Bogdan Borusewicz.
200
 There was limited support for the strike amongst Free Trade Union 
(WZZ) activists at this time, however. Both Anna Walentynowicz and Lech Wałęsa 
believed the strike to have come about two years too early.
201
 It was unclear whether they 
had sufficient reasons to launch a strike. According to Andrzej Gwiazda, while Kuroń was 
keen for them to join the strike wave, the activists argued that a more important reason than 
price increases was needed.
202
 It was not until 7 August 1980 that the cause of the Lenin 
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Shipyard strike was found: the sacking of Anna Walentynowicz after thirty years of 
employment at the yard. She was only five months from retirement.  
The politically motivated sacking was not entirely unexpected. A co-ordinated effort 
to restrict Walentynowicz’s opposition activities by management and the authorities had 
been ongoing since the autumn of 1978 with the possibility of dismissing her from work 
being raised as early as April 1979.
203
 Arguably providing an example of what the 
Czechoslovak dissident Milan Šimečka referred to as ‘civilized violence’ – ‘People were 
silenced in a dignified manner and not with a punch in the mouth’204 – the case was not 
openly pursued by the SB or management, but via official disciplinary procedures. 
Following efforts to transfer and suspend Walentynowicz, she received a court order for her 
reinstatement that was ignored by management. As Walentynowicz later recalled, ‘I 
persisted, fought them. It wasn’t easy. […] It all had to be legal and well-documented.’205 
Given that all official means of defence such as appeals procedures had been exhausted, 
Walentynowicz had no legal means of recourse left to take. The strike was the last, rather 
than the first line of defence for Walentynowicz. As such the Lenin Shipyard strike should 
be considered in keeping with the teachings of Gandhi and Martin Luther King on non-
violence. The ultimate aim of the strike: negotiations and dialogue conducted in good faith 
also fit the Gandhi-MLK model.
206
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Planning and preparations for the strike took place over a number of days and 
involved organising workers active with the Free Trade Union to launch the strike, as well 
as initial demands, leaflets, and placards. Borusewicz was assisted by three young workers 
at the yard: Jerzy Borowczak, Bogdan Felski, and Ludwig Prądzyński. Though recognising 
the importance of taking action, the fact that Borusewicz was not employed at the yard 
meant there were limits to what he could do. He could plan the strike, but could not lead 
it.
207
 Much responsibility would fall on the three young workers during the initial stages. 
The extent to which they could gain the support of other workers was questionable, 
however. As Jan Skórzyński has argued, they had not had the opportunity to gain the 
confidence of more experienced workers. As such Borusewicz asked Lech Wałęsa to lead 
the strike. Not only was Wałęsa a shipyard worker and veteran of December 1970, he was 
also an individual with whom other workers were more familiar. He was both an esteemed 
figure amongst them and a family man.
208
 It would be easier for him to appeal for the 
support of other workers in the yard.  
In spite of the importance of Wałęsa, he was only informed of his role the day before 
due to the need for secrecy.
209
 Although others were involved in the preparations, only five 
knew the date of the strike: Borusewicz, Borowczak, Felski, Prądzyński and Wałęsa.210 
While in part such caution must have been standard amongst opposition activists, in this 
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case it was also triggered by previous experience of finding an agent in their midst.
211
 
Indeed, a useful illustration of the caution involved in strike preparations can be found in the 
absence of the word ‘strike’ from the leaflet printed in defence of Walentynowicz. Those 
printing the leaflet knew nothing of the intention to strike. The word’s absence from the 
leaflet also served another function: ‘In the event of accidents or if the strike didn’t ignite, it 
could not be said that it wasn’t successful.’212 Up until the moment it launched, the strike 
remained prone to disruption by the security services. There was also no guarantee that the 
strike would take hold let alone succeed. Jerzy Borowczak estimated they had ‘a 50 per cent 
chance of success.’213  
As preparations for the strike neared completion, domestic tension and international 
concern amongst Poland’s friends began to mount. The East German Embassy in Warsaw 
began to send several telegrams a day to East Berlin on events.
214
 Based on a report 
prepared by the East German Minister of State Security Erich Mielke on 12 August 1980, it 
seems that a strike by transport workers in Warsaw may have been the cause of this concern. 
With trams and buses in the capital at a standstill, Warsaw’s ‘security organs’ had been 
placed ‘in a state of increased readiness.’ Mielke warned that the situation could worsen if 
the strike continued and broadened to include transport for delivering supplies.
215
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A KOR spokesman informed the Western media of the first detention of a strike 
leader that summer in relation to a strike by refuse collectors in Warsaw.
216
 Though in 
retrospect this detention can be viewed as something of an anomaly, at the time it threatened 
an apparent break from the practice of detaining only opposition activists. A fight at the 
heart of Warsaw also raised concern. While it was not clear whether the ‘brawl’ was a 
provocation, KOR continued to stress the need for non-violence: ‘the power of this 
movement lies in its solidarity, discipline, peace and rationality. Anyone who provokes 
brawls is acting in the interest of the political police and for repressions against society.’217 
Given Mielke’s observations about the capital’s security services, the detention and the 
‘brawl’ raise the question of how close Poland came to its first crackdown at this time. 
Although events do not appear to have drawn much of a response from the regional Party 
leadership,
218
 either violence or a strike at a key enterprise could have triggered the kind of 
crackdown feared by KOR. While they had no influence over where strikes broke out, 
through their continued and consistent calls for non-violence KOR promoted an alternative 
to the violence of the past.   
For Poland’s closest friends protests whether violent or non-violent remained a 
threat, however. Mielke noted that the situation ‘demands the highest vigilance’ and 
outlined the steps to be taken by the East German security services in response.
219
 Events 
were also beginning to be monitored in Czechoslovakia. Daily reports compiled for the 
leadership detailed not only events in Poland, but ‘their reverberations in 
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Czechoslovakia.’220 While fear of contagion was evident in both East Berlin and Prague, it 
was also present in Moscow. As well as fearing the spillover of problems from Poland, the 
Soviet Union were keen to avoid any further problems in Europe at a troubled time for 
Moscow.
221
 While it is difficult to track the course of Soviet thinking, it is clear that at least 
some in Moscow were concerned. Soviet silence was broken in early August with the 
publication of an often overlooked article penned by Oleg Rakhmanin of the CPSU 
Secretariat’s Department for Liaison with Communist and Worker Parties under the 
pseudonym “O.B. Borisov” in Voprosy Istorii KPSS [Problems of History CPSU]. 
According to Sidney Ploss, the “Borisov” article noted that the historical lessons of 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan demonstrated the significance of being able ‘“to 
mobilize the people for defense of the revolution, relying here on the support of its friends 
and allies in the international arena, on class brothers.”’ Warsaw was being pressed into 
gaining control of the situation in a manner that previous Communist regimes had failed to. 
Military assistance could be provided if required.
222
  
Although significant as the first sign of an official Soviet line, the emphasis 
remained on the Polish leadership gaining control of the situation. No planning had begun 
for Soviet intervention and it was by no means certain that Moscow would risk such a move. 
A Polish solution, including the possibility of leadership change, was more likely to be the 
preferred option. According to Piotr Kostikow, in charge of Polish affairs for the Central 
Committee, Gierek was far from guaranteed the Kremlin’s support and ‘they would do 
everything, so as not to repeat Czechoslovakia or […] Afghanistan.’223 Moscow’s 
preference was for a peaceful internal solution. They could not afford another military 
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intervention, especially at a time of fragile East-West relations. This is a notion arguably 
reinforced by the low-key nature of the “Borisov” article. Published in an ideological review 
rather than the mainstream press, it was unlikely to have been detected by the West. In the 
best case scenario Warsaw would resolve the situation without the need for obvious Soviet 
assistance. While military action was to be avoided however, there was now one less 
restraint on Moscow doing so. The “Borisov” article was approved for publication on 4 
August 1980.
224
 The Olympics had closed the day before. The U.S. had always anticipated 
that Moscow would not act while they were on.  
It was against this background that Propaganda Secretary Jerzy Łukaszewicz held a 
press conference for Western journalists in Warsaw on 12 August 1980. He used the word 
“strike” repeatedly throughout the press conference and claimed the worst had passed.225 
The use of the word “strike” was significant. As well as being the first time that the term 
had been used by the Party that summer, it also held ideological significance: strikes did not 
exist under Communism.
226
 It marked a break with both ideology and the use of official 
euphemisms such as “stoppages” and “breaks in work”. It was only in talks with foreign 
journalists, however. According to the diary of one Polish journalist, they did not receive 
official confirmation of the strikes until 22 August 1980.
227
 Łukaszewicz’s overall aim was 
apparently to counteract the development of events in Poland.
228
 He appears to have been 
attempting ‘to reduce the importance of the strikes in the Western news media’ by putting a 
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positive spin on events.
229
 There seem to be two interrelated reasons for this. Firstly, if the 
Party could reduce the significance of the strikes in the Western media, they could remove a 
potential source of encouragement to striking workers.
230
 Secondly, they may have been 
afraid that news of the strikes was harming Poland’s prospects in negotiations with banks. 
As a U.S. telegram had observed in the aftermath of the 1976 protests, ‘bankers prefer that 
the countries to which they lend – whether capitalist or communist – not be concerned about 
restive populations. Spontaneous outbreaks against either capitalist or communist 
governments are not looked on as conducive to stable economies.’231 There is no reason to 
think that the stance of bankers had changed and with completion of neither the West 
German nor the Anglo-American loan assured, the Poles appear to have been concerned. A 
telegram from the British Embassy the day after Łukaszewicz’s appearance queried whether 
worker unrest was having an adverse influence on lending.
232
  
While economic concerns pre-dating the strikes appear to have been the cause of the 
banks’ reticence, completion of the loans was far from assured. According to British reports, 
although documentation for the Anglo-American loan had yet to be completed if all went to 
plan the deal would ‘be signed on 22 August and drawdown [could] start the following 
week.’233 U.S. telegrams were more pessimistic. They reported ‘some last minute 
hesitancy’. Completion of the deal was dependent on completion of negotiations with the 
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West Germans.
234
 It was not clear when this would happen. Chancellor Schmidt continued 
to appeal to Western bankers to raise new credits for the Polish economy and although the 
West German loan had been agreed, British reports claimed that the exact terms of the loan 
had yet to be decided.
235
 Given their urgent need to repay their debts and their dependency 
on Western finance (all acknowledged by Łukaszewicz) the Poles appear to have been 
concerned that strikes were damaging their credit worthiness. They may have wished to 
assuage bankers’ fears regarding Poland’s suitability for loans. Damage limitation may well 
have been the order of the day. If this was the case, further strikes and Western media 
coverage would be most unwelcome.  
14 August 1980 (Thursday) 
At 4.15am Borowczak and Prądzyński met outside Gate Two of the Lenin Shipyard, where 
on 16 December 1970 striking shipyard workers had been shot and killed by the Polish 
army. They went straight to department K5 where leaflets, posters and placards prepared for 
the strike had already been stored. They hung the posters up in the cloakroom and handed 
leaflets to workers as they arrived. Prądzyński repeated the process in his own 
department.
236
 At the same time teams of activists, including one led by Borusewicz, 
distributed leaflets and instructions on how to strike, as well as Robotnik to workers on local 
trains heading to the yard.
237
 The ground work for the strike had already been laid before 
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workers arrived for the first shift of the day. Equally, broader networks of support had 
already come into play. While local art school students had prepared the placards, 6 – 8 
thousand copies of the leaflet had been printed by a local underground press.
238
 
 The text of the leaflet, written by Borusewicz but signed by the editors of Robotnik 
Wybrzeża and the Founding Committee of the Free Trade Unions, was written in a language 
that was simple, direct and clear. It linked Walentynowicz’s dismissal to wider problems 
facing workers at the yard. It outlined her long and successful career, described the nature of 
her dismissal, and the work she had done to protect others from injustice and abuse. It 
concluded with a simple warning: 
A.Walentynowicz became inconvenient, because her example acted 
for others. She became inconvenient because she defended others and 
could organise colleagues. It is a constant tendency of the authorities, 
to isolate those who may become leaders […]. If we are unable to 
oppose this, there will be no one who stands up against increased 
norms, health and safety violations or forced overtime. That is why 
we’re appealing to you to stand up in defence of crane operator Anna 
Walentynowicz. If you don’t, many of you may find yourselves in a 
similar situation.
239
  
 
It was not clear whether Walentynowicz’s sacking was a strong enough issue to bring the 
shipyard out on strike, however. ‘It wasn’t something that directly affected people.’ In spite 
of this, Borowczak believed that they ‘had an ace in the hole’ that might just help them 
enjoy success: the conditions in which they all worked.
240
 Although not included in the 
leaflet, a demand for a wage increase was also made. A sum of 1000 złoty was chosen at the 
suggestion of Felski. He risked ‘being left alone with this placard’ for any less.241 
 The posters and the leaflets caught the workers’ interest. Small groups began to 
gather in the cloakrooms asking about Walentynowicz and the strike. Others kept guard of 
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the posters. Foremen and management representatives attempted to intervene. They 
demanded explanations and tried to tear the posters down. Some workers returned to work. 
They feared the strike would fail unless a larger department came out first. The strike risked 
collapse. Borowczak gambled. He declared that two larger departments had gone on strike. 
He did not know if this was really true.
242
 As he later observed, ‘I was making things up as I 
went along. What else was I to do?’243 There was some hesitation. Thirty workers followed 
Borowczak into the yard. They took the posters with them.
244
 The posters and placards 
carried their first demands: the reinstatement of Anna Walentynowicz and a pay rise of 1000 
złoty.245 His gamble paid off. Prądzyński had led his department on strike. The numbers 
striking began to swell.
246
 The outcome was still far from certain. As Borowczak recalled: 
We still weren’t sure if the strike would go, or last longer than a day. It’s a 
bit intimidating once you actually start, and you’re only a trickle. We 
really were left on our own and had to fend for ourselves, without Wałęsa 
or Borusewicz anywhere.
247
 
Far from all 18,000 workers employed at the yard were out on strike. The minority involved 
marched slowly through the yard towards Gate Two picking up numbers as they went. From 
a handful of striking workers, the strike grew to over a thousand and counting. Workers 
came off the ships to join them. In other departments deals were struck: some workers 
joined the strike, others secured the machinery.
248
  
Though still small in number, the increasing scale of the strike was not due simply to 
a growth in courage or lessening of fear. It was also due to a re-awakening of hope. One 
worker recalled that during thirty years of work at the yard he had become ‘mute’. Others 
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had done too. The workers marching past that morning changed that. They ‘aroused a lively 
interest in us, a fear mixed with admiration and hope’. It was a hope that perhaps the 
workers marching past would express something that the others were too afraid to and that 
they would do so without experiencing reprisals.
249
 Maintaining such hope was vital if the 
strike were to succeed. It would not be easy, however. There was always the risk of failure 
and persecution. In Borowczak’s opinion, the worst case scenario ‘would be a 48 hours 
arrest, or I would be canned, perhaps jailed’ along with the other strike leaders.250 The costs 
of participation in the strike had to be weighed up by each individual worker, but as 
Borowczak reasoned, ‘We were young and single – no family, nothing to lose.’251 Not all 
workers were in this position. Those with families had more at stake. Older workers also 
had an additional barrier of fear to overcome. As Felski recalled, the older workers 
‘remembered December 1970 when they faced tanks and machine gun fire.’252 This was 
why the young took the lead.  
They still remembered the lessons of December 1970, however. Some in the crowd 
called for them to march on regional Party Headquarters. They paused instead, halting by 
Gate Two for a minute’s silence in remembrance of the victims of the December 1970 
massacre. They sang the national anthem before returning to the large square near the yard’s 
hospital.
253
 It was a commemorative ritual rooted in the local opposition’s anniversary 
commemorations of the late 1970s and would be repeated throughout the strike. Amongst 
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other things memories of December 1970 also shaped the workers’ conduct during August 
1980 and the kind of strike employed: an occupation strike.
254
   
News of the strike began to spread. In the shipyard’s hospital Walentynowicz and 
Alina Pieńkowska learnt of the strike. Unable to make telephone contact with Kuroń, 
Walentynowicz left to try a different line. She ended up being chased into hiding at a 
neighbour’s flat by the SB. Pieńkowska ultimately got through.255 Kuroń informed Reuter’s 
of the strike.
256
 He also informed Borusewicz that the strike had taken hold when 
Borusewicz, who had returned home to sleep, phoned in mid-afternoon.
257
 It was not only 
the opposition that became aware of the strike. The security services launched Operation 
“Brama” (“Gate”) to monitor events at the yard.258 In Warsaw MSW reports carried news of 
the initial stages of the strike.
259
 Such developments were unsurprising. Security service 
activity at the shipyard was a standard feature of life. Due in part to the economic 
importance of the shipyard as well as to the events of December 1970, the shipyard had long 
been subject to ongoing observation and infiltration by the SB. This had increased with the 
activities of Free Trade Union activists at the yard. Though not all were directed at 
opposition activists, a total of seventy agents were deployed by different SB and MO 
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departments within the yard.
260
 A maximum of 18,000 people worked at the yard, however. 
Less than 0.4 per cent of employees were agents. 
 Supported by several thousand workers, a strike was formally declared and a strike 
committee elected. Management attempted to intervene. Klemens Gniech, the shipyard’s 
director, confronted them. Speaking from an electric cart he agreed to open negotiations if 
the workers resumed work first. Some began to disperse. As they did, Lech Wałęsa arrived. 
Though subject to subsequent debate, SB reports confirm that Wałęsa arrived in the yard by 
jumping over the shipyard’s wall.261 According to his autobiography, he had been tailed by 
the SB that morning as part of their ongoing observation of him. He jumped the wall having 
given them the slip.
262
 This must have added to Wałęsa’s sense of uncertainty. According to 
Borusewicz, Wałęsa had always lacked enthusiasm for the strike. While in part this seems to 
have been due to having recently become a father again, it should also be remembered that 
Wałęsa was unaware who would be at the yard when he arrived. He was not well acquainted 
with Borowczak, Felski or Prądzyński. They had only met briefly prior to the strike.263 
Leading a strike launched by the three unknown workers was a significant risk to take. 
While Wałęsa later described his arrival in spectacular style, beneath his bravado he must 
have been nervous, scared perhaps.
264  In spite of his opposition activity in the late 1970s, he 
must have harboured memories of December 1970. Certainly, he did not arrive as a fully-
fledged leader. Indeed, given the length of time since his dismissal from the yard, many 
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workers had never seen him before. Some questioned who the man ‘with the moustache’ 
was.
265
 
 Wałęsa’s arrival came as a relief to Borowczak.266 Writing down the names of those 
elected to the strike committee, he added Wałęsa’s to the list. Wałęsa read it out and asked 
the crowd if they would accept him despite his dismissal in 1976. They shouted their 
approval.
267
 Initial demands were insignificant, but illustrative of the circumstances in 
which Polish workers existed: ‘minor personal gripes about soap, towels, work shirts’.268 
Already scrapped by the time of Wałęsa’s arrival, the committee prepared a new list. The 
issues at stake increased. They called for the reinstatement of Walentynowicz and Wałęsa. 
The original 1000 złoty pay increase was raised to 2000 złoty. A demand for a cost of living 
allowance at the level enjoyed by the police was also introduced. They demanded the 
construction of a monument to the victims of December 1970. A guarantee that there would 
be ‘no repression on account of the strike’ was also demanded.269 By now it was around 
midday. It had been almost eight hours since Borowczak and Prądzyński had arrived, but the 
strike was now firmly underway. Beginning as a form of piecemeal strike spreading 
department by department, it had escalated and was now officially an occupation (or stay-in) 
strike headed by Wałęsa. The workers had moved from economic noncooperation to 
economic intervention.
270
 They were almost ready for talks. Two pre-conditions had to be 
met: the reinstatement of Walentynowicz and the broadcast of negotiations over the 
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shipyard’s radio. Both were agreed to. Walentynowicz, soon to be voted onto the strike 
committee, was fetched by workers in Gniech’s car and received a warm welcome at the 
yard.
271
 
The demand for a guarantee of safety was quickly agreed to. It was provided by the 
management, not by the Gdańsk Party Secretary Tadeusz Fiszbach as requested (a matter 
that would later be returned to). Gniech also agreed to reinstate Wałęsa. Wages proved 
problematic. The management argued that workers had been given a major pay increase the 
previous year. The current system of work also allowed for further gain: a significant bonus, 
possibly exceeding wage demands, if they engaged in ‘further, better organised work’. The 
workers were unimpressed. Any increase in the cost of goods must be accompanied by wage 
increases.
272
 Gniech was cornered. He was unable to provide an immediate answer on 
wages. He needed to discuss the matter with his superiors. They should return to work until 
a decision was made.
273
 The workers had other issues to discuss: family allowances and the 
construction of a monument to the victims of December 1970.  
Gniech was on weak ground. He claimed he lacked information on family 
allowances and was also challenged during discussions of the monument. The workers were 
clear what they wanted: the construction of a monument to the victims of December 1970 
outside the second gate to be completed by the tenth anniversary of the shootings. Gniech 
tried to deter them. He claimed it would not be possible to meet their demand. The site was 
being redeveloped.
274
 Gniech’s protests were genuine. A decision had been taken by the 
local authorities to build on the site. The aim was to prevent the opposition from marking 
the tenth anniversary of December 1970 as they had done previous anniversaries. Work had 
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already begun and was due to be completed that autumn.
275
 Gniech declared it a problem for 
the local authorities, not just shipyard management. 
 Another management representative joined the argument. He tried to win them over 
by suggesting a commemorative tablet. It could be displayed in a shipyard hall already 
containing plaques commemorating those who had died in the war with Germany. The 
workers were adamant: ‘we want a monument!’ Walentynowicz went further. She recalled 
that the victims of 1970 ‘were killed with the words on their lips “For bread, for freedom!”’ 
As with the events of December 1970, a plaque would soon be forgotten. That could not be 
allowed.
276
 The events of December had left their mark on the workers. They did not back 
down. Gniech was forced to. He was not responsible for any decision over the construction 
of a monument.
277
  
Later that afternoon Gniech returned to talks with the strike committee. The 
authorities had agreed ‘in principle’ to the construction of the monument. Timothy Garton 
Ash has described this as a further sign ‘that a top-level “flexible-response” had been 
prepared to counter the expected workers’ protests.’278 The authorities had left themselves 
room for manoeuvre. An agreement to build a monument ‘in principle’ is not the same as a 
legally binding agreement to construct one. The authorities could still find reasons not to 
construct it once the strike was over. The issues on which the authorities were willing to 
display a “flexible-response” are also of note. As Jerzy Holzer argues, they had conceded 
ground on political demands to which they would not usually concede, but had left 
economic demands to which they normally agreed unresolved. Holzer attributes this to the 
fact that the workers were demanding considerably more money than was being granted 
elsewhere. Demands for the equalisation of benefits had been met with universal refusal, 
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however.
279
 The latter was likely to have been not only for economic reasons, but to avoid 
alienating the police and security services. Given the importance of security service 
defections to the success of non-violent campaigns of resistance, any agreement by the Party 
to undermine the financial standing of the police and security services at this time would 
have been misguided.
280
 They could not afford to lose their support. Nonetheless after six 
weeks of granting economic concessions, the authorities appeared to be seeking other ways 
of controlling the strikes. Although still presenting a largely positive picture to the West 
during loan negotiations, even before the strike the economic cost of strike settlements and 
Gierek’s promises had been raised within the Party.281 There were limits past which they 
could not be pushed. They could not afford further economic burdens. 
Wałęsa had warned management that if their demands had not been met by 4pm, the 
workers would stay the night. A guard, food supplies and places to sleep would be 
organised.
282
 The deadline passed. The demands were unfulfilled. The strike went on. It 
would not do so alone. Workers, including Andrzej Gwiazda, had been listening to events at 
the yard over the telephone from work at “Elmor” since morning. With the strike having 
taken hold, “Elmor” would also come out on strike. That night Gwiazda and his wife Joanna 
met along with others to discuss demands and possibilities for spreading the strike.
283
 Plans 
were also made to spread the strike to the Paris Commune Shipyard in Gdynia. Andrzej 
Kołodziej, who had only begun work at the Paris Commune Shipyard that day, received 
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instructions on launching the strike from Borusewicz during a meeting at the Lenin 
Shipyard.
284
 The Tri-cities were on the verge of a major strike wave. 
 The Politburo met in Warsaw. Although chaired in Gierek’s absence by Babiuch, the 
meeting was dominated by Kania. He described the situation as developing in a negative 
manner with the Gdańsk strike adding to those in Łódź and Warsaw. According to Kania, a 
total of seven demands had been made by striking workers in the yard, including ‘the release 
of political prisoners’. The demands were starting to escalate.285 This was a 
misrepresentation of events. No demand for ‘the release of political prisoners’ had been 
made during negotiations at the yard.
286
 However, it was a demand recorded by the SB as 
one of twelve Kuroń received over the phone from Gdańsk and one he announced as a 
turning point in the politicisation of the strike to a less enthusiastic Waldemar Kuczyński 
that night.
287
 The demand was planned, but had not been made. The escalation noted by 
Kania would not take place until the following day.  
A number of Politburo members mentioned KOR’s influence over the strikes, 
including Wałęsa’s connection with Kuroń. Others noted the aktyw’s criticism of the Party’s 
handling of events. A meeting with them was organised. More seriously militia 
reinforcements were posted to Gdańsk. Three army regiments were placed on stand-by.288 
Elsewhere, a small group was established amongst the General Staff of the Polish Army 
tasked with monitoring the strikes and providing both briefs and information to the 
leadership of the General Staff as well as to the MSW if requested. It was headed by 
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Colonel Ryszard Kukliński, an agent for the CIA since the early 1970s.289 The situation was 
becoming serious. According to Kania, they were faced with a situation in which ‘even a 
weaker opponent is dangerous.’ They decided to recall Gierek and begin preparations for a 
television address to the nation. The timing of the address and the official to deliver it would 
be decided by Gierek on his return.
 290
 
15 August 1980 (Friday)  
As the strike entered its second day, Poland remained at peace. Western reports gave 
different reasons for the absence of violence in a country renowned for it, however. In a 
report filed by the Canadian Delegation at NATO the previous day, the authorities were 
hailed for keeping workers off the streets and preventing any drift into violence through 
their swift response to events.
291
 The U.S. meanwhile reported that the Polish Deputy 
Minister for Foreign Trade had attributed the confinement of worker actions to factories to 
lessons learnt from 1956 and 1970. He objected to the use of the word “strike” reportedly 
uttered by one television commentator the night before, however.
292
 Events in the Tri-city 
region suggested that while the Deputy Minister’s explanation of non-violence was correct, 
his dismissal of the term “strike” was not. It would be increasingly difficult for the 
authorities to downplay events in their dealings with the West. Strikes spread peacefully 
throughout the day.  
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The first night at the Lenin Shipyard passed without incident. Negotiations resumed 
that morning. Speaking over the shipyard’s radio system, Gniech adopted a new stance. He 
combined offers with threats. The workers proved more than his match. When Gniech 
announced a new pay offer with the aim of getting workers to resume work at 6am on 
Saturday if they agreed, he announced it was to be discussed in individual departments. 
Wałęsa was swift to counter Gniech’s divisive attempt. Accepting his demand for 
departmental discussions, he made a condition of his own. Once agreement had been 
reached within departments, it would be discussed by the strike committee. Only once the 
committee had reached a decision would they announce whether Gniech’s offer had been 
accepted.
293
 He boxed clever, outwitting Gniech to retain the strike committee’s authority. 
The second prong of Gniech’s strategy was also dealt with. He attempted to discredit and 
intimidate the workers, claiming there were workers ‘under the influence of alcohol’. 
Anyone found in such a state would be disciplined.
294
 Such accusations were countered by 
the presence of a workers’ guard. Not only did they block entry to the yard by anyone 
without a pass from the strike committee, they also enforced an alcohol ban.
295
 Accusations 
of drunkenness were slanderous. 
Unknown to the workers, the position of their strike was now much stronger. While 
Wałęsa had been countering Gniech’s efforts at undermining the strike, much of Gdańsk had 
come out in support. They were part of a generalized strike.
296
 According to information 
received by the MSW by seven o’clock that morning, 2000 workers at the Repair Yard were 
on strike. So too were transport workers and those at smaller enterprises, including 
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“Elmor”.297 Not yet reported was Kołodziej’s success in bringing the Paris Commune 
Shipyard out on strike.
298
 Local opposition movements also began to demonstrate support. 
The Young Poland Movement issued a declaration in support of the workers. Members of 
the group also attended the strike along with other local opposition activists and continued 
to play a role in events throughout the strike.
299
 Such close worker-opposition links had not 
been evident in July.  
Despite disruption to services, there were no complaints amongst locals. The social 
mood was positive and independent social acts seem to have developed. Drivers picked up 
those left waiting in the absence of public transport, for example.
300
 The social response 
should not necessarily be interpreted as a sign of active support, however. While some 
sympathy for the workers may have been generated by residents’ awareness of December 
1970 and local conditions, such as food shortages and housing problems, public support 
appears to have been mostly tacit at this time. There were signs that it was becoming more 
active, however. While by the end of Thursday the families of striking workers had begun to 
gather at the shipyard, by Friday crowds were gathering at the gates where workers in 
distinctive red-and-white armbands stood guard. Packages of food were delivered to the 
workers, along with flowers. The police were nowhere to be seen.
301
  
The authorities were monitoring the situation carefully. They responded swiftly to 
the Paris Commune strike. By ten o’clock that morning Norwegian company officials 
working in Gdynia had reported a significant number of militia gathering in the vicinity of 
the yard. They were cordoning off an area of approximately 1.5 kilometres in depth. By 
                                                          
297
 K. Dubiński, ‘Zapowiedź Sierpniowego Przełomu: Meldunki MSW o sytuacji w kraju w okresie 1 lipca – 16 
Sierpnia 1980’, Zeszyty Historyczne, (Paris, 2000), pp.69-164 (p.158). 
298
 A. Kazański, ‘Sierpień ’80 w Gdyni,’ Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej, 9-10 (118-119) wrzesień – 
październik 2010, pp.45-56 (pp.47-48). 
299
 J. Kufel, ‘Rola działaczy Ruchu Młodej Polski w strajku sierpniowym w Stoczni Gdańskiej’, in: W. Polak and 
others (eds.), Czas Przełomu. Solidarność 1980-1981 (Gdańsk, 2010), pp551-562. 
300
 Bratniak, Nr.24 (lipiec-sierpien 1980), p.6. 
301
 A. Friszke, Rewolucja Solidarności 1980-1981 (Kraków, 2014), p.30; Bratniak, Nr 24 (lipiec-sierpien 1980), 
p.6; Bądkowski, ‘Przypisy dnia (z dzienników gdańskich 14 VII – 1 IX 1980)’, pp.68-99 (p.68-69).  
79 
 
midday the U.S. Embassy had informed Washington of events.
302
 At the same time 
telephone and telex connections from the coast to the rest of Poland were cut.
303
 While this 
appears to have come partially in response to the increased number of telephone calls to the 
area,
304
 the need to disrupt the flow of information between the workers and KOR was 
arguably more significant.  
As Kania’s claim about demands for ‘the release of political prisoners’ in the 
previous day’s Politburo session demonstrated, Kuroń had been receiving regular telephone 
updates on events, which he then passed on to foreign journalists with an apparent emphasis 
on the workers’ political demands.305 With the escalation of the strike wave and the 
demands, the authorities appeared keen to break this link. Kuroń’s telephone was left 
connected, but if a phone call concerned strikes rather than personal matters, it was instantly 
cut off. Kuroń and other activists used alternate telephones, including those of neighbours 
instead.
306
 Ultimately ‘a human relay system’ was devised that enabled the continued 
transmission of information from the strikes through the use of public telephones outside the 
blockade.
307
 Innovation from the workers and the opposition allowed KOR to continue its 
role as an information centre. There were also simpler ways in which news of the strike 
could find its way around the blockade. Poles returning from holiday on the coast witnessed 
the strike through train windows, for example.
308
 Even with the blockade in place, the Party 
could not exert complete control over news about the strikes.  
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 By midday Wałęsa had out-thought Gniech. His attempt to divide and rule had 
failed. Following the departmental meetings and follow-on discussions, a near unanimous 
rejection of Gniech’s offer was reached. Only a single department accepted. The strike 
committee would not back down. They wanted a 2000 złoty wage increase and would settle 
for nothing less.
309
 Their determination was increased both by the regional spread of strikes 
(announced during negotiations) and also by the arrival of a foreign journalist in the yard. 
Wałęsa hoped the journalist’s presence would lift a sense of fear amongst the workers.310 It 
may have worked. The workers showed no signs of caving in. After two rounds of talks, the 
issue of pay remained unresolved. The final round began at 5pm.  
The workers were tiring. Wałęsa tried a change of tactic. Abandoning pay 
discussions, he returned to two issues Gniech thought already resolved: the guarantee of the 
strike’s safety and the reinstatement of Walentynowicz. In the case of Walentynowicz, when 
it became clear that she had not been reinstated to her original department Wałęsa called an 
impromptu vote. It resulted in unanimous support for Walentynowicz. Wałęsa challenged 
Gniech to defy ‘the will of the people’. Another member of management tried to intervene. 
He claimed an agreement had already been reached. Wałęsa responded: ‘That was 
yesterday, and today is today! […] Yesterday I was full, today I am hungry!’ The workers 
cheered.
311
 By retreating to safer ground Wałęsa ensured an easy, morale boosting victory. 
He also demonstrated the level of support he enjoyed. He was the clear leader of the strike 
and held the upper hand in negotiations. He dominated Gniech, increasing pressure on him 
by repeatedly switching tack between threatening to end talks and escalating demands.  
Calls were made for an improvement in the supply of food, the release of political 
prisoners (a day later than Kania claimed) and payment for the strike. It was not clear how 
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far Wałęsa intended to pursue these new demands nor how much support he enjoyed for 
doing so. Such demands had not been agreed upon by the strike committee. There were 
limits to what he could do without their support. However, it was not only his authority that 
was limited in this regard. All such demands went well beyond the limits of Gniech’s 
powers as well. They would need to be dealt with by the authorities. Having backed him 
into a corner, Wałęsa returned to the central demand for workers: a 2000 złoty wage 
increase. Gniech’s stance had not altered since morning. When he refused to yield to the 
workers’ demands, Wałęsa called an end to the day’s talks. He left Gniech with a new 
demand to consider: the creation of free and independent trade unions.
312
  
Although neither Gniech nor the authorities could be sure, Wałęsa was probably 
bluffing. He may simply have been trying to increase pressure on Gniech in order to force 
him to cave in to their wage demands. Even though as a Free Trade Union activist this will 
have been a demand close to Wałęsa’s heart, as with the earlier escalation of demands, the 
call for independent trade unions was not officially listed as one of the strike committee’s 
demands. Though it is clear that Wałęsa was drawing on pre-existing demands formulated 
by the opposition during the 1970s, such as the aim of ‘independent trade unions’ outlined 
in the Charter of Workers’ Rights published by Robotnik’s editors a year earlier,313 there 
were limits to what he could do on the basis of support from the current strike committee. 
He did not have the necessary authority to pursue such demands on their behalf. This was in 
marked contrast to enterprises elsewhere in the region, where calls for the dissolution of the 
official unions and the establishment of independent ones were explicitly stated in the 
workers’ demands. Wałęsa was aware of this. During negotiations with Gniech he read out 
such demands from two other enterprises.
314
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Andrzej Gwiazda and Andrzej Kołodziej had significantly escalated demands. The 
first three demands of fourteen made at “Elmor” for example, clearly show that the strike 
was more political than that at the Lenin Shipyard. Workers called for the authorities to: 
1. Guarantee the right to strike 
2. Respect the guarantee in the constitution for freedom of 
expression, and thus not repress independent publishers, 
abolish censorship 
3. Respect convention Nr 87 of the International Labour 
Organisation concerning freedom of association, ratified by the 
PRL. 
 
The sixth demand on the list called for an end to ‘interference by state organs and enterprise 
management in the activities of trade unions.’315 Equally explicit was the fourth of twenty-
one demands at the Paris Commune Shipyard: ‘The acceptance of free trade unions (the 
present do not fulfil their role correctly and are not independent)’.316 Such demands were 
fully explained by Andrzej Kołodziej to his new co-workers.317 Although they required the 
support of all those on strike to implement them, those associated with the opposition in 
Gdańsk were beginning to make their influence felt through the demands. The escalation 
was intentional. 
Andrzej Gwiazda had prepared a list the night before that unlike the Lenin 
Shipyard’s could be used by all enterprises. Political demands for the central authorities 
were drawn up alongside work-related demands for the director.
318
 The most significant 
demands were made within the framework of domestic and international laws ratified by the 
Polish authorities. This was in keeping with the stance on legality promoted by KOR since 
the mid-1970s and was one of a number of opposition methods that proved an effective 
means of resistance. As Aleksander Smolar observes of such methods, ‘Practical solidarity 
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with the persecuted, the fight against the lie in the domestic sphere, and the use of law – 
both international and domestic – turned out to be efficient means of resistance.’319 What 
had begun with the Warsaw intelligentsia in the mid-1970s was continuing with the coastal 
workers in the summer of 1980.  
 The spread of strikes in the Tri-city area and the escalation of demands placed the 
authorities under increasing pressure. Kania continued to dominate the Politburo in spite of 
Gierek’s return. He made clear to the First Secretary the nature and severity of the situation 
in Gdańsk. However, while noting that demands differed to those elsewhere and also the 
concerns of Tadeusz Fiszbach, Kania appears to have considered the situation at the 
shipyard under control. Szczecin was also calm. Although Kania reported an attempted 
strike at the city’s port, it had been dealt with.320 Strikes had actually been attempted in 
several Szczecin enterprises and at two enterprises a pre-emptive rate increase had been 
awarded.
321
 The problem of maintaining a strike when faced with a “free Saturday” the 
following day also appears to have prevented strikes in Szczecin.
322
 The absence of strikes 
did not necessarily mean the Party was in control of events.  
Łukaszewicz labelled the demands ‘political’. Others singled out KOR as 
responsible for leading this new, more political phase. Babiuch meanwhile was more 
concerned by the economic damage inflicted by strikes in higher-earning enterprises. He 
also pointed to the fact that official media coverage was being undermined by Radio Free 
Europe and ‘gossip’. Rank-and-file members of the Party were passive and unprepared.323 
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The Party was losing control of two of its greatest sources of power while internal support 
was weak. Action was needed at the highest levels, but Gierek’s response was limited. He 
ordered a television appearance by Babiuch and announced a further meeting for the 
following day at which a new option would be discussed: the possible use of force.
324
 The 
latter may have been a step to reassure hard-liners that he was willing to take firmer action if 
needed. There are no signs that he was genuinely considering it. Even Brezhnev does not 
appear to have advised him to take such a course.  
In the Crimea, Brezhnev told Gierek to promote ‘socialist internationalism’, to 
employ ‘relentless counter-propaganda against attempts to blur the class content of socialist 
patriotism […] and to idealize Poland’s pre-revolutionary past’ and to ‘conduct a consistent 
offensive’ against the opposition.325 He may have advised Gierek to take a firmer line, 
particularly against the opposition, but he had not advocated the use of force against the 
workers. Such a step was unlikely to be Brezhnev’s preferred course of action when faced 
with worker unrest. As a KGB report later compiled in relation to ‘mass disturbances’ in the 
USSR between 1957 and 1988 demonstrates, in only three of nine such incidents to occur 
under Brezhnev were weapons employed.
326
 Despite a reputation for intervention based on 
Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, Brezhnev was unlikely to push for the use of force against 
strikes rooted in genuine worker grievances. It was not Moscow’s usual way of dealing with 
such events. Ever since Novocherkassk (1962) they had attempted to move away from such 
responses.
327
 This is not to say that Moscow would never advocate such a response, 
however. As Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) illustrated, Moscow had set clear 
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‘ground rules’ for Eastern bloc states in order to protect its regional ‘geostrategic interests’: 
attempts to leave the Warsaw Pact and challenges to the Party as the sole holder of power 
would not be tolerated.
328
 They were likely to push for an internal solution first if the need 
arose, however.  
 With the use of force not under consideration, Babiuch’s speech remained the 
authorities’ most high profile response. If it was intended to provide a frank account of 
Poland’s problems and the steps being taken to resolve them, it failed. Despite 
acknowledging ‘that the public expects a clear answer’, Babiuch did not provide one. 
Instead of outlining an economic reform programme, he attacked strikes as damaging to the 
economy and accused the opposition of exploiting the situation ‘for their own political 
ends’. He appeared defensive, arguing: 
In no country in the world is there a universal and miraculous prescription 
for solving complex economic problems […]. There have never been 
miracles in economics, nor will there be any. Our economics, like those of 
other countries are ruled by firm and strict laws and rules. One can bypass 
them for a brief period, but later on they will come back with redoubled 
strength […] 329 
 
Poland’s economic difficulties could have occurred under any economic system. They had 
to be dealt with. The support of the workers was required to do so, but was not forthcoming. 
Babiuch’s calls for work and unity made little impact. MSW reports recorded that workers 
in the Lenin and Paris Commune Shipyards were more interested in talking to Babiuch than 
listening to him. Workers in Szczecin were equally unimpressed.
330
  
Criticism was not limited to the domestic arena. The U.S. Embassy was critical of 
the economic aspects of Babiuch’s speech, describing it as ‘si[n]gularly devoid of new 
proposals or complete recognition of the magnitude of the problem except by 
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implication.’331 By contrast the British seemed more understanding. Although questioning 
its impact, the following day they praised Babiuch’s speech for its ‘sound economic 
sense.’332 The Poles required money rather than criticism or sympathy, however. Media 
reports placed greatest emphasis on the West German loan and the pressure being applied to 
commercial banks by Bonn. Helmut Schmidt was reportedly concerned for the political 
survival of Gierek due to his stabilising influence on relations between East and West.
333
 
While the Anglo-American loan had also not been completed, it was the West German loan 
that was of greatest concern. The following day Babiuch forwarded a translation of a Der 
Spiegel article concerning the loan to Gierek. It highlighted the reluctance of German 
bankers to participate in the loan despite Schmidt’s desire to present the deal to Gierek on 
his trip to West Germany the following week.
334
 The loan must have been of great 
importance for Babiuch to have forwarded the article to Gierek at this time. The significance 
of West German support should not be understated. As the article made clear, West 
Germany was the only country that could provide Poland with the money needed to survive 
its financial crisis.
335
 Maintaining the support of Bonn was vital, especially as no significant 
help was forthcoming from Poland’s friends.  
Although rumours had been circulating that Gierek had spent his holiday attempting 
to secure additional economic aid from Moscow,
336
 the outcome appears to have been 
limited. According to a Soviet summary of economic assistance to Poland, the only hard 
currency aid Moscow provided during this period was a $30 million credit for sugar at the 
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start of the month.
337
 Such limited Soviet support would no doubt have come as a surprise to 
the Western banks. Media reports suggest a belief that Moscow had already loaned Warsaw 
$1 billion for debt-servicing that year.
338
 If true, commercial banks were significantly 
overstating the levels of Soviet economic support for Poland. There were no signs that the 
“Soviet umbrella” was close to opening.  
The most high-profile action engaged in by the Soviet Union was military. That day 
“routine manoeuvres” by Warsaw Pact forces in East Germany and on the Baltic Sea were 
announced by TASS, the Soviet News Agency. They would take place in early September 
and involve 40,000 Warsaw Pact troops.
339
 The same day a ‘theory article’ appeared in 
Pravda, attacking reform Communists within the leadership in a style similar to that which 
preceded the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968.
340
 While the appearance in 
the official press of attacks on “revisionism”, as well as the timing of the announcement and 
the proximity of the manoeuvres to the Baltic coastline, could be interpreted as a sign of an 
impending Soviet threat to Poland, the manoeuvres were unrelated to events in Gdańsk. 
Aside from the fact that pressure was likely to be applied to the Polish leadership prior to 
any Soviet military action, the East Germans had already announced the manoeuvres prior 
to the Lenin Shipyard strike. This provides a useful reminder of the East-West context in 
which Polish events were unfolding. Though economically intertwined with the West, 
militarily Poland was still at the heart of the Warsaw Pact. It also illustrates a further point: 
despite the post-Afghanistan rupture in détente, the international norms that had developed 
during the easing of East-West tensions in the 1970s remained in place. The East German 
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authorities had already provided advance notification of the manoeuvres under the terms of 
the Helsinki Final Act.
341
 The structures of détente were more durable than the spirit. This 
should not be forgotten when assessing the Soviet threat, particularly with preparations for 
Madrid underway. 
16 August 1980 (Saturday) 
By Saturday Poland’s strikes were attracting considerable media coverage in the West. The 
most notable article appeared in the New York Times: ‘U.S. Fears that Strikes in Poland 
Will Encourage Russians to Intervene’. In the first public hint of a response from the Carter 
administration, officials at the Department of State warned that although there was no 
reason for alarm at present, the outbreak of strikes increased the risk of problems. Although 
broadly supportive of the Polish authorities and their handling of events, the White House 
was watching carefully. Their main fear was that any Soviet intervention reminiscent of 
Hungary or Czechoslovakia would be met with resistance by Polish workers, placing an 
additional strain on East-West relations and forcing Carter to respond. While officials could 
not say what such a response would entail, the report implied that it was unlikely to involve 
military action.
342
 Indeed, the latter will not have been under discussion. Poland was a 
member of the Warsaw Pact. 
  Overall, talk of Soviet intervention was premature. Aside from the fact that previous 
Soviet interventions had been preceded by pressure on the domestic leadership to take 
action, with the exception of the “Borisov” article and Pravda’s on ‘theory’ there had been 
few public signals of concern from Moscow. A front-page editorial in Pravda suggests that 
Moscow’s main concern was spillover from Poland, as it sought to promote the role of its 
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own trade unions to Soviet workers.
343
 Given that coverage of the unions had earlier 
stemmed from the Baltic regions, the publication of such an editorial on the front page of 
the national press can arguably be taken as a sign of increased concern. Whether this was 
triggered by domestic or Polish factors is not clear, however. Even if the latter, Moscow’s 
response to events was still a long way short of that concerning the U.S. While in part 
American concerns were presumably triggered by memories of Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, domestic concerns during a pre-election period in which Carter found 
himself under pressure from a resurgent Right and suffering from major foreign policy 
setbacks in Afghanistan and Iran rather than Soviet actions may also have been behind 
concerns voiced in the report. Carter could not afford to be caught out. There seems to have 
been little other reason for these comments. Although increasing, Soviet signals were still 
limited and carried no threat of action. No CIA Alert Memorandum had been issued as at 
Lublin and the TASS announcement should have come as no surprise given prior 
notification under the Helsinki provisions. The article also came at a time when events at the 
Lenin Shipyard were nearing completion. 
At the Lenin Shipyard there was no mention of the trade union issue as negotiations 
got underway. Gniech had apparently decided that the workers’ political demands, although 
genuine, ‘could be treated as deliberate over-bidding.’344 The real issue at stake was money. 
Gniech reiterated his earlier offer of introducing a new table of wages. The maximum pay 
rise he could offer was 1200 złoty. While his financial offer remained the same, his tactics 
changed. The third day of negotiations was to be conducted in a different manner to those 
on the second. The talks should be ‘democratic’. Each delegate would be allowed the 
opportunity to voice their opinions over the yard’s radio system. Wałęsa would not be 
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allowed to speak for everyone, a decision others in the hall supported.
345
 Gniech was 
attempting to isolate Wałęsa and undermine his role as strike leader. The broadcast of 
negotiations would further divide the workers and highlight the fact that they were far from 
united. 
Faced with little choice but to go along with Gniech’s proposal, Wałęsa called out 
departments one by one. Each representative announced their decision over the microphone. 
Responses varied. They ranged from those happy to accept Gniech’s offer to those 
demanding 2000 złoty for all workers and voicing support for the Free Trade Unions. The 
consensus was that they would settle for 1500 złoty.346 Although Gniech had highlighted 
divisions within the strike committee, he had failed to divide them completely. He was left 
to appeal to patriotic sentiment and older workers in a last-ditch attempt to gain acceptance 
for his offer. It was to no avail. The workers would not budge. Gniech had little choice but 
to accept the workers’ decision. As Wałęsa noted, having asked for and received a 
democratic response to his offer, there was nothing to discuss.
347
 Gniech could not agree to 
such an increase immediately. A second round of talks would begin at eleven o’clock.  
In the interim the issue of new trade unions reappeared, but was dropped when 
Gniech returned after consultations. He accepted the strike committee’s demand for 1500 
złoty. Talks amongst the delegates now concerned two conditions attached to the pay offer: 
the evacuation of the yard and a return to work on Monday morning. Intense discussion 
followed. The guarantee of safety re-emerged as an issue for the workers. The delegates 
insisted on a signed guarantee from Fiszbach. Fear was evident. They remembered what had 
happened in December 1970.
348
 Although workers outside continued to call for 2000 złoty, 
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with the signed guarantee of safety in place their delegates voted to accept the new pay 
offer. In keeping with the democratic nature of the vote, Wałęsa accepted the majority’s 
decision. At 3pm he declared an end to the occupation of the Lenin Shipyard.
349
 Gniech 
telephoned the Minister for the Engineering Industry Aleksander Kopec to inform him of 
the news.
350
  
The strike was far from over, however. As Wałęsa declared an end to the protest at 
the Lenin Shipyard, a number of opposition activists were listening in the yard. Amongst 
them were Bogdan Borusewicz, Andrzej Gwiazda and Joanna Duda-Gwiazda. Upon hearing 
Wałęsa declare the strike over, the Gwiazdas raced back to “Elmor” to prevent the strike 
from collapsing elsewhere.
351
 In the Paris Commune Yard news of the strike’s end triggered 
confusion. Amongst those informing the yard of the strike’s end were workers claiming to 
be from the Lenin Shipyard and the director of the Paris Commune Shipyard, who broadcast 
the news over the shipyard’s radio system. The Party aktyw also strove to undermine the 
strike. Indeed, it marked the culmination of the day’s efforts against both the strike and 
Kołodziej, following overnight meetings designed to discredit him as an ‘agent’ amongst 
other things.
352
 Events at the Lenin Shipyard were similarly chaotic. Wałęsa found himself 
under fire. The words “Traitor” and “Informer” were daubed on the walls.353 Crowds at the 
gates started to turn on departing workers. Workers from elsewhere, who had been relying 
on the yard for protection, found themselves abandoned. Henryka Krzywonos, a 
representative for transport workers, summarised how many felt. She shouted: ‘If you 
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abandon us, we’ll be lost […] Buses can’t face tanks!’354 Without the support of the largest 
enterprise in the city, it would be difficult for strikes elsewhere to survive. 
Krzywonos’ fear of a crackdown was warranted. In addition to memories of 1970, 
that day Gierek, while noting the need to examine ‘the problem of trade unions, work 
legislation etc.’, ordered the establishment of a team headed by Kania to oversee the 
suppression of the strikes.
355
 A directive was immediately issued, announcing the 
establishment of a twelve member MSW Staff to organise the operation. Led by General 
Bogusław Stachura, the operation went by the name of “Lato-80” (“Summer-80”).356 A 
further directive was issued providing an assessment of the situation in Poland. It outlined 
the measures to be taken by the security services and militia ‘in the event of a threat to 
safety and public order’.357 In terms of the short-term outcome of events, two sections of 
this directive appear deserving of discussion: sections seven and eight. They deal with 
actions to be taken by the SB and MO when faced both with peaceful demonstrations and ‘a 
threat to public order’. In the event of the former they were not to intervene. They were to 
prevent radical elements from joining the demonstrations. Peace was to be maintained. The 
SB and MO would perform a watching brief, documenting the proceedings and identifying 
the key participants. By contrast, in the event of a public disturbance they would take a more 
active role. Amongst other things, they would be tasked with ‘Preventing and counteracting 
arson, looting, vandalism and theft.’ Rather than observing key participants, they would 
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detain them.
358
 On this basis it seems that so long as the workers maintained their adherence 
to non-violent action, they would be able to escape repression but not observation. They 
would enjoy comparative benefits from the use of non-violence as opposed to violence, 
therefore. While there was always the risk of provocation, it seems that the response of the 
security services in the short-term at least was to be shaped by the actions of the workers. 
No plans for the security services to play a proactive role in ending the strikes through force 
had been prepared. This would explain why, as Timothy Garton Ash notes, security forces 
were not sent into the Lenin Shipyard at a time when activists were working to save the 
strike.
359
  
While Gierek could not afford to appear soft in the face of extensive worker protests 
and Politburo pressure, it is also questionable whether he could engage in a violent 
crackdown under the gaze of his Western partners while seeking loans. This may have been 
behind Gierek’s decision to approach ‘Western diplomats’ about the strikes. Gierek’s stance 
arguably mixed the liberal necessary to appeal to the West with the communist necessary to 
retain support amongst Poland’s allies and the Politburo. While the strikes were seen as 
lessening, there was to be an admission that economic reforms had caused ‘some’ stoppages 
alongside criticism of RFE.
360
 With the exception of the apparently standard criticisms of 
RFE, which were only to be expected at such times, the other elements could all be seen as 
reassurance that the situation was under control. Economic reforms were continuing with 
certain problems only to be expected. Similarly, while the approach to the West was to state 
a clear need to act against ‘acts of terror’ and the spectre of force was to be raised, for now 
such action had been avoided.
361
 Gierek was performing a balancing act. Under pressure 
from the workers, he could afford to lose neither the support of the West on the one hand, 
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nor the support of his Politburo and allies on the other. It would be a difficult act to 
maintain. Reassurance that strikes were lessening and economic reform was underway was 
likely to appease Western concerns regarding Poland’s economic credibility. Raising the 
spectre of force alongside criticism of RFE meanwhile could help to reassure the Politburo 
and Poland’s friends while also getting the West to back off. 
In spite of Gierek’s claims, the strikes were far from lessening. At the Lenin 
Shipyard the strike was saved. Although the yard’s radio system had been disabled as soon 
as negotiations had ended in an effort by management to hasten the strike’s demise, a core 
of activists led by Walentynowicz, Pieńkowska and Ewa Ossowska (a Young Poland 
Movement activist) attempted to save the strike from collapse. They were joined by Wałęsa. 
Together they attempted to persuade workers to remain on strike out of solidarity with other 
workers in Gdańsk. Management attempted to undermine such actions, however. Gniech 
used a megaphone to announce that wage increases would not be granted to those remaining 
in the yard after 8pm.
362
 According to Walentynowicz, the role of Pieńkowska was crucial at 
this time. Through her appeals to continue the strike, she succeeded in persuading a number 
of workers to remain in the yard at the very time that official announcements declaring the 
strike over were being made. A lack of trust in the official guarantee of security also played 
its part in the workers’ decision to remain.363 The authorities had failed to keep their 
promises before. They had nothing to lose. While enough workers remained in the yard that 
night to continue, their numbers had not been this low since Borowczak and Prądzyński 
began the strike less than 72 hours earlier.  
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With the situation under control ‘emissaries’ including Walentynowicz, Ossowska, 
and Borusewicz were sent to local enterprises to announce the continuation of the strike.
364
 
A similar process had already started elsewhere. In Gdynia a decision had been taken to 
continue without the Lenin Shipyard if necessary in a strike committee comprised of 
enterprises still on strike,
365
 while at “Elmor” a meeting was held at which workers spoke of 
the need to maintain unity amongst local enterprises. They put forward a proposal to work 
together in an Inter-Factory Strike Committee (MKS). With the strike at the Lenin Shipyard 
saved, the MKS was established there instead. Its first meeting took place in the Health and 
Safety (BHP) Hall that night. Approximately fifty people were present, including 
representatives from over twenty striking enterprises and Free Trade Union activists. 
Together they agreed on the ‘essential principles’ of the MKS, drew up an initial list of 
demands and elected a Presidium headed by Wałęsa. Work continued on preparations for 
the next stage of the strike throughout the night.
366
  
It marked a significant turn-around for Wałęsa. SB reports suggest a reluctance to 
continue with the strike, doing so only ‘under pressure’ from other activists.367 Such 
reticence was perhaps understandable given his initial misgivings about leading the strike 
and that he had already achieved all that had been asked of him. Wałęsa, as with all those at 
the yard, was venturing into the unknown again. The strike remained vulnerable. Rumours 
were spread by management that workers were being kept in the yard against their will. 
Threats of MO and SB intervention were made.
368
 While it was not clear whether the 
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authorities would use force as in December 1970, Borusewicz later admitted that such 
means would have brought results at this stage.
369
 They had no means of protection. They 
even lacked sufficient guards along the perimeter walls and gates.
370
 The future of the strike 
was uncertain. It was not clear whether it would survive the Sunday. New enterprises would 
not be joining the MKS nor were workers likely to return. It would be unclear until Monday 
whether a new phase of the strike was genuinely underway.  
17 August 1980 (Sunday) 
Relations between the Church hierarchy and the opposition had been of limited importance 
during the 1970s compared to those with the authorities on the one hand, and with Catholics 
(ranging from the clergy to the congregation) on the other.
371
 As such the support of the 
Church for the strikes on the coast was not to be taken for granted. According to Andrzej 
Friszke, while sympathy for the striking workers from Bishop Kaczmarek of Gdańsk could 
be anticipated, support for the work of the opposition and involvement in a worker-state 
confrontation could not. In the days prior to the first Sunday of the strike Kaczmarek had 
indicated to the local authorities that he held moderate views on events and was also initially 
against the idea of holding Mass at the yard.
372
 The views of the Church hierarchy were not 
necessarily the same as those of parish priests, however.  
In the Gdańsk region, for example, there was a legacy of cooperation between local 
opposition activists and certain parish priests as a result of earlier religious services 
dedicated to imprisoned activists that could be built upon. The organisation of prayers every 
evening at the Lenin Shipyard by two Young Poland Movement activists built on earlier 
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religious actions held to highlight the case of two imprisoned local activists, for example.
373
 
Such ties arguably came to the fore on the first Sunday of the strike in spite of Kaczmarek’s 
reticence. Mass was celebrated at a number of striking enterprises in the region, including at 
the Lenin and Paris Commune shipyards.
374
 The origins and the nature of Mass at the two 
shipyards differed considerably, however.  
While Mass at the Lenin Shipyard was celebrated by Father Henryk Jankowski with 
the ultimate agreement of both Bishop Kaczmarek and the Provincial Governor Jerzy 
Kołodziejski,375 Mass at the Paris Commune Shipyard as well as a later service at the Port of 
Gdynia was conducted by Father Hilary Jastak without permission from either the local or 
the Church authorities. Bishop Kaczmarek had warned Father Jastak against doing so in 
person following a request from Kołodziejski.376 Neither the Church nor the authorities 
ultimately prevented him, however. Although his taxi was halted by the militia cordon 
around the yard, he travelled the rest of the way on foot. The militia did not stop him. Some 
even knelt before him.
377
 Amongst some of the militia at least, the Church as an alternate 
source of authority to the Party carried influence.  
If such influences were to be felt upon Polish citizens however, the authorities 
preferred them to be moderate. As such the fact that Jankowski was granted permission 
while Jastak was not is unsurprising. More than twenty years Jankowski’s senior, Jastak had 
served as a Home Army (AK) chaplain during the Warsaw Uprising of August 1944, an 
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experience he invoked during his service at the Paris Commune Yard.
378
 He had also been 
subject to ‘administrative proceedings’ by the authorities for engaging in ‘activity harmful 
for the state’ in the summer of 1978 after dedicating Mass to a local opposition activist then 
on hunger strike in prison.
379
 He had a clear link with opposition activity, a fact that must 
have concerned the authorities. By contrast Jankowski appears to have held views far more 
in keeping with those of Bishop Kaczmarek at around this time. He reportedly questioned 
whether the strike was justified since economic conditions had been met and suggested that 
the Church keep its distance from those representing the strike.
380
 As such Jankowski’s 
views appear to have been far more moderate and commensurate with the dominant stance 
of the Church to the opposition at this time.  
This was arguably reflected in the nature of the sermons delivered in Gdańsk and 
Gdynia. Jankowski’s sermon was by far the more moderate of the two. Amongst other 
things, Jankowski sympathised with the workers over the nature of work in an industrialised 
society. However, he also discussed the dignity of work, viewing it as an act that linked 
‘humanity in one family, contributing to peace on Earth.’381 While the Church stood on the 
side of the Polish nation therefore, a point made clear by a later reference to Pope John Paul 
II’s June 1979 Victory Square homily which saw the Polish nation and Catholicism as 
forever bound to one another, work even under these circumstances was also for the good of 
the nation and should be done. Work was not the only source of peace, however. He 
concluded his sermon by urging a ‘path of dialogue’ leading amongst other things to ‘peace 
on the terrain of Gdańsk in our nation’.382 It was arguably this part of his sermon that 
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chimed most closely with the beliefs not only of the workers and the opposition, but also of 
the authorities. It was the Church as the voice of moderation. 
 The attitude to work displayed in Jankowski’s sermon, as well as his desire for 
peace and stability, appears to have been in keeping with sentiments expressed in Cardinal 
Wyszyński’s first public declaration on events.383 While Wyszyński also used his sermon to 
demonstrate ‘understanding’ of Polish workers, his approach was balanced and cautious. 
The workers’ demands but not their actions were supported.384 This was in stark contrast to 
the Paris Commune Mass where Father Jastak invoked not only John Paul II’s Victory 
Square homily in support of the defence of ‘the inalienable rights of man’, but also domestic 
and international law. Having studied the workers’ demands he found them to be supported 
not only by God, but by the Helsinki Final Act, the Constitution of the PRL, and the United 
Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.385 It was clear whose side he was on. This 
was a point not lost on the Interior Ministry. Although they reported the stance of the 
Catholic Church favourably, including the sermons of Wyszyński and Jankowski, Father 
Jastak’s influence was negatively assessed.386 His was a voice of dissent within the Church. 
It was presumably due to the scale of the strike at the Paris Commune yard, where 
12000 people attended Mass on both sides of the gates (as opposed to 6000 at the Lenin 
yard), rather than the tone and unauthorised nature of Father Jastak’s Mass that caused the 
authorities to make a renewed attempt to end the strike. As Father Jastak delivered his 
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sermon, a helicopter circled over the yard and dropped leaflets on the workers below.
387
 
Amongst other things, the leaflets noted the granting of pay increases to workers despite 
Poland’s serious economic difficulties and contrasted the situation in the Paris Commune 
Shipyard unfavourably with that in the Lenin Shipyard where an agreement had been 
reached to conclude the strike and go back to work. It also warned of ‘political slogans 
directed at the basis of social order’ being found at the yard and urged them to reconsider 
their demands. They should think of what they might lead to.
388
 It was a typical mixture of 
concessionary language coupled with insinuations and threats aimed at dividing and 
undermining the strike. While it proved ineffective, it provides a useful reminder that with 
the strike still in the balance at the Lenin Shipyard, during the first Sunday of the strike it 
was the Paris Commune yard that, in terms of numbers of workers still on strike, was the 
more significant of the two. Had the authorities succeeded in undermining the strike in 
Gdynia, the strike in Gdańsk may well have proved more difficult to sustain. 
Despite the authorities’ negative assessment of Father Jastak and their efforts to 
break the Paris Commune strike, the response to the sermons of Jastak and Jankowski 
amongst workers seems to have been uniformly positive. At a time of great uncertainty 
surrounding the strikes, particularly at two enterprises where the collective memory of 
December 1970 remained so strong, the services helped to save the strikes. They brought the 
workers together and also drew crowds back to the shipyards. They provided a morale boost 
at a time of previously low spirits and also strengthened the workers’ beliefs. Confidence in 
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their chances of success also increased.
389
 Equally it made clear their commitment to non-
violence and to peace. They had no desire for a repeat of 1970.  
This was a point reinforced in the aftermath of the Lenin Shipyard’s Mass. A simple 
wooden cross was blessed by Father Jankowski and erected outside the second gate of the 
Lenin Shipyard, where the first workers had fallen in 1970.
390
  Even leaving aside the 
symbolism of its location, the cross became an important symbol for the strike. As Jan 
Kubik notes in his analysis of symbolism during the strike, alongside the accepted reading 
of the cross as a symbol of ‘Christianity’ and ‘Christ’s sacrifice’, it held additional meaning 
for the Poles: ‘First, it was a sign of defiance toward the Communist regime and the 
authorities; second it was a metaphor of national martyrdom; and third, it was a symbol of 
Poland as a messiah of nations.’391 It was symbolically significant irrespective of whether 
the workers were Catholics or not. This was also true of Mass itself. Jean-Yves Potel, for 
example, has described Mass as a source of strength to those who were religious and as 
evidence of freedom of speech for those who were not.
392
 Both understandings were in 
keeping with the spirit of the strikers’ demands. Christianity sowed unity rather than 
division at the strike. 
Mass and the wooden cross were not the only symbolic means of resistance in 
evidence. While the red-and-white flowers, as with the arm bands of the strike guard, 
recalled the national colours and were already an established part of Poland’s ‘repertoire of 
contention’, two further images deserve recognition as part of the workers’ symbolic 
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resistance to the state.
393
 Firstly, the image of the Black Madonna of Częstochowa, 
considered by Poles to be ‘the Patroness and Defender of Polish sovereignty, national 
identity, and culture’ was present at the strike.394 It offered a firm reminder of Poland’s 
history of resistance to repression and subjugation by foreign powers, beginning with the 
Swedes in 1655 and more recently under the authority of Cardinal Wyszyński as a symbol 
of the Great Novena and renewal of Polish Catholicism in 1966.
395
 Secondly, the image of 
Pope John Paul II was also displayed, as it was at many other strikes. This was a national 
symbol that had not been long available, but was a vital one. The dual impact of Karol 
Wojtyła’s unexpected election as Pope in October 1978 and his subsequent pilgrimage as 
Pope John Paul II in June 1979 should not be underestimated. While on the one hand they 
sowed discord within the Party and provided Poland with a parallel source of sovereignty, 
they also united Polish society in unprecedented fashion.
396
 While the atomisation of society 
was to some extent reversed therefore, the atomisation of the leadership similarly increased. 
Although not the only cause of such unity and division in Poland, these events arguably 
played an important part in laying the groundwork for the success of non-violence in the 
summer of 1980. 
It was the simple wooden cross and one of three sets of words pinned to it that best 
highlighted the strike’s peaceful nature, however. Below a quote from another Polish 
national figurehead Józef Piłsudski and above a small print of the Black Madonna and a 
typed leaflet warning those who would destroy the Polish citizenry, the Polish nation and 
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the natural environment, was a section of Lord Byron’s poem Giaour.397 As Jan Kubik and 
Timothy Garton Ash note, a vital word was missing from the version of Byron’s poem on 
display at the yard. While the original read ‘For Freedom’s battle once begun/Bequeath’d 
bleeding sire to son/Though baffled oft is ever won’, the word “bleeding” was absent from 
that displayed at the shipyard. It was, Kubik presumes, ‘omitted […] in order to emphasize 
the peaceful, nonconfrontational philosophy of the strike.’398 While Kubik has also claimed 
that the three pieces of writing displayed on the cross were symbolic, amongst other things, 
of the workers’ understanding that they were part of a shared and long-established Polish 
culture of rebellion,
399
 it is arguable that December 1970 was the key to understanding these 
writings and the associated imagery. Workers did not wish to spill blood to achieve their 
demands. Nor did they wish to go through 1970 once again.
400
 It was a desire arguably 
shared by the local authorities.  
In addition to the leaflet dropped on the Paris Commune Shipyard, an appeal by 
Tadeusz Fiszbach was also broadcast on local television and radio. In many respects, the 
style and tone of the appeal was similar to that employed in the Party’s appeal during the 
Lublin strike. Arguably there were two differences relating specifically to the coast, 
however. Firstly, there was a reference to the memory of December 1970 and the need for 
‘prudence’ and ‘responsibility’ that resulted from this.401  While this could be read as a 
‘warning’ rather than a ‘threat’,402 it could also be seen as a genuine sign of concern that the 
workers would take to the streets again. For the local Party as with the workers, the memory 
of 1970 will have been stronger than elsewhere in Poland. The local authorities had no more 
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desire for a repeat of 1970 than the opposition and workers did. As Fiszbach’s statement 
made clear, dialogue was still the favoured outcome.
403
 A session of the local Party 
committee held to discuss events in the region called on Warsaw to establish a government 
commission to resolve local strike demands.
404
 The local Party favoured a resolution along 
the lines of that of Lublin 1980, than that of the Baltic coast 1970.  
Secondly, Fiszbach also hinted at a factor that made both Gdańsk and Gdynia 
different to earlier strikes and may have added to their desire for a peaceful resolution: the 
international context. As Fiszbach noted towards the end of his speech, there was a need to 
demonstrate not only to their fellow citizens, but also to ‘international public opinion’ that it 
was possible for them ‘to solve our own problems’ in an appropriate fashion. A reference in 
the final line to the influence of the nation’s ‘reason of state’ on their thinking at this time 
indicated concern over a potential Soviet threat if they failed to resolve matters 
themselves.
405
 Not only did they not wish to employ violence, but perhaps with the 
forthcoming Warsaw Pact manoeuvres in mind, they did not want Moscow to become 
involved either. This was particularly the case with Western eyewitnesses present, 
eyewitnesses who came not only in the form of journalists but also through the region’s 
business ties. As major port cities both Gdańsk and Gdynia were “gateways to the world” 
and had far more contact with international observers, than a city such as Lublin did. As 
such there was a greater international context to events on the coast. With both trade and 
new finance still required from the West, any violence on the coast witnessed by the West 
(unless it were triggered by the workers and the Party only acted in response) could damage 
Poland’s prospects in this regard. The nation simply could not afford this to happen. 
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Although events were still uncertain however, there were no signs that the workers were 
considering the use of violence. They were preparing for the next stage of the strike.  
18 August 1980 (Monday) 
On Monday morning local radio in Gdańsk broadcast an interview with the Vice-Chairman 
of the Provincial Board of Społem in which he reassured listeners that shops contained 
‘sufficient’ supplies of basic goods such as bread and milk for the day. There was no need 
for locals to ‘panic’ buy goods in excess numbers as they had been doing in recent days.406 
While the authorities sought to reassure a general public preparing for a black day on the 
coast, in the Lenin Shipyard they were continuing to rely on leafleting as a means of 
persuading workers back to work. An aeroplane flew over the shipyard scattering leaflets 
calling for a return to work, while ‘every four minutes’ Gniech used the radio system (to 
which the MKS had no access) to appeal to workers outside the shipyard to return to work. 
A leaflet signed by Gniech was also distributed outside the gates, making a similar 
appeal.
407
 With the survival of the strike at the yard by no means assured due to the limited 
number of participants, the authorities could still bring it to an end without force. 
 Having left on Saturday afternoon following the end of the initial strike, the majority 
of workers were now ready to return. It was not clear whether they would be willing to join 
the new inter-factory strike, however. Under the influence of the leaflets and appeals, some 
departments took up work again.
408
 The strikers did not allow the efforts of the management 
to go unchallenged, however. Using a megaphone they called for those who considered 
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themselves workers and citizens of Gdańsk to return to the yard.409 Wałęsa appealed not 
only at the second gate, but also within the departments for returning workers to join the 
strike.
410
 Following what must have been a period of confusion, it became clear that the 
strike was still on. It was a different kind of strike however, both in terms of its nature and 
demands. 
Although an initial list of sixteen demands had been drawn up during the night of 
16-17 August and distributed by KOR to Western news agencies, it was only during the 
night of 17-18 August that a final list of twenty-one demands was completed.
411
 While the 
sixteen demands already marked a significant escalation from those put forward at the Lenin 
Shipyard on 14 August 1980, the twenty-one demands marked a further progression. The 
main reason for this hinged on the difference between the sixteen and the twenty-one 
demands in terms of their approach to the MKS’ central demand: that for free trade unions. 
As Jan Skórzyński notes, in the sixteen demands trade unions were represented only in 
points five and seven. As with the demands made by workers at “Elmor” on 15 August, 
these called for observation of ILO convention number 87 as ratified by the Polish 
authorities and an end to ‘interference’ in the activities of trade unions by the authorities.412 
Perhaps indicating caution on the part of the workers in case it provoked the authorities, the 
demand for free trade unions was implicit rather than explicit in these demands. It was only 
in the twenty-one demands that it was made plain. In point one of the demands it stated: 
‘The acceptance of free trade unions independent from the Party and employers, [in 
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accordance] with Convention Nr 87 of the International Labour Organisation concerning 
freedom of unions.’413 As Holzer notes, six further demands were also considered 
‘political’, the rest were ‘social’ or ‘economic’.414 While the former included demands for 
the release of political prisoners and freedom of expression, the latter included changes to 
pensions and retirement ages, as well as child care for working women.  
They appealed to a broader cross-section of society than the initial demands. They 
were national rather than local issues, appealing to all Poles rather than to workers at 
specific enterprises. As point eleven (a demand for the introduction of rationing cards for 
meat) demonstrates, the workers had a good understanding of the problems facing Poles. As 
Joanna Duda-Gwiazda later observed, Poles who lived through this period ‘well remember 
the terrible queues for everything – lemons, toilet paper, and above all for meat.’415 The 
workers were well aware of these problems from the experience of their daily lives. The 
demands were designed to tackle this problem for them all, not just for those on strike. 
Noticeably the demands also illustrated an awareness of the geopolitical realities within 
which they were operating. A call for censorship to be abolished was quashed by 
Borusewicz who referenced the impact of such demands in Czechoslovakia. A demand for 
free elections was also deemed unacceptable to the Soviet Union.
416
 Borusewicz was keen to 
avoid any provocation of Moscow. The Soviet Union, as he later observed, ‘played a critical 
role in absentia, since no one could anticipate what they would do.’417 Amidst the hope and 
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uncertainty, there was realism. There were certain things they could never hope to change. 
Point one was controversial enough.  
Despite being rooted in an international labour convention ratified by the Polish 
authorities, the demand for ‘free trade unions independent from the Party and employers’ 
was entirely at odds with Communist ideology. So too was the nature of the strike. As 
Milovan Djilas explains, ‘proper political conditions for general strikes’ did not exist under 
Communism. They were possible ‘only in exceptional situations.’ The chances of a free 
trade union ever emerging were also slim: ‘Trade union organizations and other professional 
organizations, because of their purpose and functions, can only be the appendages of a 
single owner and potentate – the political oligarchy.418 They were little more than a 
“transmission belt” for the directives of the Party. A trade union that genuinely represented 
the working-class would become a significant threat to the Party and also the nomenklatura. 
After all, the working class ‘is the class on which production depends and on which the rise 
and very existence of the new class depends.’419 Hence their desire to prevent such 
organisations from developing 
While in the long-term a free trade union could provide the best means through 
which the workers could defend their interests, in the short term the problem was of how to 
force the Party to acquiesce to a demand for their creation. Solidarity in the form of the 
Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS) provided their best chance of success. The purpose of 
the MKS had already been made clear. In the aftermath of the initial strike a communiqué 
had been issued announcing its formation. The MKS would be fully responsible for 
coordinating both the demands and actions of those enterprises on strike in the region. It 
alone had the power to represent the workers in discussions with the authorities and the 
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strike would be brought to an end only on its say so. The end of the strike would not mean 
the end of the MKS, however. It would remain in existence to oversee the implementation 
of its demands and the organisation of free unions.
420
 The strike would be of a different 
order to that of the previous week.  
 Any striking enterprise signing up to the MKS had to accept each of the 21 demands.  
The fact that they did so in large numbers, demonstrates just how broad support for these 
demands really was on the coast. When registration opened that morning, striking 
enterprises registered en masse. At first they came from nearby enterprises, and then from 
nearby towns to register.
421
 The numbers increased rapidly. From 40 enterprises that 
morning, by the end of the day a total of 156 had registered.
422
 The strike was expanding all 
along the coast. In Gdynia workers had gone on strike at the naval shipyard where some of 
the Polish and Soviet navies were based.
423
 Influenced by news of Gdańsk meanwhile, a 
solidarity strike had begun in Elbląg. By the end of the day their own demands, including 
for independent unions, and an MKS had been formed.
424
 There were also the first signs of 
strikes in Słupsk.425 More significantly Szczecin was now on strike. The “Parnica” Repair 
Yard was first to come out on strike that morning. It was followed hours later by the 
region’s dominant enterprise the Warski Shipyard.426 All three of the main centres of 
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activity on the Baltic coast from December 1970 were now on strike. They were different 
kinds of strikes and would follow different paths, however.  
 While as with Gdańsk the strike at the “Parnica” yard was not as spontaneous as it 
might have first seemed to the outside world at least, it did not involve the opposition as that 
at the Lenin Shipyard did. While there were some centres of opposition in Szczecin, these 
were far more limited than along the coast.
427
 They did not become involved, nor did the 
workers wish them to. Indeed the strike in Szczecin swiftly and consistently displayed a 
cool attitude to outsiders.
428
 This was a purely working-class affair. This is not to say that it 
was unplanned, however. According to Aleksander Krystosiak, a veteran of December 1970 
and an August 1980 strike leader, the strike was subject to some planning. Discussions had 
taken place prior to its launch amongst a group of workers. Although they were generally 
confident of success, there was some fear in case the strike did not ignite and they were 
imprisoned. They attempted to cover their tracks by adopting a low-key start to the strike. 
While one worker was sent to one department to inform them that a strike had begun in 
another department, another worker did the same in the other department. A third worker 
spread the news to an additional department that the other two were on strike. Although no-
one had actually downed tools at this point, the hope was that as workers left their 
departments to investigate the rumours they would naturally congregate in the main 
thoroughfare at the yard, attracting other workers in the process. The strike would develop 
from there. As Krystosiak informed Jack Bloom: 
We picked the people who were hardest to remember so they wouldn’t get 
arrested for starting the strike. They were told that as soon as they gave 
their message, they should disappear. We already had our demands. We 
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knew the workers were ready for some action and that the news would 
spread with the speed of lightning.
429
 
 
With the plan unfolding as anticipated, a strike committee was soon elected and demands 
formulated. News of the strike was then spread to the Warski Shipyard.
430
 It also downed 
tools and formulated its own demands. The demands differed from department to 
department. However, twenty-two out of twenty-six departments at the Warski yard 
included demands for either the reform of existing trade unions or the creation of new ones. 
They were to be ‘free and independent’ and to operate without interference.431 A similar 
demand was also included in the eighteen presented by the strike committee at the “Parnica” 
yard.
432
 As with many other enterprises launching strikes, those in Szczecin skipped the 
limited demands made during the initial phase of the strikes in July and at the Lenin 
Shipyard only days before, and went straight for the demand that would dominate the rest of 
that summer: free trade unions. Events had escalated sharply along the coast in terms of 
enterprise numbers, geographical spread and demands. They would be more difficult to 
control.  
 At a lengthy Politburo session Kania assessed the situation on the coast. Gierek 
emphasised that no appeals for the workers to take to the streets had been made, but the 
situation was far from promising. As Stanisław Kowalczyk warned, the possibility of 
workers doing so could not be discounted.
433
 In spite (or because) of previous experience, it 
seemed unlikely that they would do so however. As one worker involved with the 1970 
strike at the Lenin Shipyard informed Janina Jankowska, ‘We made mistakes, but we have 
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already not repeated these mistakes.’434 The Party could not be any surer of this than the 
workers could be that the Party had learnt from its mistakes, however. Rumours continued 
to circulate about army and militia build-ups around the edges of the city.
435
 Preparations for 
“Lato-80” also continued with the strikes in Gdańsk a main focus of attention. In spite of 
some calls for the use of the militia, they were not heeded. The defence of vital buildings 
was their primary aim.
436
 Preparations amongst the armed forces were also underway, 
including in the Navy. There was nothing exceptional about their activities at this time, 
however.
437
 Even if there had been, it was unclear whether they would act. That evening at a 
plenum of the regional Party committee in Gdańsk at which Stanisław Kania also spoke, 
Rear-Admiral Janczyszyn claimed that despite disquiet amongst soldiers, the armed forces 
were ‘disciplined’. The army would ‘do nothing to threaten links with society and the 
workers.’438 While there were no defections, it is clear that the armed forces would be 
reluctant to take action against the workers as they had done a decade before. 
 It was a reluctance shared at the highest levels. Although one Politburo member 
voiced criticisms of the leadership’s response so far and called for a tougher stance from the 
Party, and another spoke of the urgent need to quarantine the Gdańsk shipyards ‘from the 
rest of the country’, a proposal by Gierek to release a Politburo communiqué followed by a 
radio and television appearance won universal backing. However, many felt that even with 
the serious situation on the coast the text for Gierek’s television appearance required more 
work and should be delayed for a day.
439
 He ignored these calls. He addressed the nation 
live on television and radio later that day. He admitted that ‘mistakes in economic policy’ 
had contributed significantly to Poland’s problems. New measures were to be presented to 
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the Central Committee in the near future. In the interim he offered further economic 
concessions, including a step-by-step increase in child benefit levels commencing in 
1981.
440
 There was little new on offer. Regarding the strikes themselves, he expressed a 
willingness to engage in dialogue. This is not to say that it would be in good faith, however, 
or that he would engage in them with the MKS. As he warned: 
Attempts to use stoppages at work for political ends and to incite tension 
by irresponsible individuals and anarchic, anti-socialist groups, are a 
dangerous aspect of recent events at plants on the Gdańsk coast. [...]  [I]t is 
our duty to state with complete resolution, that any actions which strike at 
the foundation of the political and social order in Poland cannot and will 
not be tolerated!
441
 
 
There were clear limits within which Poland had to operate. These could not be challenged. 
Neither Gierek’s promises nor his threats made any impression on the workers. 
Walentynowicz complained that Gierek was talking down to them and that nothing had 
changed. They would wait for someone from the capital to come to them in person and 
negotiate with them in good faith.
442
 A similar stance was adopted by Wałęsa. Others also 
voiced their loss of faith in Gierek.
443
 In the minutes after his speech they put the 21 
demands on display by the second gate and listened to Radio Free Europe.
444
 Gierek was 
still in charge, but he had only limited control over the coastal workers. Indeed the only 
significant action on the coast appears to have been the halting of cars flying the national 
flag by Gdańsk’s militia.445 With the flag being flown to symbolise support for the shipyard 
workers it had, in the words of Lawrence Goodwyn, been turned against the authorities as ‘a 
private declaration of resistance and a public affiliation with the cause of the shipyard 
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workers.’446 It was a relatively minor act of defiance, however, and one that was easy for the 
authorities to tackle without inflaming the situation. They may also have felt that it 
increased their chances of halting the spread of support for the strike as well as the 
transportation of underground publications. Their options in Gdańsk were limited. 
 They were proving more effective against the opposition elsewhere. Although the 
security services could not completely prevent the spread of information via the 
underground press, they had begun to carry out an increased number of detentions over the 
weekend. According to MSW reports, a major aim was to prevent opposition activists 
reaching the coast. Seven opposition activists had been detained over the weekend in this 
regard, including Kazimierz Świton, a free trade union activist from Katowice.447 A number 
of opposition detentions were also carried out on 18 August in Wrocław.448 According to 
Western media reports, which were now carrying front-page coverage of the strikes, KOR 
activists in Warsaw were also under increasing pressure.
449
 The noose appeared to be 
tightening around the main opposition centres in the country. The security services did not 
succeed in stemming the flow of information nor support for the strikes, however. While the 
countryside remained largely undisturbed by strikes, peasant self-defence activists in 
Zbrosza Duża had issued a statement over the weekend declaring their support for the 
shipyard workers. On 18 August they called for further action by farmers and began a 
collection of money for the workers.
450
 In urban areas KOR, Robotnik and ROPCiO also 
indicated their support.
451
 Though limited, such signs of support demonstrated the continued 
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links and support of pre-existing opposition networks for the strikes. It will have provided a 
welcome morale boost for the workers. 
 Less promising was the international situation. In the Eastern bloc, including East 
Germany, media coverage had increased although the term ‘strike’ was not being used.452 
Behind the scenes, the authorities were also starting to pay greater attention to events. In 
relation to the situation in Poland the State Security Ministry started to produce reports ‘on 
the public mood within East Germany’ while the East German National People’s Army’s 
Intelligence Department also began to produce reports on Polish events.
453
 The army warned 
that strikes were the work of counter-revolutionaries planning to introduce ‘a permanent 
state of disquiet and uncertainty’ and aiming for the ‘elimination of the socialist order in 
Poland.’ Such actions against the Polish state had not yet reached their peak.454 East 
Germany’s domestic concerns appeared limited by comparison, however. A U.S. assessment 
of the public mood in East Germany’s border area with Poland suggested that the authorities 
should have little fear with regards to contagion. Although East Germans were aware of 
events in Poland, those they had spoken to saw ‘little reason to strike’ due to the 
comparatively good economic situation in East Germany.
455
 This is not to say that East 
Germany’s economic situation was assured, however. Though less severe than Poland’s 
economic crisis, East Germany was not without its debt problems. It also shared Poland’s oil 
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dependency on the Soviet Union and faced similar cutbacks as Moscow sought to boost 
hard-currency earnings.
456
 There was always the potential for unrest.  
Though no significant signs of disquiet, including amongst Polish workers based in 
East Germany, were recorded in the first of the Stasi’s reports events were being monitored 
carefully.
457
 A more pressing reason for East Germans not to strike, however, was the East 
German security service. A U.S. telegram noted that those East Germans they had spoken to 
‘felt that the GDR’s security police were so well-organized and firm that no significant 
number of GDR workers would consider striking even if GDR economic conditions were to 
deteriorate.’458 Although in terms of personnel numbers the Stasi was far from its late 1980s 
peak, a clear increase had taken place since Helsinki.
459
 It would be difficult for potential 
protesters to escape their attention. East Germans were unlikely to risk challenging them. 
The significant presence of the Soviet army on East German soil was also likely to add an 
additional barrier of fear. There had been no major worker uprising since 1953 when Soviet 
forces had crushed it.
460
 This was not an experience that Poland had. Although Soviet tanks 
had rolled on Warsaw during the Polish October of 1956, they had ultimately turned back.
461
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Despite further major protests in Poland in 1968, 1970 and 1976, the Soviet Union had 
always stayed out. 
East Germany was not alone in paying increased attention to events. In private talks 
with the Polish ambassador in Washington and in Department of State statements, the U.S. 
was adopting ‘a hands-off attitude’ to events. They were Poland’s own ‘internal affairs’.462 
Behind the scenes they were more concerned.  Their embassy in Warsaw sent no fewer than 
four telegrams to Washington that day. While two provided situation updates,
463
 the others 
were more interesting. The first carried an economic assessment based on official statistics 
published for the first six months of the year in Trybuna Ludu. While welcoming the fact 
that Poland’s balance of trade had improved, the U.S. raised doubts about whether it would 
last.
 
No mention was made of the strikes in connection to these doubts.
464
 Although the 
strikes were becoming increasingly important to the U.S., it is clear that the economy was 
still of great significance. It was not clear whether they would retain this economic focus as 
the worker-state confrontation intensified.  
Although Gierek had left open the possibility for negotiation over economic 
demands and compromise, as the second report on Gierek’s speech noted, ‘a confrontation 
is now much closer with both sides having fewer options than heretofore.’ What happened 
next was the responsibility of the workers. The report suggested that while the Polish public 
would support them if they chose to negotiate over economic grievances, they would lose 
support if they pursued political demands. The majority of the Polish public was ‘not ready 
to fight for wider political freedoms.’ Meanwhile with Gierek’s reputation at risk it was felt 
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that if the workers and the Party were unable to resolve the situation, then his speech had 
potentially ‘laid the basis for stronger measures.’465 The CIA warned the workers were ‘on a 
collision course with the regime’ as a result of their strike demands: ‘Gierek’s reluctance to 
use police may be severely tested’. If force were used, the situation could escalate.466 Under 
such circumstances, Poland’s fragile economy could be threatened and with it the prospect 
of new loans. These already appeared to be under threat. That day Gierek cancelled his two-
day trip to West Germany to meet with Chancellor Schmidt. It had been due to begin the 
following day. All of the preparations were in place.
467
 It was a blow for both sides. While 
for both Schmidt and Gierek it damaged their respective foreign policies, it will also have 
hurt Poland’s economic needs. Poland’s much needed bank loan had yet to be signed. The 
future of Poland’s economic ties with West Germany was far from assured. In the build up 
to West German elections that autumn, Schmidt faced increasing domestic political pressure 
over continued economic support for Poland’s communist regime.468 Due presumably to the 
importance of Poland’s ties with West Germany not only for economic reasons, but also for 
peace and stability in Europe, the Poles were keen to reschedule. Although due to the 
elections the meeting was now likely to take place in November, the Poles had proposed the 
earlier date of September.
469
 This suggests they expected to have the strikes under control 
within weeks. It was not clear how they intended to do so. 
19 August 1980 (Tuesday) 
Local press coverage of the previous evening’s regional Party Committee session and the 
arrival of the Pyka commission suggested that the authorities intended to use negotiations to 
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end the strikes on the coast.
470
 Many of their actions suggested otherwise, however. That 
day an aeroplane circled over Gdańsk dropping copies of an appeal from the mayors of 
Gdańsk, Gdynia and Sopot to local residents.471 The appeal focussed on the local rather than 
the national impact of the strike, particularly on children and the sick. Essential services 
needed to be maintained for the good of local residents. They called for a swift return to an 
‘atmosphere of stability and peace’ in the Tri-cities.472 In the event that such peace and 
stability did not return to the region, the security services continued to prepare for action. 
Rumours of an impending crackdown, which some claim were spread by the SB in an effort 
to undermine the strike, were rife.
473
 Even in the Church some feared that violence could 
result from a confrontation at this time.
474
  
The West was also watching with concern. The media reported accounts of riot 
police being flown into Gdańsk from Warsaw. The U.S. Embassy sent reports of similar 
sightings to the Department of State, noting that a Finnish source returning to Warsaw had 
seen “special militia” disembarking from aircraft at Gdańsk’s airport. A journalist had also 
reported militia being helicoptered into the area and ‘massing’ on the outskirts of the city.475 
Despite maintaining a cautious stance in public so as not to be seen as encouraging unrest, 
privately the U.S. administration was concerned about the possibility of violence.
476
 At 
NATO the U.S. Mission released an earlier Department of State analysis of events to 
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POLAD’s (Political Advisers) and members of the Economic Committee. Alongside the 
considerable economic ramifications of unrest for the Polish authorities, it included a 
warning that the ‘possibility for more widespread civil disturbances, including bloodshed, 
cannot be ruled out.’477 A list of seventeen ‘indicators of possible violence’ had also been 
prepared for the Warsaw embassy. The list was not restricted to actions by the authorities 
and workers, but also included actions by the Church, the opposition and Moscow. Amongst 
the most noticeable were two referring to a militia build-up in the vicinity of striking 
enterprises and the ‘mobilization and deployment of some elements’ of the MSW. A list of 
units most likely to be deployed in Gdańsk was also provided. A number of others would 
also become relevant, however: an alcohol ban; public appeals for calm by Cardinal 
Wyszyński, the Pope or KOR; as well as public Soviet warnings that the situation needed to 
be ‘brought under control’. Private Soviet assurances that Warsaw had the ‘situation under 
control’ were also deemed suspicious.478 Moscow was far from nearing this stage, however.  
According to Western media reports, Soviet diplomats were avoiding contact with 
their Western counterparts so as not to discuss the situation.
479
Although Moscow had finally 
broken its media silence, Moscow’s public response remained relatively restrained.480 TASS 
reported on Gierek’s address to the nation, but drew particular attention to Gierek’s warning 
about altering the socialist basis of Poland.
481
 A similar focus was also evident in the East 
German and Czechoslovak media.
482
 While keen to remind Warsaw of the limits placed on 
Poland’s sovereignty and of one of the key expectations of the Polish leadership, they did 
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not wish to be seen to interfere in the internal affairs of another country. The latter was an 
attitude that remained in keeping with both the spirit of Helsinki and arguably also with a 
realistic assessment of the Soviet Union’s national interest at this time, particularly with the 
war in Afghanistan underway.  
It was also an attitude that chimed largely with the thinking of the British Foreign 
Secretary Lord Carrington. Against a backdrop of rumours of an imminent crackdown 
against the Polish workers with all of the ramifications that it would bring for stability in 
Poland and Europe, questions were beginning to be asked about what Western diplomacy 
could achieve under the circumstances. Carrington had replied to such a question following 
a lecture in Stockholm by stating: ‘Well, I think that the short answer to that is that there is 
nothing very much we can do except if it ever happens to express our disapproval of any 
means of putting down these things by force.’ Until such a crackdown took place or ‘a third 
country’ intervened, they should refrain from comment even if they ‘sympathise’ to some 
extent with the aims of the workers. As he made clear: 
I think once you get interfering into the internal affairs of other countries 
you get into very considerable trouble and I don’t think it is very wise. 
There is an increasing tendency in some quarters in my country, if I may 
be allowed to say so, and I daresay in yours too, to behave like the 
proverbial English nanny and to think that the whole world is your 
business and you have got to put it right. I am not sure that I believe that 
this is altogether sensible. But if one sympathises one can sympathise. 
 
If Britain considered Poland to be a Polish problem for the Poles to deal with, then he hoped 
that neighbouring countries would do also.
483
 It was a stance arguably in keeping with 
longer-term policy towards this region, which despite its interest in human rights saw ‘no 
interest in provoking a crisis in the area, which would again be ended by invasion if the 
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Russians thought it necessary.’484 It was unlikely to win popular backing from all quarters, 
however. Criticism of outside interference in another country’s ‘internal affairs’ by regimes 
such as those of normalisation-era Czechoslovakia and Apartheid-era South Africa had 
made the stance advocated by Carrington unpopular with some. As one journalist noted, ‘In 
an interdependent world, that argument is invalid.’485 Balancing the defence of human rights 
in other nations with the need for world peace was no easy task, but the two could not be 
separated entirely. As John Paul II argued, ‘What happens in a country’s internal social life 
has a considerable bearing – for better or worse – upon peace between nations.’486 Whatever 
the outcome of Polish events, they were likely to have an influence more broadly on global 
peace.  
In keeping with the Soviet Union’s public line and despite the announcement of 
military manoeuvres days beforehand, there were no signs of preparations to enforce the 
socialist basis of society by the Warsaw Pact. A trip to the East German-Polish border area 
by a U.S. embassy official indicated that the situation was normal. Although East German 
citizens were aware that intervention was a possibility, there was no evidence of troop 
movements.
487
 Concerns appear to have remained domestic at this time. In Czechoslovakia, 
for example, despite government officials admitting to concerns in private, they were 
equally relieved that it had not triggered strikes in Czechoslovakia. Indeed the main 
repercussion for Prague at this stage appeared to be an apparent delay in price increases, 
                                                          
484
 ‘Lord Carrington (FCO) to Sir C. Keeble (Moscow), 7 December 1979. Confidential (FCO 28/3683, EN 
021/2). British Policy in East-West Relations’, in: R. Smith, P. Salmon and S. Twigge (eds.), Documents on 
British Policy Overseas, Series III, Volume II. The Invasion of Afghanistan and UK-Soviet Relations, 1979-1982 
(London and New York, 2012), p.3. 
485
 [P. Hebblethwaite], ‘Magisterium’ in, J. Whale (ed.), The Pope from Poland: An Assessment (London, 
1980), pp.97-120 (p.103). 
486
 Pope John Paul II quoted in, Ibid., p.103. 
487
 DOS FOIA: Telegram from Berlin to State, ‘East German Reaction to Polish Events’, 19 August 1980. 
Document No: 80BERLIN003807. 
123 
 
including for meat.
488
 As with East Germany, economic rather than socio-political spillover 
was in many ways the major risk at this time as well. Having undergone a gradual decline in 
performance since the mid-1970s and in particular since 1979, the Czechoslovak economy 
was also in need of reform. They had to attempt to resolve a hard currency deficit under 
difficult international conditions whilst still delivering a standard of living sufficient for 
their citizens.
489
 As any threat to the latter could trigger off social unrest in Czechoslovakia, 
this was a difficult moment for the leadership in Prague to face the possible spillover of 
discontent from Poland. With leading figures from Czechoslovakia’s main opposition 
initiatives Charter 77 and the Committee for the Defence of the Unjustly Persecuted 
(VONS), including Václav Havel, recently imprisoned there was little chance of a Polish 
scenario emerging right away.
490
 Immediate pressure on the Polish leadership was unlikely, 
therefore.  
Indeed it was the Polish Party rather than its friends that was laying the groundwork 
for a crackdown at this point. In addition to preparations for “Lato-80” a letter issued by the 
Central Committee Secretariat that day (and leaked to the Lenin Shipyard), a much harder 
line was evident. Sent to all Party members, it warned that the Lenin Shipyard’s demands 
‘threaten the essential security of the country.’ Poland’s ‘national survival’ was endangered. 
The demands were ‘accompanied by acts of terror and intimidation against anyone who is 
not with them, against anyone who dares to question their demands’. There was a need to 
back both the police and security forces in Poland. The Party had been ‘called to a battle. 
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This battle we have to win ….’491 While this may simply have been an attempt to reassert 
the Party’s leadership over its members and to reassure them that Warsaw was not wavering 
in the face of unprecedented strike actions, it also laid the ground work for a crackdown if 
needed. ‘West German revisionists’ were also singled out for attention in the letter.492 While 
such attacks on “German revisionism” were not unknown under Communism,493 under the 
circumstances it may also have reflected concerns over criticisms Schmidt faced 
domestically regarding the provision of the new loan to Poland. It remained unsecured. 
Despite the hard line in the letter, the situation on the coast had not developed in 
such a way as to give any pretext for a crackdown domestic or otherwise. In spite of the 
rumours regarding the build-up of militia, the situation in the city itself remained calm. 
There was peace on the terrain of Gdańsk. Local shops were supplied with essential goods 
and vital services were also maintained. The MKS had also secured a ban on alcohol sales 
so as to stop any possible troubles from developing.
494
 The latter point stood in marked 
contrast to the claims made by the local mayors in their appeal. The MKS, which now 
consisted of over 240 enterprises, had ensured that vital services joining the strike had not 
begun occupation strikes. With the permission of the MKS, health services, public utilities, 
and food production enterprises were functioning as normal. The MKS recognised that their 
position as Poland’s ‘first authentic and free’ working-class representatives meant that they 
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bore a tremendous level of ‘responsibility’ for others.495 Their actions reflected this fact. As 
Walentynowicz recalled: 
We issued permits for food shops to reopen. Delivery lorries still operated, 
so too did the bakeries. The canning factory stayed at work so that the fish 
would not be wasted. The factory making tins had to work as well, as did 
the transport. Drivers wore red and white arm-bands and flags were flown 
outside the shops.
496
 
 
They also took on responsibility for resolving issues brought to them by others. For 
example, when farmers complained they needed parts for their tractors, the MKS arranged 
for a factory to manufacture the parts in question. Petrol was also issued during the strike by 
the Gdańsk Refinery on the say so of the MKS.497 Such actions were reciprocated by society 
in the form of increasing support for the strike. Farmers delivered supplies to the workers, 
while bread came from private bakeries in both Gdańsk and Szczecin during this period.498 
While the actions of the MKS in preserving vital services were essential if local support 
were to be maintained, the provision of food and the support of society were just as 
important if the strike itself were to be maintained.      
In many respects it was such solidarity that the authorities sought to undermine. 
Additional checkpoints were established around Gdańsk in an effort to halt cars related to 
the MKS, while further checkpoints were also set up in Szczecin and elsewhere in the Tri-
cities. Patrols on the electric railway in Gdańsk were also strengthened.499 Work dedicated 
to the preservation of ‘security and public order’ in the Tri-city region also continued. 
Amongst the six detained in Gdańsk that day were a number of significant figures within the 
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Polish opposition, including Mirosław Chojecki of the independent publishing house NOW-
a.
500
 Such actions were far from effective in halting the spread of the strikes and news 
related to them, however. In Poznań, for example, one hundred leaflets carrying various 
slogans expressing support for the strikes on the coast were distributed.
501
 The first strikes 
by steel workers at Huta Lenina near Kraków also took place. Alongside socio-economic 
demands made to management, was a call for the fulfilment of the coastal workers’ 
demands.
502
 Local ties were also strengthening. The Elbląg MKS registered with Gdańsk.503 
Events in Gdańsk were also amplified by the Western press, which unlike the domestic 
press was now descending on the yard in increasing numbers.
504
 In Szczecin the situation 
had also escalated. An MKS headed by Marian Jurczyk had been formed. A list of thirty-
seven demands was drawn-up. As with Gdańsk it included a demand for ‘free, independent 
from the Party and Government, trade unions.’505 Events were slipping from the Party’s 
grip. They had not yet abandoned plans for a peaceful resolution of events, however. 
Negotiations were still on offer, but not on the workers’ terms. 
 In Szczecin the regional authorities offered discussions if the workers returned to 
work first. A government commission headed by Deputy Prime Minister Kazimierz 
Barcikowski also offered to negotiate, but only with the shipyard workers and not the MKS. 
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Jurczyk refused. Negotiations were only to be with the MKS.
506
 In Gdańsk the authorities 
attempted similar tactics with slightly greater success. Although the Gdańsk MKS had 
written a letter to Edward Babiuch calling for the authorities to engage in negotiations at the 
Lenin Shipyard, it was announced that Tadeusz Pyka would be negotiating only with 
individual enterprises and their strike committees. Negotiations started that afternoon with 
talks with the strike committees of the Repair Yard and the Port Board of Gdańsk, major 
enterprises in the region. Although it was made clear that it was economic rather than 
political demands that the workers wished to discuss, Pyka was presented with a copy of the 
21 demands. He emphasised that he wished to fulfil the workers’ demands swiftly and that 
he was fully authorised to do so by the government, the Politburo and the First Secretary. He 
implied that all demands would be met, although his stance on trade unions differed 
somewhat to that demanded by the MKS. While acknowledging problems with the official 
unions and the workers’ unhappiness with them, change rather than the establishment of 
new trade unions was suggested. The strike committees could be joined with the existing 
unions once the strike was over.
507
 This seems to have been similar to the Lublin solution. 
As such it may have sounded appealing to a number of the workers involved. After all only 
the day beforehand Czesław Niezgoda had been elected to the official union in Lublin 
having previously led the railway’s strike. Despite efforts to undermine the democratic 
process by the authorities, the majority of delegates had been involved in the strikes. It was 
a major success for the workers.
508
  
It was not what the MKS was demanding, however. Merging with the official trade 
unions and establishing independent trade unions were very different things. While the Party 
could tolerate the former, they could not countenance the latter. Not only was Pyka 
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attempting to weaken the MKS through engaging in individual negotiations with its 
members therefore, he was also attempting to buy off the workers at any cost short of new 
trade unions. Their first and most important demand was the one he sought to water-down 
the most. He appeared to enjoy some success. Throughout the day he conducted similar 
talks with other enterprises from the MKS. By late evening some appeared close to ending 
their strikes if not abandoning their support for the shipyard workers overall.
509
 
20 August 1980 (Wednesday) 
The meeting between the Pyka commission and seventeen enterprises lasted until the early 
hours of Wednesday morning.
510
 Although the MKS was still not recognised the 21 
demands continued to form the basis of discussion. Pyka went to great lengths to reassure 
sceptical members of the individual strike committees that he had the authority to grant all 
of their demands (a claim that convinced Party activists and workers present).
511
 He claimed 
willingness to talk to any workers apart from those connected with KOR and tried to win 
over the workers through promises of action in the near future or by invoking earlier 
promises made by Gierek and Babiuch.
512
 Outlandish promises were also made with regard 
to the import of vast quantities of meat and work-free Saturdays.
513
 Many workers appear to 
have been convinced. By 6am each of the 21 demands had been discussed and with most of 
those present having gone home, work on the wording of the agreement got underway. It 
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was at this point that Pyka announced that the agreement needed to be passed to the Council 
of Ministers for approval.
514
 He did not have the authority he had claimed.  
The Pyka negotiations did not go without challenge by the MKS. They well knew 
the temptation that a swift agreement presented and the threat this posed to the strike.
515
 
They faced a struggle to get individual enterprises to agree to abandon the negotiations, 
however. Even the usually persuasive Wałęsa had problems. When Wałęsa attempted to 
speak over the fence to workers from the neighbouring Repair yard he found that no one 
was willing to listen.
516
 Andrzej Gwiazda and Anna Walentynowicz made similar attempts. 
They found the few they talked to determined to end the strike and go home. Although an 
appeal for “solidarity” from Walentynowicz apparently made an impact, the workers were 
generally uninterested.
517
 The MKS faced a significant challenge. If major enterprises such 
as the Northern and Repair yards succumbed to Pyka, the unity of the strike would be 
seriously undermined. Others could follow their example. There was little the MKS could 
do. They could not make appeals over the walls of every enterprise. Until Pyka returned 
they could not be sure whether the seventeen enterprises involved would stay with the MKS 
or break with them and undermine the strike in exchange for a deal with the authorities not 
involving new unions.   
The authorities remained determined not to give ground on this issue. The previous 
evening the head of the official trade unions, Jan Szydlak, had announced to a meeting of 
the Gdańsk aktyw that ‘We will not give up power, nor will we share it with anyone.’518 It 
drew a firm response from the MKS. They issued a statement reiterating the importance of 
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the first demand and strongly criticised the official unions not only for their failure to 
protect workers’ interests, but also for being ‘more hostile to the strike action than the party 
and state organs.’ As a result all striking workers within the MKS were to withdraw their 
membership not only from the Party, but from ‘the state-controlled trade unions’ as well.519 
Szydlak’s statement had resulted in a further, more permanent loss of support. Words as 
well as force could backfire on the authorities. By contrast support for the workers was 
mounting. They were confident they had a broad base of support within Poland and around 
the world due to the ‘deeply humanitarian’ nature of their demands. They called for the 
maintenance of ‘unity’ in the face of efforts by the authorities to weaken the strike.520 They 
were determined to succeed. When the authorities sought to divide them, they remained 
united. This could not be said of the authorities themselves.  
 In a session of the Politburo led again by Kania, he claimed that although the 
situation had not altered in Gdańsk, they were ‘full of determination, and even rage’ at the 
Paris Commune Shipyard as a result of the Pyka negotiations. Kowalczyk went further. He 
noted indications in both the Lenin and Paris Commune yards of ‘alarm and irritation’ 
concerning the negotiations. Their position would be strengthened if none of the enterprises 
returned to work as a result of Pyka’s talks. The Paris Commune shipyard, which was 
deemed the larger of the two strikes at this stage, was of particular concern.
521
 It was the 
potential consequences of the demands being acquiesced to in negotiations by Pyka, rather 
than the potential failure of negotiations that concerned others, however. While for some the 
concern was political, for Babiuch it remained economic. He warned that Pyka had gone too 
far in his economic concessions, describing them as ‘a time bomb’ threatening the national 
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economy. They also needed to be prepared for a worsening of the situation in Szczecin. It 
could occur at any time.
522
 His suggestion that Gierek hold one-on-one discussions with 
Politburo members suggested that there were divisions within the Politburo at this time.
523
 
Gierek faced problems not just with the workers, but within his leadership team. The 
meeting ended with Gierek considering the ‘crisis of confidence’ in the Party. They all bore 
responsibility for the situation, but he did the most. Previous officials could not be held 
responsible. There was a need ‘to restore confidence and credibility’ in the Party and he 
voiced his opposition to actions that would drive a wedge between them and the working 
class. Talks could be held with workers at any time.
524
  
The use of force against the workers was not an option. The government was keen to 
make this clear to the West. One Western newspaper report quoted a government 
spokesman as excluding even ‘the possibility that the Government might be contemplating 
force’. He also played down the reports of militia and troop movements on the Baltic coast 
with the excuse that any such movements were to do with ‘traditional army exercises’ held 
during the summer.
525
 The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw also received reports from a variety of 
Western sources questioning reports of an unusual militia or troop build-up in the area.
526
 In 
a farewell meeting with the ambassador, the Deputy Foreign Minister Kulaga ‘affirmed 
emphatically’ that the Polish authorities had no intention of using force to end the strikes.527   
 While they may have had no intention of using force, they did have plans if needed. 
Preparations for “Lato-80” continued. The Staff team met almost daily until the beginning 
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of September.
528
 That day General Stachura ordered MO heads in over 20 locations to 
undertake preparations for the establishment of reserve militia forces. Dependent on location 
either one or two companies were to be formed. A time-scale of approximately three weeks 
was set for their readiness for training.
529
 This pointed to mid-September at the earliest. On 
a nationwide scale the Party could not simply draw up and implement plans for a crackdown 
overnight. Only standard actions were feasible at this time. In the meantime more routine 
security service actions continued around the strikes. The distribution of illegal literature 
remained a major focus of activity while further check points were also established. The aim 
was to restrict the movements of strike committee and opposition members, who were 
perceived as having a negative impact on events.
530
 The latter were now of particular 
concern. The first major action against them was ordered by the Interior Ministry. 
According to documents cited by Andrzej Friszke, the deputy director of Department 
III of the Interior Ministry (responsible for combatting ‘anti-state’ activity)531 signed an 
assessment stating that an increase in the activities of groups hostile to socialism and the 
state, including KOR, the Free Trade Unions, and the Young Poland Movement had taken 
place. They were taking advantage of the social unease and strikes in Poland that summer 
with the intention of escalating them into serious large scale unrest.
532
 While the 
establishment of the Gdańsk MKS was, according to Friszke’s account, seen as an example 
of this due to the opposition’s role in formulating its demands, it seems that the MKS in 
Szczecin and also Elbląg was not. This suggests that the involvement of the opposition 
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rather than the form of strike or the manner in which it was organised may have been a 
factor in shaping the authorities’ response to the strikes. Certainly it was the opposition 
rather than the strikes that were targeted by the security services at this time. While 
previously the opposition had been subject to various methods of observation, the report 
concluded that the MSW was now in possession of sufficient evidence to investigate over 40 
people active in such groups.
533
  
That afternoon Jacek Kuroń’s flat was raided and the SB arrested not only Kuroń but 
also a large number of other KOR activists and associates present. Most would be detained 
for 48 hours, a practice standard in security service actions against the opposition, while 
three Western journalists present were escorted from the premises. Further arrests of 
opposition activists took place throughout the day. Amongst those detained were key figures 
such as Mirosław Chojecki, Jan Lityński and Adam Michnik.534 According to MSW reports 
issued the following morning, a total of 32 opposition activists were detained throughout 
Poland, eighteen of them in Warsaw.
535
 The coast may have been the major strike centre, 
but it was the capital city that was the major centre of opposition. While the latter presented 
a challenge of a different nature for the security services, it was also considerably easier to 
target than the former.   
In spite of this, the outcome of the arrests was mixed. On the one hand, they had a 
significant impact on the main activists in KOR. Kuroń, for example, played no further role 
in August’s events. Using another standard technique of the security services at this time, 
when his initial 48 hour detention expired he was released before his re-arrest took place 
moments later. This continued until the end of August when a further escalation took 
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place.
536
 On the other hand, not all of the detentions were beneficial to the authorities. 
Michnik had been due to travel to Gdańsk in an effort to reign in the workers as both he and 
Kuroń felt that they were going too far with their demand for free trade unions. His 
detention prevented him from exerting a moderating influence on events.
537
 Equally the 
detentions failed to end the opposition’s role in the strikes and the spread of information. As 
Friszke notes, KOR retained a presence in the Lenin Shipyard and played an important part 
in printing the strike bulletin (discussed below). Ewa Kulik, a Student Solidarity Committee 
activist, was also amongst those who remained in Kuroń’s flat to gather news on strikes 
from across the country. In addition to this the press continued to cover events from the 
Lenin Shipyard with Radio Free Europe playing an important part in strengthening the 
strikes across Poland.
538
 The mass arrests did little to help the authorities gain control of the 
situation.  
In spite of the role that the Western press and media were playing in transmitting 
information about the strike in Gdańsk, according to Neal Ascherson, the authorities made 
no effort to prevent foreign journalists from travelling to the yard. Visas were issued ‘to 
almost every western journalist who applied’.539 It is not clear why they allowed this to 
happen. Ascherson has suggested that the Polish authorities ‘intention may have been that a 
publicity barrage might deter the Soviet Union from an immediate intervention.’540 Another 
possibility is that they simply did not realise what was happening until it was too late and 
that sudden restrictions on journalists may have alarmed the West. If they interpreted it as a 
sign of an imminent crackdown, it might have jeopardised the ongoing negotiations over 
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loans. While the aftermath of June 1976 suggested a continued willingness to lend even 
after repression had taken place, given Poland’s dire economic circumstances the Party 
could ill afford any risks.  
Whatever the reason for the continued presence of Western journalists, it did not 
mean the authorities were happy with Western broadcasts to Poland on events. Kulaga 
complained on behalf of the Polish authorities about the media, and in particular about RFE. 
He asked ‘once again for media restraint’ as the authorities ‘needed time to defuse the 
situation and come to a constructive solution.’541 The authorities did not want RFE or other 
media outlets fuelling the situation. It would only make resolving it more difficult. Such 
concerns were only increased by their economic needs and dependence on the West. While 
protesting over Western coverage of the strikes, they also needed to prove that they were a 
stable partner for the West. In a separate meeting that day between Schaufele and Karski, 
the Minister of Foreign Trade and Maritime Economy, Karski blamed the Gdańsk and 
Szczecin strikes for damaging Poland’s chances of achieving a trade surplus in 1980. He 
had hoped for one in order to demonstrate to the West that they were ‘a reliable economic 
partner’, but any hope for such a surplus now hinged on the length of the strikes.542 As 
MSW reports indicate, the Party was well aware that the economic impact of the strikes on 
Poland’s economy and in particular on the nation’s ‘solvency’ was a major topic of 
discussion in the West. Although the MSW noted suggestions that these problems should 
not damage Poland’s ability to obtain new loans,543 French reports suggested a belief 
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amongst Western diplomats that negotiations were being damaged by events.
544
 Poland’s 
economic ministries appear to have taken the latter view. In his talks with Schaufele, Karski 
expressed his hope that these stoppages would not cause any ‘last minute difficulties’ with 
obtaining the $300 million loan from the Anglo-American syndicate. It was due to be signed 
on 22 August 1980.
545
 
The U.S. response in both meetings was sympathetic. Regarding media coverage, 
they ‘had no desire to see the situation in Poland destabilized’ and ‘hoped Poland would be 
able to solve its general problems as well as remedy its labor unrest.’ They had already 
made the BIB aware of its stance and were maintaining their hands-off approach in spite of 
being ‘heavily badgered by the press’ for comment.546 On the subject of Poland’s financial 
dealings with the West meanwhile, the ambassador had heard of no potential problems with 
the loan.
547
 Schaufele was also ‘reasonably optimistic’ about Poland’s application for 
agricultural credits. The West’s position had not been altered by Polish events. In addition to 
stating official recognition of the need for ‘some change in the price structure’, the 
ambassador also underlined the fact that the U.S. was ‘very sympathetic to Poland in its 
current difficulties and wants to be as helpful as possible.’548 In both meetings Schaufele 
suggested that the use of force would change things for the U.S.
549
 This was his personal 
opinion on the matter, rather than a government policy designed to shape Warsaw’s 
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response to events, however. The U.S. refrained from interference in events. Even MSW 
reports drew attention to the fact that the embassy’s private line was consistent with that of 
the Department of State’s in public. Perhaps most importantly, the same reports also 
highlighted the fact that no attempts to hold meetings with opposition groups had been 
detected.
550
 In its dealings with the Polish authorities the U.S. was conducting its business as 
usual. They dealt with the state rather than the opposition and did not inflame the situation. 
Indeed Schaufele appeared concerned about the direction in which events were heading. 
Privately he warned the Department of State that although pursuing a path of peace and 
negotiations, the Party was ‘in increasingly serious trouble and that time, despite what it 
may think, is not on its side.’551  
While attempting to manage their relationship with their partners on the one hand, 
the Poles continued to attract attention of their friends on the other. Events faced increasing 
coverage in the Soviet Union and parts of Eastern Bloc.
552
 Pravda published another 
summary of Gierek’s speech, which focussed heavily on the role played by what it dubbed 
‘anarchistic, irresponsible, and antisocialist elements’ in work stoppages and directly quoted 
Gierek’s assertion that ‘Only a socialist Poland can be a free and independent country with 
inviolable borders.’553 The first statement has been seen as part of a Soviet propaganda 
campaign for possible intervention in Poland by blaming Poland’s problems on what Arthur 
Rachwald describes as ‘a supposed Western intervention in Poland’s internal affairs’.554 The 
second has been described by Thomas Cynkin as a statement designed ‘primarily to 
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intimidate the Poles’ by threatening an intervention by ‘non-Polish units’ in the event of a 
worsening of events in Poland.
555
 The key link between both statements and analyses is that 
intervention was only a theoretical possibility at this stage. If one considers an analysis of 
decision-making during previous Soviet interventions by Constantine Pleshakov, it becomes 
clear how far Moscow was from intervening. According to Pleshakov, despite changes in 
leadership between 1956 and 1968 decision-making in the Politburo regarding military 
intervention remained largely consistent:  
alarm signals from the Foreign Ministry and secret services; heated 
discussions in the narrow circle of oligarchs in the Kremlin; talks with 
native East European ‘revisionists’; consultations with socialist allies; and 
finally discussion at the Politburo and the taking of a vote.
556
 
 
Providing that no major changes in the decision-making process had taken place since 1968, 
based on the public response Moscow was not even nearing the first stages of this process. 
While it was unhappy with Polish events, ‘alarm signals’ were not being raised. Indeed 
despite their unhappiness, according to Jaruzelski during that day’s Politburo session, the 
Soviet Union had complied with Polish requests to alter the routes of previously planned 
military movements on Polish soil.
557
 Both Soviet and East German diplomats were also 
reportedly offering private reassurances that events were solely Warsaw’s responsibility.558 
Intervention had not been threatened while Soviet press coverage could be interpreted as a 
sign of support for Gierek’s determination to maintain the Party’s hold on power.559  
Moscow’s main concerns remained domestic. While Soviet media coverage of 
events increased, the flow of information on events from outside the Soviet Union was 
                                                          
555
 T. Cynkin, Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis (London, 1988), p.41. 
556
 C. Pleshakov, ‘Studying Soviet Strategies and Decisionmaking in the Cold War Years’ in, O.A. Westad (ed.), 
Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London and New York, 2000), pp.232-241 
(p.235). 
557
 AAN, PZPR KC Biuro Polityczne, V/159, 129-139,  ‘Protokół Nr 20 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 
20 sierpnia 1980r’, p.8. 
558
 See: DOS FOIA: Telegram from Warsaw to State, ‘Sitrep #3: Strikes spreading; Babiuch in Gdansk’, 20 
August 1980.  Document No. 80WARSAW008284 
559
 See: S.I. Ploss, Moscow and the Polish Crisis: An Interpretation of Soviet Policies and Intentions (Boulder 
and London, 1986), pp.14-15. 
139 
 
simultaneously reduced with the resumption of the jamming of Western broadcasts in 
violation of the Helsinki Final Act. Although Cynkin has argued that this was designed to 
‘allow a free hand in the war of words over Poland, in which they were firing the opening 
shot’, Ascherson interprets it as a sign of fear of contagion in Moscow.560 The latter seems 
the more likely of the two as the resumption of jamming had been trailed in the Soviet press 
by a campaign suggesting that Soviet youth were a vulnerable target for Western 
broadcasts.
561
 Given that previous Eastern bloc crises in Hungary and Czechoslovakia had 
prompted a reaction amongst Soviet citizens, including students and dissidents in particular, 
it is possible that Moscow was wary of Soviet youth gaining outside information on the 
situation in case it caused domestic unrest.
562
 The Western borderlands will have been of 
particular concern. They were always particularly sensitive areas for Moscow.
563
 Moscow 
would not wish for the Polish unrest to spread to these regions, particularly given their 
historic ties with Lithuania and Western Ukraine. As recent strikes in the Soviet Union had 
shown, the Soviet leadership also had problems with workers elsewhere to consider. At a 
time when the Soviet Union had significant economic and infrastructure problems of its own 
to overcome,
564
 they could not afford for unrest to spread from Poland.  
 For Warsaw meanwhile the problem remained Gdańsk rather than Moscow. That 
afternoon the Pyka negotiations collapsed. Only three less important demands of the twelve 
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points agreed upon by the government commission and the individual strike committees had 
been accepted.
565
 As with Szydlak’s comments the previous evening, the failure of Pyka to 
keep his word backfired on the authorities. Not only did those enterprises engaged in 
negotiations with Pyka return to the MKS, but the MKS adopted a tougher line as a result. 
In a statement released that day the MKS made plain that enterprise strike committees were 
not to conduct negotiations with the government on ‘any of our common demands’. The 
MKS was ‘the only guarantor of the workers’ demands being met’ and only they would 
negotiate with the government. Individual strike committees were simply to maintain ‘order 
and safety’ at their own place of work until negotiations had been completed and the MKS 
informed them that they should undertake work again.
566 Having reasserted their leadership 
over the negotiating process and with over 260 enterprises involved, the MKS was now in a 
much stronger position than before. It had survived the first significant attempt by the 
authorities to undermine its authority. In addition to this they had also gained support for 
negotiations from a further section of Polish society during the day: the intelligentsia.   
Organised by the Catholic intellectual Tadeusz Mazowiecki, amongst others, an 
appeal signed by 64 members of Warsaw’s intelligentsia was issued to both the Party and 
the workers with the intention of avoiding bloodshed.
567
 The authorities were blamed for 
Poland’s present difficulties and called upon to negotiate with the MKS. Although the 
workers were praised for their conduct and aims, both sides were warned of repeating the 
events of 1970. The appeal concluded with a warning that ‘Only common sense and 
imagination can lead today to an understanding, which will be in the interests of our 
common motherland. History will not forgive anybody who attempts solutions other than 
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those stemming from such an understanding.’568 It was an assertion that applied equally to 
the workers and the state. Neither was favoured by the appeal. Violence was not an 
acceptable response from either. It was a call for moderation and one that would enjoy 
increasing support. News of the appeal soon reached Radio Free Europe.
569
 In the days that 
followed 200 more signatures would be added. It was not the only voice of moderation at 
this time. John Paul II wrote to Cardinal Wyszyński about events that day.570  
21 August 1980 (Thursday)  
The Pyka negotiations ended in failure. At Politburo Kania announced his replacement by 
Jagielski as the head of the government commission in Gdańsk.571 In the long term his 
appointment was seen as a positive step due to his role in the peaceful resolution of the 
Lublin strikes.
572
 In the short-term his appointment made little difference. Efforts continued 
to undermine the strikes. In addition to the ongoing attempts to divide the MKS through 
individual negotiations, communiqués and the media continued to be the main official 
means of pressure on the strikes.
573
 Although the MKS countered all of these efforts through 
the use of communiqués, they were no closer to the achievement of their overall aim of 
negotiations over the 21 demands and with it official recognition of the MKS.
574
 In this 
respect no progress had been achieved in the five days since the MKS was founded. The 
strike continued to garner support, however. Amongst other things, residents in the Tri-city 
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region as well as Young Poland Movement activists had all collected money for the 
strike.
575
 Further opposition support meanwhile came from intellectuals in the Polish League 
for Independence (PPN) in a statement that was as critical of the authorities as it was 
supportive of those on strike.
576
 The Lenin Shipyard also received the support of local 
members of the Union of Polish Writers with Lech Bądkowski soon elected to the MKS 
Presidium.
577
 Although significant for worker morale, this made little contribution to the 
achievement of the MKS’ aims. With progress stalled at Gdańsk, it was at Szczecin that the 
most significant progress was made. 
Following the failure of negotiations with individual strike committees the previous 
day, Warsaw had granted permission for negotiations between the Barcikowski commission 
and the Szczecin MKS to begin on 21 August.
578
 Following the introduction of the 
government team by the Shipyard’s director Stanisław Ozimek, Marian Jurczyk read out the 
37 demands, including the first: ‘To establish trade unions free and independent from the 
Party and government as well as to create conditions for their independent activity.’ He took 
a firm stand on this demand making clear that the MKS expected the government to agree to 
it. They would call a halt to talks and refuse to take up work unless the demand was met. 
Jurczyk’s approach failed to draw a positive response. As Barcikowski said, the government 
commission wished for both talks and agreement. However, they ‘must be two-sided talks.’ 
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If the workers continued to pursue their demand in this fashion, it was clear that negotiations 
would not bring results.
579
  
While Barcikowski essentially presented himself as being in favour of good faith 
negotiations during his opening remarks, he adopted a hard line in negotiations and 
successfully undermined a number of key demands. As Marcin Stefaniak notes, through his 
negotiating skills Barcikowski was able to reduce the political nature of the strike. Changes 
were brought about to some of the political demands made by the MKS in a manner that 
reduced their strength and ultimately contributed to an increased ambiguity in their final 
wording. By the end of the first day point one, along with demands concerning an end to 
censorship, ‘persecution’ of the opposition and the ability to legally establish socio-political 
groups, had been watered down. The first demand now read: ‘To establish free and 
independent trade unions as well as to create conditions for their independent activity. Free 
and independent trade unions will not conduct political activities, as should be defined in the 
Constitution of the PRL and the statutes of the union.’580 While this alteration retained the 
demand for new unions, it now placed limits on their activities. What was considered as 
‘political’ did not seem clearly defined and given Jurczyk’s adamance regarding the 
achievement of this demand, the fact that alterations were made does seem surprising. Other 
less important points might have been expected to have been conceded perhaps, but not this 
one.  
Despite alterations to a number of demands, the significance of the negotiations 
themselves should not be underestimated. As Andrzej Friszke notes, such negotiations were 
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only comparable to the talks between workers and Gierek a decade earlier.
581
 The fact that 
direct negotiations were only employed in Szczecin at this stage seems significant, however. 
It is a decision that may have been shaped not only by the failure of Barcikowski’s earlier 
talks with individual enterprises, but also by the differing influence of the opposition on the 
strikes. While MSW reports continued to note a strong opposition involvement with the 
Gdańsk MKS, no such influence was detected in Szczecin.582 This must have made the 
decision to undertake direct negotiations with Szczecin easier as they did not need to justify 
direct talks with “anti-socialist groups.” The watering down of the Szczecin demands with 
regard to the opposition and new socio-political groups seems to underline the importance to 
the authorities of not being seen to cede any ground to such groups in the negotiations. 
While some opposition activity had been tolerated since the late-1970s, it had never been 
officially sanctioned. The Party could not afford to change their stance on this. Indeed, even 
in Szczecin efforts were still made to deny recognition to the MKS. Throughout the first 
negotiations Barcikowski refrained from using the term MKS in discussions.
583
 It is also 
possible that the size of the strike made it more suitable for negotiations with the MKS. 
Although numbers for both strikes were increasing, the Szczecin strike was by far the 
smaller of the two. By the end of the day there were 82 enterprises registered in Szczecin 
compared to 350 in Gdańsk.584 It could be undermined more easily than Gdańsk.  
The need to undermine the strikes on the coast was certainly greater than it had been. 
Strikes were spreading to new parts of Poland. The MSW reported strikes in the Toruń, 
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Bydgoszcz, Poznań and Słupsk regions.585 They were becoming more pressing to control. 
Despite negotiations in Szczecin, the threat of force still remained. News reached the coast 
that night of plans for a crackdown on the strike committee at the Lenin Shipyard and the 
printing facilities at the Paris Commune Shipyard.
586
 Such rumours and even threats were 
common during this period as a means of intimidation. Days earlier Marian Jurczyk had 
been subject to anonymous phone calls threatening bloodshed and assaults on the shipyard, 
while Walentynowicz also recalled news of plans for the militia to gather them up ‘like fish 
from a pond’ that week.587 Although the crackdown never came, such threats and rumours 
appeared to have had an impact. MSW reports note the port in Gdynia being barricaded with 
pieces of concrete that night and patrolled by guards armed with ‘lengths of cable’.588 
Although the strikes had been conducted peacefully so far, its continuation could not be 
guaranteed when faced with a crackdown. While KOR and the Free Trade Unionists within 
the Gdańsk MKS had long been committed to non-violence, there were no guarantees that 
all workers shared their beliefs.  
The strikes were not the sole focus of security service activities at this time, 
however. Runs on the purchase of food were also regularly reported and while MSW reports 
continued to focus their attention on actions aimed at hindering the opposition, they also 
noted efforts to target market speculation.
589
 As they also served legitimate means such as 
these, the role of the security services was far from black-and-white.
590
 Meanwhile the 
increasing purchases of food at a time of shortage will only have added extra weight to 
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claims being made in the official press that food was rotting inside ships that were unable to 
dock due to the port strikes on the coast.
591
 Striking dock workers found a way to counter 
such criticisms. According to Anna Walentynowicz, when the Gdańsk MKS gave workers at 
the port written permission to unload the citrus fruits that were alleged to be going off, the 
workers refused. They knew that fruits held in cold storage would not have spoiled by that 
time. They also knew that if they started using cranes for unloading, it would be filmed by 
television crews and used as evidence they had broken the strike. In the end the fruit was 
sent to Sweden. They were asked to use it and return the same amount of fruit once the 
strike was over.
592
 This was not the only international co-operation with striking workers 
that was causing the Polish leadership problems with ports, however. The International 
Longshoremen’s Association was calling for its members to cease loading and unloading 
Polish ships at ports on the East coast of the United States.
593
 This was seen by Kania as 
potentially complicating events.
594
 Both domestically and internationally the ports held 
tremendous economic significance for Poland. 
The support of the International Longshoreman’s Association was by far from the 
only source of Western pressure. In the first public criticism of the Polish leadership by 
Washington, the detention of KOR activists was condemned by the Department of State.
595
 
While such criticism was arguably in keeping with an administration that had made the 
defence of human rights a cornerstone of its foreign policy, it was unlikely to make much of 
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an impact on Warsaw. The CIA, for example, considered the Polish authorities ‘willing to 
absorb the foreign criticism’ created by the arrests.596 Indeed it was not clear how much 
criticism such arrests would attract. A British report, for example, noted that while the 
arrests indicated a harder-line from the authorities, they were ‘not, of course, a breach of 
their assurance not to use force against the strikers themselves.’597 In the context of the 
strike wave, they were comparatively unimportant. Equally, the use of repeat 48 hour 
detentions was in keeping with the strategy for dealing with the opposition employed since 
the mid-1970s. Given that this strategy had been in use for some time, there is no reason to 
think that it would attract particular Western opprobrium at this time. International 
condemnation of arrests as well as support for the workers, such as that expressed by young 
Austrian Catholics and Swedish protests,
598
 was arguably more likely to provide a morale 
boost for the workers at this time than to influence Party policy. In terms of obtaining new 
loans it was further strikes rather than opposition arrests that were most likely to derail 
agreements. Non-governmental international criticism of the Party and support for the 
workers would arguably have a more significant influence in the long-term if it could be 
sustained long enough to influence the policy of Western governments. In this regard the 
support of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organisations 
(AFL-CIO) for Polish workers, in addition to Republican support for the right to strike and 
independent unions in Congress, was arguably of the greatest significance.
599
 Ronald 
Reagan was on the horizon.   
 In the short term the most significant international pressure that day came from 
Poland’s friends rather than her partners. During the Politburo session Gierek read out a 
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letter he had received from Brezhnev.
600
 Although the contents of Brezhnev’s letter are not 
recorded in the Politburo minutes and the letter has not been obtained from either the Polish 
or Russian archives since 1989, its contents were described by Stanisław Kania at an oral 
history conference at Jachranka in 1997. He recalled it as expressing ‘quite simply 
dissatisfaction’ with Polish events along with ‘impatience’. It contained no suggestions 
regarding the use of force.
601
 Although at Politburo Władysław Kruczek warned that the 
East German and Czechoslovak First Secretaries could dispatch similar letters to Warsaw, 
there are no further comments on record regarding the Brezhnev letter. This along with the 
fact that even Kruczek only suggested a Party plenum was required rather than action 
tougher than this seems to suggest that Kania’s recollection of the letter not pushing for the 
use of force is accurate. Equally the fact that Gierek read the letter to the Politburo 
immediately after he had raised the issue of approaching Moscow and East Berlin with 
regard to ‘help for our market’ also seems to endorse this fact. Indeed the only other 
reference to the Soviet Union and East Germany at Politburo came from Edward Babiuch 
concerning the need to approach them ‘about help in unloading ships with raw materials’.602 
Economic issues were at the forefront of discussions regarding Poland’s friends at this time. 
Presumably such approaches for assistance would not have been the main subject of 
discussion with regard to the Soviet Union and East Germany if the tone of the letter had 
been stronger than Kania has suggested.  
 This is not to say that the Soviet and Eastern bloc response to events was entirely 
clear cut, however. While the CIA noted that there had been no signs of increased activity 
amongst Soviet troops stationed in Poland since before the strikes on the coast began, some 
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signals bore resemblance to those employed prior to the Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the case of the Soviet Union this concerned the resumption of 
the jamming of Western broadcasts.
603
 Resemblances to 1968 were also being reported by 
the British in their analysis of East German press reports on the forthcoming Warsaw Pact 
exercise.
604
 While naturally there were no such signals in the Czechoslovak press, a detailed 
information bulletin on the Polish summer was prepared for the Czechoslovak leadership 
and interior ministry at this point.
605
 Any concerns presumably remained mostly domestic 
although obvious signs of this appear to have been limited. While in the Soviet Union trade 
unions in Ukraine’s Crimean oblast came in for fierce criticism at a plenum attended by the 
Chairman of the Council of Trade Unions and other high-level officials from Kiev,
606
 there 
were still no signs of spillover amongst East German workers.
607
 Given that such spillover 
was likely to increase the urgency with which the Warsaw Pact would act, there is no reason 
to think that Moscow or East Berlin had any increased need to do so at this time. Indeed 
another restraining factor on Soviet actions was also evident that day. In what appears to 
have been the first contact between the Soviet and U.S. leaders that summer, Brezhnev sent 
Carter a letter concerning the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western 
Europe.
608
 No intervention could take place in Poland without further damaging détente and 
with it control of the arms race. Indeed, although not mentioned in the letter, given the 
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leaking of Carter’s new nuclear strategy PD-59 in early August, Soviet concerns may well 
have been heightened at this time.
609
 It also serves as a useful reminder that for both the 
Soviet Union and the U.S., Poland was not the most important factor in superpower 
relations at this time. Nuclear weapons and the arms race, along with Afghanistan, 
overshadowed all else. 
With no signs of Soviet pressure for a crackdown therefore, the main problems 
facing the Polish Politburo in addition to the strikes appeared to be economic. Babiuch 
noted problems with payments due to declining amounts of short-term credits.
610
 Although 
the Politburo minutes do not elaborate upon the reasons for or impact of these shortages, the 
fact that Babiuch raised the issue alongside requests to the Soviet Union and East Germany 
for assistance underscores the severity of the economic problems facing Poland. They were 
easily on a par with those of the strikes. Babiuch’s comment that the government was 
struggling to formulate a new economic program due to time constraints adds to a sense of 
the leadership’s lack of control over the economy at this time.611 It is also noticeable that in 
negotiations at Szczecin that day economic issues were directly raised by the authorities 
with the workers. Stanisław Ozimek, the shipyard’s director, stressed the need to quickly 
conclude negotiations due to the economic losses incurred as a result of the strike. Fines for 
late completion were amongst the problems mentioned. Action had already had to be taken 
to avoid paying a fine relating to a West German ship. Barcikowski also noted the problems 
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of fulfilling economic demands.
612
 The workers would be difficult to persuade on these and 
all other points, however. As Barcikowski later recalled, there was a strong belief amongst 
Szczecin’s workers that if the Party genuinely wanted to do something, it was possible for 
them ‘to facilitate everything and to create an ideal world’.613 Squaring worker expectation 
built up under Gierek during the 1970s with the economic realities facing Poland in the 
1980s was going to be a difficult job. Resolving such difficulties would only be made worse 
if there were divisions within the Politburo regarding their response. As Kania warned, 
employing the term ‘counterrevolution’ in relation to the strikes as some in the Politburo 
had would only hinder their efforts to reach an agreement with the workers. The strikes 
would continue to develop and the lack of trust in the Party’s words was a major problem.614 
High levels of public expectation coupled with low levels of trust and an economic inability 
to deliver improvements was a significant problem for the Party leadership in resolving the 
strikes. In spite of this, the Party had not attempted to contact Cardinal Wyszyński to ask 
him to speak about the situation in Poland, nor did the Polish Primate have any plans to 
make such a statement.
615
 However, earlier comments from a sermon by Wyszyński had 
been voiced indirectly on Polish television the previous evening ‘in the form of an interview 
with a Catholic deputy to the Polish parliament.’616 Fragments of Wyszyński’s sermon had 
also been printed by the press in Warsaw.
617
 Wyszyński continued to stress moderation, 
celebrating a Mass that day stressing the need for ‘peace’ and ‘trust in God’.618 The Church 
remained a trusted source of guidance and moderation. 
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At the Lenin Shipyard meanwhile an oft discussed speech was made to MKS 
delegates assembled in the BHP Hall at around 9pm by Ireneusz Leśniak.619 Relying on a 
pre-prepared speech, he appealed to Gierek to personally enter into talks at the shipyard as 
he had done in 1971. They had ‘complete trust’ for Gierek as ‘apart from our Pope John 
Paul II you are the only authority capable of leading our country out of the present 
impasse.’620 In spite of its pro-Gierek stance, Leśniak’s speech was greeted with applause by 
the listening delegates. This was swiftly brought to a halt by Walentynowicz, who identified 
Leśniak as one of those involved in her sacking.621 Although he was escorted peacefully 
from the shipyard without major incident, the Leśniak affair revealed two important points 
about the strikes. According to Timothy Garton Ash, the applause for Leśniak’s speech 
indicated that MKS delegates remained unclear ‘about their strategy and goals’ while the 
manner in which he was removed from the yard highlights the ‘dignity’ with which the 
workers acted throughout the strike.
622
 The nature and outcome of the strike was still far 
from certain at this time and in a tense atmosphere they needed to keep their cool at all 
times. In spite of the Szczecin negotiations, the authorities were still employing a varied 
repertoire against the strikes.  
22 August 1980 (Friday) 
Szczecin and Gdańsk continued to follow different paths. In the former negotiations 
continued, in the latter the waiting did. Despite events being more advanced at Szczecin 
however, it was Gdańsk that remained the centre of attention. At Politburo Kania described 
the situation as deteriorating in the city with the workers demonstrating ‘greater and greater 
determination.’ Żandarowski meanwhile noted that it was this strike that held the attention 
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of other Polish workers. It was the barometer by which events were measured.
623
 With 
negotiations ongoing Szczecin remained important, however. According to Kania, the strike 
committee, which included a number of Party members, was taking a firm stand.
624
 Point 
one remained a major point of discussion. Although Barcikowski noted that any new unions 
would be ‘socialist’ in nature, he wanted to undertake further talks on the matter. The need 
for a new law with regard to trade unions should be included in the agreement with the aim 
for it to be completed by the end of 1980.
625
 The MKS did not accept his proposal. When 
Marian Jurczyk read out the modified demands later that day, it was made clear that the 
legal basis of their activity would be provided by article 87 of the ILO covenants already 
ratified by the Polish state.
626
 Along with article 98 of the same covenants, it was a vital 
legal basis for the demand for new unions along the coast as well. As Andrzej Gwiazda 
made clear when discussing the relevant ILO articles with workers at Gdańsk, they had both 
been ratified by the Polish sejm in 1956.
627
 The legal basis for point one at both strikes 
already existed. This was a point already clear to all involved with opposition activity in 
Poland. The Charter of Workers’ Rights (1979) issued by the editors of Robotnik and signed 
by many of the Gdańsk opposition had included an account of article 87 amongst others in 
its text.
628
 In many respects Gwiazda was simply continuing the work already begun by 
Robotnik in the late 1970s. He was educating the workers about their rights.  With no sign of 
the government commission agreeing to negotiations with the MKS, there was little else he 
could do.  
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Such activities formed an important part of life at the Lenin Shipyard throughout the 
strike and had already done so for much of that week. Speech after speech was given by 
delegates and supporters of the MKS. They ranged from the simple repetition of MKS 
statements to the reading (and re-reading) of messages of support, such as those from the 
Union of Polish Writers and the appeal of the 64. Speeches were not limited to members of 
the MKS Presidium. The opportunity to stand at the microphone and make a speech was not 
restricted solely to the strike leadership. Many who had not been politically active before 
were able to make statements to the assembled workers. A high school teacher and her 
colleague from Gdynia noted that they had informed a Party activist at their school that they 
were breaking with their ‘glorious tradition’ of inaction in 1968, 1970 and 1976, for 
example.
629
 Although negotiations had not begun, minor breakthroughs such as this were 
still being made. The open approach to speeches reflected the democratic nature of the 
strike.  
The broadcast of speeches also served a purpose to those outside the hall and at other 
enterprises within the MKS. As numerous photographs testify, for those workers outside the 
hall much of the strike involved simply sitting and waiting in the yard or at their 
enterprise.
630
 Given everything else that was happening it is easy both to overlook and to 
underestimate the importance of this to the survival and success of the strike. Without the 
patience and support of these workers, nothing could have been achieved. No matter how 
important an enterprise is to a nation’s economy, a strike can only take place with sufficient 
support from the enterprises’ workers and can only be sustained if this support continues. As 
time passed and boredom set in it would have been easy for this support to dwindle. The 
broadcast of speeches to the yard and the tape recordings of the broadcasts made by 
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delegates and sent back to their enterprises provided a way of sustaining this support and of 
keeping the majority of workers involved in proceedings. Amongst other things they 
provided striking workers who were not based at the Lenin Shipyard with the means by 
which to hold the MKS and their own representatives to account without being present at 
the yard itself.
631
 It also killed time. Speeches from the previous day would simply be 
rebroadcast when there was nothing important happening.
632
 Those outside the gates were 
similarly kept involved in this manner while listening to RFE was also a significant memory 
of the strike for those involved.
633
 Alongside communiqués and soon a strike bulletin, 
cassette tapes and broadcasts played a crucial role in keeping those outside the Presidium 
informed and occupied during the strike. They helped to maintain their support. Such 
sources of information were also better trusted than the Party.  
At Politburo the Party leadership appeared in disarray and disconnected from 
society. With the social situation deteriorating rapidly and the economy under severe 
pressure, Babiuch called for urgent action in addressing ‘the crisis of confidence’ that 
existed between Polish citizens and the Party. The scale and significance of this crisis 
should not be underestimated. As Gierek observed, ‘Society doesn’t believe us, and it is 
more threatening than the strikes.’ They needed to act rapidly. According to Babiuch, there 
was ‘no time for sentiments or friendships’. The Party and the country had to come first. 
They needed to rally around Gierek in order to aid him in leading Poland ‘from this difficult 
situation.’ It was vital to maintain him in post due to his domestic and international 
‘authority’ without which Poland faced catastrophe. While Gierek should remain as First 
Secretary, there was a need for a change in the government. Having only been Prime 
Minister since February, Babiuch revealed that he had offered his resignation to Gierek two 
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days earlier. As he observed, all around the world such changes took place at moments of 
crisis. Major changes were needed for any reshuffle to have credibility in the eyes of the 
nation. There was a need for ‘a new government team’. This was the only way of calming 
the situation and coming to an agreement with striking workers. If change was not 
forthcoming, the country faced ruin. Whatever happened, there was a need for those in 
charge of the economy ‘to speak another language.’ Gierek, who had asked Babiuch not to 
raise the issue at Politburo, agreed that change was needed in either the Party or 
Government. The Prime Minister’s post was key as the new incumbent would not have long 
to act. Although he did not have any clear candidates in mind for the post, he was clear that 
they should have ‘authority and sufficient knowledge and experience’ to fill the role at this 
time. Although he would not be resigning, it is clear that Gierek also knew he was under 
pressure.
634
 
While the contents of Babiuch’s failed resignation letter are not known, it seems 
likely that he was attempting to stand down due to an inability to cope with the economic 
crisis engulfing Poland. According to Kania reports from the regions were suggesting that 
the internal market was being threatened by mass purchases.
635
 Interior Ministry reports 
elaborate on this point. Basic goods and in particular ‘flour, sugar, kasha and butter’ were 
amongst those most hit. In Warsaw ‘bread and petrol’ were similarly affected.636 The social 
impact should not be underestimated. Polish citizens were already experiencing serious 
shortages of many of these goods prior to the strikes. Runs on goods and further shortages 
would only fuel further discontent with the Party. Coal was also being affected by events. 
Kania reported that supplies earmarked for export were now required for domestic 
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purposes.
637
 Given the importance of coal exports as a major source of much needed hard-
currency earnings, this will have been a significant blow to the Party and government’s 
hopes of resolving their balance of payments crisis. The fact that the leadership appeared 
determined not to countenance strike pay and wage increases, two of the major means of 
successfully buying off workers since July,
638
 only adds to the sense that in economic terms 
the Party was on the brink. Arguably even more so than the strikes and the worker-state 
crisis of trust, the economy was Poland’s greatest challenge. As Babiuch said, ‘The biggest 
problems are in the economy and the most serious tasks are in this sphere.’639 The strikes 
only added to these problems.  
Although not discussed at Politburo the cost of the strikes was being placed at £12 
million per day in the West.
640
 This came at a time when Poland was already falling behind 
in its repayments to the West for goods. In addition to the £1.2 million owed to British 
exporters under guarantee from the British government for example, a reported £1.4 million 
was owed to uninsured exporters. While the Poles had managed to repay £700,000 owed to 
firms exporting under an official guarantee, the situation illustrated Poland’s ‘cash flow 
problems’ at this time.641 While such problems were caused by long-term economic 
mismanagement in Poland and were more serious than just ‘cash flow problems’, the strikes 
did appear to be causing the Poles some problems in terms of trade. For example, a British 
Aerospace visit to factories in Mielec and Świdnik scheduled for the following week was 
cancelled. This was possibly due to fear of strikes breaking out in these factories once 
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again.
642
 It seems that Polish workers were also deliberately attempting to disrupt Soviet 
trade with Poland. Although Kania announced that the port in Świnoujście was working,643 
in Gdynia a stir was caused when a Soviet ship left port without official permission from the 
relevant Polish agencies. The strike committee had vowed that Soviet ships would not take 
goods from Polish soil.
644
 Enterprises with transnational links, in particular ports, remained 
a sensitive area for the Party leadership.  
Under the circumstances even reports reiterating that the West German loan was still 
due to go ahead without any alteration to the terms attached and that the $325 million loan 
from the Anglo-American consortium had been signed that day appear to have offered little 
economic respite for the Polish leadership.
645
 Such loans would not resolve Poland’s 
economic problems or remove the need for structural reforms of the economy. Nor would 
they buy the Party much time in which to act. Indeed in the long-term it was arguable that 
the new loans would only cause the Party further problems. As Cam Hudson notes, the 
Polish authorities received less money and higher interest rates than they had expected. In 
keeping with earlier cited British government reports on the conditions attached by banks 
during initial negotiations, according to Hudson, the Polish leadership had also been ‘forced 
to accept […] that a steering committee of Western bankers would meet regularly (every 
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two months) with Polish authorities in order to review Polish economic policies.’646 Western 
banks were now in a position to hold the Poles to account for their economic policies and 
performance. It seems unlikely that the banks would countenance anything other than 
further economic reforms if they were to continue lending to Poland. In order to introduce 
such reforms however, the Party would need to win back the trust and support of society at a 
time of social unrest. Simultaneously they would need to persuade them to accept a lower 
standard of living and to work harder. Retaining the trust and support of their friends and 
partners would also be crucial.  
    In the short-term at least the support of their partners seemed assured. With regard to 
the French, plans continued to be made for the visit of Giscard d’Estaing in September.647 In 
terms of West German-Polish relations meanwhile Schmidt wrote to Gierek, noting that 
Bonn did not wish to be seen to interfere in Polish affairs. He also stated his desire for 
Gierek to re-schedule his cancelled visit once the elections were over.
648
 There were no 
signs of a change in Washington’s position either. Although the situation was discussed at 
the White House as part of a ‘foreign affairs breakfast’, a later public statement was made 
along standard lines.
649
 The British stance was also welcomed by the Polish ambassador to 
London.
650
 This is not to say that events in Poland were not without their complications for 
her Western partners. Schmidt’s meeting with Honecker was cancelled that day. It was 
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believed to be due in part to the influence of Polish events. This was a significant blow to 
Schmidt in an election year.
651
 
Despite the stability that Western support for the Polish leadership brought, this is 
not to say that they were unconcerned by the prospect of violence in Poland. Amongst the 
most notable U.S. Embassy and CIA reports was a CIA Special Analysis. It argued that the 
situation, particularly on the Baltic coast, was now at a stage at which ‘clashes between 
workers and security forces are a distinct possibility’.652 It did not believe that the use of 
force was the preferred course of action for the authorities, but suggested that the build-up 
of security forces in Gdańsk was part of ‘contingency preparations for any violence’. There 
was a risk that if violence erupted however, that the military in particular ‘might not perform 
reliably.’ The situation might spiral out of control.653 This was a view with which the 
embassy in Warsaw concurred.
654
 Despite these concerns, they anticipated a purely 
domestic scenario. 
  There was certainly no suggestion that the Soviet Union were intending to intervene. 
Pravda simply referenced an earlier Trybuna Ludu article. It emphasised the need for a 
normal rhythm of work for the resolution of Poland’s difficulties. It praised enterprises that 
had fulfilled their economic plans. The work of Polish coal miners was also singled out.
655
 
The latter was an important reference. Not only was Poland one of the biggest producers of 
coal in Europe at this time, a fact that was of great importance in attracting Western 
economic support, but the mining region also formed the heart of Gierek’s power base. If he 
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lost their support, his power would be damaged on two fronts. There were no suggestions 
that this was about to happen, however. In contrast to Western press coverage, the Soviet 
press was actually used to present ‘an illusion of Gierek’s tight hold on authority.’656 
Moscow was providing its tacit endorsement of Gierek and his response to the situation, a 
fact that tallies with statements made by Soviet officials and academics to the West. Along 
with support for Gierek, Afghanistan and a desire for the continuation of détente were given 
as reasons for this stance.
657
 It was clear that they were not pushing for a harder line. Press 
coverage actually seems somewhat gentler than that published in Pravda just two days 
before. This raises the question of whether they were less concerned now that Poland’s 
Western loans had either been completed or seemed secure. Certainly continued Western 
economic support for Poland will have been in Moscow’s interests. They also had their own 
economic problems to deal with. The CIA considered this to be a further restraint on Soviet 
action. In spite of this, economic support was considered to be Moscow’s most likely form 
of action towards Poland.
658
 This is not to say that behind the scenes Soviet concern over 
events was not growing, however. Through Soviet diplomats in Warsaw the West had learnt 
that the return of the Soviet Union’s ambassador to Warsaw Boris Aristov was imminent. 
He had not been due back from holiday for another seven days.
659
 Moscow’s concern was 
clearly mounting. So too was East Berlin and Prague’s.660  
Twelve years since the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, it was the latter’s 
position that was most noticeable. According to a U.S. Embassy report, although there was 
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‘a strong undercurrent’ in local media reports that Poland’s problems were a result of 
‘hostile outside forces’, a softer approach to the anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion 
was adopted by the authorities. The ‘emphasis [was] on how the Party is responsive to the 
people’s needs rather than on how the Soviets saved the country.’661 Any Warsaw Pact 
intervention in Poland would need to keep such memories in mind. They would have to 
persuade a society that had itself been crushed by the Warsaw Pact to support (or at least not 
to directly challenge) their country’s participation in an identical intervention in a 
neighbouring country. The primary concern of the Czechoslovak authorities however, 
remained not to provoke domestic unrest through the implementation of its own price 
increases for basic goods such as bread, meat, petrol and textiles.
662
 They could not delay 
such increases forever. As a spokesman for the authorities noted, it was vital that these 
increases were implemented. Many had not changed price for twenty-five years. The 
authorities were now considering ‘a series of small increases rather than one large one.’663 
Spillover was economic rather than political.  
How long the concerns of Poland’s friends would remain primarily domestic was 
unclear, however. Despite Moscow’s confidence in Gierek, it is clear that his hold on power 
within the Party was under challenge as was the economy. The challenge he faced from 
workers was also increasing. The Gdańsk MKS was continuing to gain support from all 
parts of society. For example, although they continued to work in order to save the harvest, 
farmers expressed solidarity with the MKS.
664
 Intellectuals from Poznań also expressed their 
support for the strikes in both Szczecin and Gdańsk.665 The discussion group ‘Experience 
and the Future’ (DiP) also supported the strikes as the ‘only means of expression’ open to 
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the workers ‘in the absence of authentic institutions’ providing similar means. They also 
outlined a number of much needed reforms and called for ‘dialogue’ between society and 
the state to prevent future problems.
666
 They were not the only voice of moderation. The 
Church made its first public statement via Bishop Kaczmarek. Following consultations with 
Cardinal Wyszyński, Kaczmarek expressed sympathy with the workers’ aims, but called for 
reason and prudence. Work stoppages along with possible unrest and bloodshed were not in 
society’s best interests.667 At the highest levels in the Church concern was growing. 
Wyszyński sent envoys to Gdańsk.668 The MKS itself also remained keen for a peaceful 
resolution to events and for dialogue. At 11.50pm a communiqué was issued announcing 
they had sent a delegation to Jagielski to invite the government to talks at the yard. Jagielski 
had met them and provided acknowledgement of their request.
669
  
23 August 1980 (Saturday) 
Following a proposal from the Provincial Governor Jerzy Kołodziejski a “working contact” 
was established at the Lenin Shipyard in preparation for talks between the MKS and the 
Jagielski Commission. At 2pm Kołodziejski met an MKS team consisting of Lech 
Bądkowski, Andrzej Gwiazda, Zdzisław Kobyliński and Bogdan Lis. The aim of the 
meeting, as Lech Wałęsa reassured delegates anxious at being cut out of the process, was 
simply ‘to sort out when, where and what we talk about.’670 Observed by Klemens Gniech 
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and Wałęsa, the meeting lasted two hours and offered Kołodziejski an opportunity to assess 
whether there was any hope of reaching an agreement with the workers. Although he was 
clearly intimidated by his reception outside the negotiating hall, Wałęsa made a positive 
impression on Kołodziejski from the start.671 The talks were a success. A breakthrough had 
been made. Wałęsa made the announcement that the workers had waited ten days to hear: 
‘A government delegation is coming to us at 8.00p.m. We will hammer it all out, point by 
point.’672  
The significance of the breakthrough should not be underestimated. While as already 
noted, such negotiations were comparable only to those of February 1971, the most 
significant factor at Gdańsk was that the government had agreed to negotiate with a group of 
workers that, as Bogdan Borusewicz notes, they knew were headed by opposition activists 
with links to KOR.
673
 Indeed the membership of the likes of Wałęsa, Gwiazda and 
Walentynowicz in the Free Trade Unions and their ties with opposition groups such as KOR 
was highlighted in a number of local security service reports.
674
 Given the role of the 
opposition in the strike and the fact that the Soviet Union is known to have been concerned 
by the development of an opposition in Poland,
675
 undertaking negotiations cannot have 
been a decision taken lightly. This raises the question of why the authorities did so. It seems 
unlikely that it was a decision triggered by one sole factor. Although not providing a clear 
answer, that day’s Politburo minutes indicate a few factors that may have shaped their 
thinking. 
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If one considers the support of inter-factory strikes at Szczecin, Elbląg and Słupsk, 
as well as the survival of the strike at the Paris Commune Shipyard to be vital to the survival 
of the MKS at the Lenin Shipyard, then the failure of the Party to break any of these strikes 
since the start of the week may well have been a factor in forcing the authorities to negotiate 
with the MKS. At Politburo the situation was considered to be deteriorating in the first three 
locations, while following a meeting at the Paris Commune Shipyard the previous day the 
assessment was that ‘the strikers are exhausted but determined.’676 If the Party could not 
fracture the solidarity of the strike either in Gdańsk or along the coast, they may have felt 
they had no choice but to negotiate with the Gdańsk MKS, especially with the prospect of 
the strike spreading both locally and nationally.  
The economic cost of the strikes on the coast may also have been a factor in their 
thinking. Though such costs were not discussed at Politburo, a CIA ‘Situation Report’ 
makes clear the economic impact of the coastal strikes: 
the port strikes cost Poland $20 million daily in export earnings. Seventy 
ships waiting to be unloaded cost the port of Gdańsk $1.5 million a day in 
penalty fees. Fifty-seven percent of coal exports – that account for one-
fifth of Polish hard-currency exports – and 82 percent of grain imports 
come through the Baltic ports. 
 […] Large oil tankers are waiting to be unloaded for the idle Gdansk 
refinery, which processes about 18 percent of total Polish output. 
 Moreover, all Polish shipbuilding – which accounts for 5 percent of 
Polish hard currency earnings – is now at a standstill. In Gdansk […] the 
Lenin Shipyard is losing $1 million a day in penalty fees for late 
deliveries.
677
  
 
While it is not possible to vouch for the accuracy of the CIA’s figures, in all likelihood 
Poland’s economic situation was worse than the West believed. Although the Finance 
Minister Henryk Kisiel had displayed ‘considerable satisfaction’ at the completion of the 
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Anglo-American loan ‘on schedule’ to the US,678 comments by Babiuch at Politburo suggest 
that the deal was completed on the basis of misleading figures. In discussing the report to 
the Plenum, Babiuch noted with regard to Poland’s debt that he had an understanding with 
Kisiel ‘so that there was no divergence from the declarations for banks.’679 This suggests 
that differing figures were available and that the most optimistic assessment had been 
provided to banks in order to secure their support. With the West German loan agreed but 
apparently not yet signed, they may have been keen to avoid any suggestions that the 
economic situation was worse than thought. Certainly Poland’s external debt remained a 
major factor in shaping the Party’s actions that summer. In many respects the entire 
Politburo was responsible for it. As Jaruzelski observed, having learnt of Poland’s external 
debt levels from Radio Free Europe two years earlier, none of them had taken any action 
when told that it was a problem for the lenders rather than the Politburo.
680
 Now it was 
something they had no choice but to deal with. Under the circumstances the economic 
importance of the coastal enterprises for the rest of Polish industry is unquestionable. 
  It is also clear from comments made by Kania that the supply of raw materials was 
reaching crisis point. If after ten days supplies of raw materials continued to suffer, then 
significant parts of Polish industry would be brought to a standstill.
681
 There was also the 
social cost of shortages to consider with food shortages as problematic as those of raw 
materials.
682
 With Poland’s economic situation already dire, Kania’s remarks suggest that 
the Party had only until early September to prevent further catastrophe. Given its economic 
importance to Poland, the coal mines would prove crucial if such catastrophe were to be 
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avoided. The Party was already facing problems in these regions, however. As a delegate 
from Silesia made clear at the Lenin Shipyard that day, they had already struck once and 
placed demands. They would strike again on 1 September 1980 if they had not been met. 
Silesia, he believed, would support Gdańsk.683 It would be a fatal blow to Gierek if they did. 
As it was Gierek was already facing a serious loss of support within the Party. Regional 
Party leaders were sharply criticising the Central Committee and their failure to act. They 
were pushing for a Plenum at which major changes were expected to take place.
684
 Much of 
the Politburo session was dedicated to preparations for this eventuality rather than the 
strikes.  
Although an inability to break the coastal strikes through other means as well as the 
economic cost of their failure to do so may well have been the driving force behind the 
decision to negotiate with Gdańsk, the greatest threat to Gierek at this stage was arguably 
internal. Certainly the Soviet Union was showing no signs of pressuring Gierek into any 
form of action. That day a Radio Moscow broadcast simply noted the country’s economic 
problems and the efforts of the Polish authorities to overcome them.
685
 With no sense of 
threat conveyed in Soviet media reports, it seemed that Gierek was still being given time to 
act. Certainly there was no pressure for a crackdown. Even the CIA considered any potential 
crackdown as resulting from the actions of the strikers rather than the authorities. They 
noted that strikers on the Baltic coast ‘are maintaining discipline within their ranks and are 
not making provocative moves that would require a government response.’686 While the 
workers retained ultimate responsibility for the avoidance of a crackdown through their 
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conduct, if they ceased to adhere to non-violent means of resistance, it was possible that a 
crackdown may have been deemed necessary and therefore justified.  
Demands as well as actions could be provocative, however. A petition to 
management at one enterprise in southern Poland, for example, included demands for the 
halving of Soviet armed forces stationed on Polish soil and the return of Poland’s former 
eastern territories, which had been lost to the Soviet Union at Yalta.
687
 Although news of 
these demands was detected by the local security services, they do not appear to have 
attracted any wider attention. Nonetheless these demands provide a clear reminder of the 
fact that the coastal workers and opposition activists associated with KOR were no more in 
charge of events nationally than the Party were. While such demands would not have been 
made in Gdańsk or in those strike centres influenced by the KOR milieu, the actions of 
workers without such links always ran the risk of provocation elsewhere. The Gdańsk MKS 
could not control the actions of workers throughout Poland. It was responsible for its own 
conduct and demands not those of others. It remained the main centre of strike activity 
however, and negotiations remained the only realistic option for the Party to pursue. While 
negotiations continued in Szczecin,
688
 they were now set to begin in Gdańsk as well. 
The Lenin Shipyard remained the focus of both domestic and international attention. 
It continued to gain in strength. From strikes in a handful of departments on 14 August it 
was now at the heart of a strike that represented 370 enterprises in the region.
689
 It had been 
further strengthened by two developments that day. Firstly, a “group of experts” to advise 
the MKS had been created. Although they had only gone to the Lenin Shipyard to deliver 
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the appeal of 64 Warsaw intellectuals to the MKS and the local authorities, Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki and Bronisław Geremek had been co-opted as “experts” by the MKS upon their 
arrival in the early hours of the morning.
690
 They would advise, but not impose their views 
on the MKS. As Mazowiecki told MKS delegates, ‘we shall do our best to help you. But our 
role is purely advisory. All decisions will remain in the hands of your Presidium.’691 It was a 
further development that distinguished Gdańsk from Szczecin. Within 24 hours the team of 
experts at Gdańsk would expand as further intellectuals including lawyers and economists 
arrived from Warsaw at the request of Mazowiecki and Geremek.
692
 By contrast Jurczyk 
had just appointed two local lawyers for advice.
693
  
Secondly, links with the opposition and the ability of the MKS to publicise itself had 
also been strengthened. In addition to the free press that had long been operating out of the 
Paris Commune Shipyard, a Free Press of the Lenin Shipyard had begun. Amongst those 
involved were key figures from the underground press that had developed in the late 1970s, 
including Konrad Bieliński and Mariusz Wilk. They published the first of fourteen editions 
of a strike bulletin “Solidarity” that day.694 It was a development that helped to continue an 
important trend from earlier that summer: the use of domestic sources of information by the 
opposition to inform the West and through them the rest of Poland. The bulletins provided a 
useful source of information for Western journalists reporting on events and were often 
republished in part in the Western press. Through Radio Free Europe they were also 
transmitted back to Poland.
695
 The continued support of different cross-sections of Polish 
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society and continued international publicity meant that negotiations would take place in 
front of the eyes not only of Poland, but of the world.  
That evening the first round of talks between the MKS and the Jagielski Commission 
got underway. Arriving by coach, the commission were given a hostile reception by the 
workers until Wałęsa intervened and led Jagielski to the hall.696 In a small glass-walled 
room adjacent to the main hall, Wałęsa began the meeting.  Broadcast through loudspeakers, 
he did so in front of three separate audiences: the delegates in the BHP Hall; the workers in 
the yard; and those outside the shipyard gates.
697
 Sitting across from Jagielski, who only 24 
hours earlier had tried to have Wałęsa, Gwiazda and Walentynowicz (all WZZ activists) 
removed from the MKS as a pre-condition for talks,
698
 Wałęsa used his opening speech to 
highlight the scale, determination and conduct of the striking workers in the Tri-city region.  
Although hoping for a swift end to the strike, Wałęsa made clear that they would not be 
hurried: ‘The serious matters we must settle require us to act prudently and without haste. 
We have been waiting for nine days and we have plenty of patience left.’699 For his part, 
Jagielski made clear his desire for the talks to be held ‘in a most straightforward 
constructive manner.’ He wanted the key issues to be resolved ‘together, mutually, to the 
best of our ability.’  He also reminded Wałęsa that although they had been waiting for nine 
days, he had only been in Gdańsk for two.700 He was trying to disassociate himself from the 
Pyka negotiations both in terms of substance and of style. Both sides presented themselves 
as seeking negotiations in good faith.  
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In spite of apparent mutual good intentions, there was little real negotiation at the 
first meeting, however. Jagielski simply presented the government’s views on the demands. 
As might be expected, his response to the first demand for ‘free trade unions, independent of 
the Party and employers’ was not promising. Employing a protest similar to those used by 
Gniech during the initial strike negotiations, Jagielski sought to deflect responsibility for 
decisions. He declared: ‘I am speaking as a representative of the government on a question 
which does not lie within its competence. This matter concerns the trade union organisation. 
We cannot dictate its statute nor any of its functions.’701 Responsibility for the demand lay 
elsewhere. He did try to win the workers over and encourage them to settle for less by 
expressing his own views on the matter, however. Acknowledging their unhappiness with 
the existing unions and accepting that trade union laws and structures in Poland required 
change, he presented possibilities that fell far short of what the MKS was demanding: a new 
trade union law; a new trade union structure or the swift replenishment of the existing one; 
the appointment of those on the current strike committees to positions within the existing 
structures; ‘regular’ discussions between the authorities and the official unions that were 
‘permanent and continuous: a dialogue between partners.’ While Jagielski believed that such 
options left the path clear for further reform to take place, Wałęsa made clear that though 
they would discuss the matter further, it was not what they were after. They would move on 
to the second demand.
702
 This was a tactic employed by Wałęsa whenever the meeting 
started to become too fractious or it felt as though talks were stalling. 
The issue of political prisoners, whose roots lay in the post-1976 actions of KOR, 
proved to be one of the most contentious issues discussed. Jagielski offered assurances 
based on information provided by the Minister of Justice himself that ‘there are no political 
prisoners in Poland’ by which Jagielski meant ‘persons convicted for their political 
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opinions.’703 It was a definition that did not include the detentions of Kuroń, Michnik and 
Lityński. By now the subject of protests by Amnesty International, they remained under 
arrest.
704
 It was also a definition disputed by Wałęsa. Having attended the trials of those 
prisoners under discussion, he declared ‘I can say straight out because I am a worker and 
don’t mince words that they were rigged.’705 It was a direct and unprecedented challenge to 
Jagielski, his straight-talking approach entirely at odds with the language of obfuscation 
used by those in power. Andrzej Gwiazda also responded by questioning whether it was 
possible given previous official falsehoods concerning the Polish economy (‘despite some 
minor difficulties, everything was running smoothly’), that the judicial system suffered from 
the same kind of problems.
706
 It was an intelligently argued and dignified challenge to the 
authorities. It arguably made all the greater impact because of it. When he concluded his 
argument with a call for the re-examination of cases over which the public had questions ‘if 
only to clear the name of the judicial apparatus’, it was met with applause and by Jagielski 
noting down the cases under discussion.
707
  
Although they differed in approach, the responses of Wałęsa and Gwiazda typified 
the fact that the strike was as much a struggle over language as it was over free trade unions. 
As Ryszard Kapuściński reported from the Lenin Shipyard, in Gdańsk ‘a battle about 
language took place as well, about our Polish language, about its integrity and clarity, about 
returning to words an unambiguous sense.’708 As Gwiazda later stated to Jagielski in a 
dispute over the lack of official press coverage for the MKS,  
I second your proposal that we speak the truth. But the truth must be the 
whole truth. So let’s speak the whole truth: what we are demanding, why 
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we are on strike, what you and the Government Commission propose. We 
can report later what we have agreed.
709
 
Nowhere did this struggle for truth become clearer than in discussions with the Central 
Committee Secretary Zbigniew Zieliński concerning an important pre-condition that still 
needed to be met: the restoration of telephone connections. While the connection with 
Szczecin had been restored, the authorities had not updated them as they had promised to on 
the reconnection with Warsaw. It still was not working.
710
 In a lengthy discussion on the 
subject, Zieliński announced: 
A hurricane passed through Warsaw last night, destroying buildings in 
large areas of the city. I was in Warsaw at the time, to be exact just after 
the hurricane. You can see whole streets – such as the avenue from the 
airport – where huge trees, huge limes, beautiful limes are completely 
demolished along half the route. The central telephone exchange was 
completely demolished. So I don’t think telephone links with Warsaw will 
be restored today – even though I haven’t been in Warsaw today – and I 
don’t know how advanced the repair work is, or whether it can be finished 
tomorrow.
711
 
While as with so many lies Zieliński’s statement may have had the smallest kernel of truth 
at its heart,
712
 coming at a time in which the authorities were already struggling for 
credibility with the workers, it was a statement that left not only Jagielski unimpressed, but 
did little to aid the government’s position in the eyes of the workers.713 The workers’ 
response illustrates the difference in attitudes towards language and truth between the 
workers and the authorities at this time: 
Pieńkowska: May I point out that telephone links with Warsaw were cut 
off last Friday, a week ago. Nothing was said then of any hurricane. 
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Zbigniew Lis: I would like to ask the Deputy Premier why today’s press 
and television made no mention of this hurricane. We have heard nothing 
about it. […] 
Gwiazda: I would like to inform the Minister that in modern telephone 
exchanges there is no need to push a block into the socket of every 
subscriber. Disconnection is done simply by transmitting appropriate 
information to the register from the centre, or by removing it. It really just 
amounts to issuing an instruction.
714
 
 
In perhaps of one of the simplest expressions of Václav Havel’s notion of ‘living within the 
truth’ they adopted a dignified response to the lies of the Party and confronted them with the 
truth.
715
 They refused to be taken for fools.  
 Although the rest of the meeting went more smoothly with Jagielski presenting the 
government’s position on each of the remaining twenty-one points, the commission still 
struggled for credibility in the eyes of the workers. This was a point made clear when in 
relation to a demand on health care Jagielski paused to discuss his personal experiences. In 
addition to discussing his heart attack in the late 1970s, he placed his life within the context 
of recent Polish history. He recalled the experiences of him and his family during the Nazi 
occupation in World War Two, including that he was ‘beat[en] day and night, three times 
daily with a whip and a loaded stick. I can show you all my scars.’716 It was, as Neal 
Ascherson argues, an attempt by Jagielski to show ‘that he was as good a Pole as anyone in 
the room.’717 A later report by TW “Rybak”, an SB informant reporting from the shipyards 
at Gdańsk and Gdynia since at least 22 August 1980, suggests that for some workers this 
was just one aspect of Jagielski’s appearance with which they were unimpressed. Talking to 
workers as they were leaving the hall, they expressed embarrassment at Jagielski’s offer to 
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show them his scars.
718
 Credibility remained an issue. It remained a problem for the 
authorities as a whole. The workers did not believe they could resolve the problems facing 
the country. As Wałęsa stated, ‘you did not explain why we keep returning to the same 
place. This time it took ten years. I expect that in another ten we will be back again where 
we are now.’719 The workers did not believe the Party. While the negotiations marked a 
significant breakthrough for the MKS therefore, they had not resolved the Party’s crisis of 
trust.  
24 August 1980 (Sunday) 
Eight weeks since the first strikes erupted in response to meat price increases, Poland found 
itself in the midst of the most significant strike wave in its history. Over the course of the 
summer 640 000 workers at 533 enterprises in 49 administrative regions had gone on strike. 
The situation showed no signs of abating. For the Polish leadership, as Stanisław Kania 
made clear at the Party’s IV Plenum, there was a ‘real threat that the country may stand in 
the face of national catastrophe.’ The Baltic coast remained the main focus of activity. 
According to Kania, in the Tri-city area 130 000 workers at 140 enterprises, including the 
shipyards, ports and the oil refinery were on strike. In Szczecin strikes involved 60 000 
workers at 80 enterprises, again including shipyards and the port. Some 25 000 workers at 
40 enterprises were also striking in Elbląg and Słupsk. Although no figures were provided 
by Kania, he made clear that the impact of these strikes on the national economy was 
severe.
720
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Three particular strikes appear to have been causing the Polish leadership problems 
at this time: the ports, transport, and Gdańsk. In economic terms the port strikes were 
crucial. Although the naval port, along with the Soviet Union and East Germany, were 
helping to unload goods, as Kania’s account of events on the coast made clear many were 
not in operation. Strikes on public transport were also considered a problem in this region.
721
 
It was these strikes that attracted calls for particularly strong action from some. Along with a 
call for the army to get public transport working again so that citizens could get to school 
and work, Wrocław’s First Secretary called for firm action against the ports. He cited the 
recent French experience of employing the navy to break strikes that were disrupting oil 
supplies and threatening the national economy as an example that could be followed.
722
 
Despite the economic significance of the ports as well as the use of such methods in the 
West, it was not a suggestion that the Politburo took on board at this stage. Nor were they 
necessarily under any external pressure to do so. 
Although reports must have been filed on Polish events throughout the summer, 
from papers smuggled from the KGB archives in the early 1990s by Vasili Mitrokhin it is 
known for certain that Moscow was paying attention. That day the Soviet ambassador 
informed Moscow of the Jagielski negotiations.
723
 Despite claims by Gierek to the contrary, 
there appears to have been no pressure for the Poles to take any action against the strikes, 
however.
724
 Nonetheless Moscow’s concerns about the strike in Gdańsk were likely to have 
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been similar to those of Warsaw. Alongside the determination and demands of the workers 
on the coast, a major point of concern appears to have remained the involvement of 
established opposition activists from across Poland in the Tri-city strikes.
725
 It was a factor 
that distinguished the Lenin Shipyard strike from all others. As Kazimierz Barcikowski 
made clear the involvement of ‘anti-socialist elements’ was not an accusation that could be 
levelled at Szczecin.
726
 Indeed, so far as Kania could tell, most workers in the Szczecin 
MKS were actually Party members.
727
 Jagielski’s report to the Politburo will only have 
confirmed perceptions of Gdańsk as an altogether different problem. He described the 
MKS’ ‘strategy’ as being ‘to prolong the strike at all costs and to win.’ He went on to 
describe it as ‘Difficult to lead talks, we are degraded, humiliated.’728 It appears to have 
made little difference to the Party’s strategy for dealing with the strikes, however.  
Perhaps because of the admission at the Plenum that the Party was at fault for the 
severe crisis facing Poland, as well as the fact that despite opposition activity in Gdańsk the 
strikes were broadly recognised as being genuinely working-class protests, the differences 
between Szczecin and Gdańsk appear to have made little difference to the actions taken by 
the Party leadership: changes in the leadership team and the announcement of possible new 
elections to the official trade unions. The leadership changes amounted to ‘one of the most 
complete leadership changes in the post-war history of eastern Europe’.729 They made no 
difference to the workers, however. Interior Ministry reports indicate that the coastal 
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workers were of the opinion that the changes would not help to eliminate the current 
crisis.
730
 Even in Poznań where the changes had at first been met with responses ‘ranging 
from happiness to inebriated euphoria’, enthusiasm proved to be short lived as people began 
to question whether they would bring genuine change or more of the same.
731
 The changes 
were arguably more significant for Gierek. They significantly undermined his power base 
within the leadership team. Critics such as Stefan Olszowski returned to the Politburo, while 
a number of those removed from office, including Babiuch, were amongst those with the 
strongest ties to Gierek.
732
 Noticeably all of those dismissed from office had also been 
involved in the failed efforts to halt the strikes without negotiating with the MKS.
733
 Not all 
of those dismissed were paying the price for long-term failures in leadership. 
One leadership change in particular was of great importance to Poland at this time: 
that of Prime Minister. Due to the Prime Minister’s role in formulating policy on social and 
economic matters, at a time of deep social and economic crisis it was arguably one of the 
most important positions in the country. While Minister of Defence Wojciech Jaruzelski 
was the favoured candidate for the post, as in February he declined. In addition to the focus 
of the Prime Minister’s job on social and economic concerns unsuited to a soldier, there was 
the obvious risk of the appointment of a military man to the post at a time of great social 
unrest being misconstrued.
734
 The post instead went to Józef Pińkowski. It is indicative of 
the scale of the problems facing Poland at this time, particularly in the economy, that despite 
his economic and political experience, Pińkowski considered his appointment as Prime 
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Minister ‘a certain political suicide’ amongst other things.735 The economy he was inheriting 
control over was in serious trouble and had required reform for years.  
As the Polish Finance Minister stated on Polish television that night the national debt 
stood at $20 billion (the equivalent of 24 months’ foreign exports and based on Olszowski’s 
January 1980 report an underestimation of some $4 billion). Although exports would be 
increased in order to pay off these debts, the country required new loans for the maintenance 
of living standards as well as for essential imports. This was a significant shift. As a British 
report concluded, ‘It seems to imply no early reduction in Poland’s indebtedness, which 
continuation of the strikes may intensify in any case.’ However, it may have been ‘a price 
the leadership intend to pay to prevent further social unrest.’ The significance of the debt-
credit axis was also made clear in the speech. While they could generally obtain new credits, 
they had to repay their debts on schedule in order to maintain investor confidence.
736
 Given 
the need for increased exports to repay these debts, strikes would only damage Poland’s 
reliability in this regard. In combination with the economic demands, strikes would only add 
to the difficulties facing Pińkowski as he resolved these problems.  
While Gierek’s personal power base and the economic basis of society crumbled, 
support for the coastal workers grew. The celebration of Mass once again demonstrated 
local support for the coastal workers. In Gdańsk Mass attracted over five thousand 
celebrants with the majority of them outside the shipyard’s gates.737 In Szczecin Mass 
attracted similarly large crowds despite the fact that Father Jerzy Sosna was prevented from 
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delivering a sermon to the workers by Bishop Majdański.738 In Gdańsk Pope John Paul II’s 
letter to Cardinal Wyszyński was also published in that day’s strike bulletin, with the Pope 
providing a major source of ‘spiritual support’ throughout the strike.739 Although he did not 
actively express support for the strikes, the Pope offered assurances to the Polish Primate 
‘that in the course of these recent difficult days I am particularly close.’ He prayed that the 
Polish Episcopate under Wyszyński’s guidance could assist Poland at this time ‘in its 
difficult struggle for one’s daily bread, for social justice and protection of its inviolable right 
to its own life and development.’740 It was a statement very much in keeping with the Polish 
Episcopate’s attitude towards events in Poland, but with the added importance of being sent 
from the Vatican.  
The Western media, also mentioned in the Pope’s letter, continued to watch as well. 
Newspaper clippings from around the world were pinned to a notice board in the yard.
741
 
They provided clear evidence that the workers were not alone. Further evidence of this came 
from a number of other sources: the Szczecin MKS; the “group of experts”; and the 
countryside. The previous day Kazimierz Barcikowski had agreed to allow the Szczecin 
MKS to send delegates to Gdańsk, along with a representative of the government 
commission, so that they could coordinate their position on point one: the demand for free 
trade unions.
742
 It was an important moment in the strike and one that bore fruit once the 
delegates arrived. Alongside a decision to send Gdańsk delegates in the opposite direction 
                                                          
738
 R. Kościelny and A. Kubaj, ‘NSZZ “Solidarność” Region Pomorze Zachodnie’, in: Ł. Kamiński and G. Waligóra 
(eds.), NSZZ Solidarność 1980-1989. Tom 3. Polska Północna (Warsaw, 2010), pp.249-354 (p.256). 
739
 See: L. Olejnik, ‘Polski Sierpień 1980 roku. Przyczyny, przebieg Wydarzeń i ich skutki’, in: S. Pilarski and D. 
Rogut (eds.), Czas Nadziei: NSZZ “Solidarność” w Bełchatowie na tle sytuacji w kraju i regionie (Łódź, 2011), 
pp.13-35 (p.33). 
740
 P. Raina, Kardynał Wyszyński. Czasy Prymasowskie 1980 (Warsaw, 2010), pp.60-61. 
741
 See: Robotnicy ’80 (dir. A. Chodakowski et al: Poland, 1980); E. Ciołek, Solidarność sierpień 1980 – sierpień 
1989/August 1980 – August 1989 (Warsaw, 2010), p.55; Gdańsk 1980 – Pictures from a strike (London, 1981), 
p.46. 
742
 See: A. Głowacki (ed.), Rozmowy Komisji Rządowej pod przewodnictwem Kazimierza Barcikowskiego z 
Międzyzakładowym Komitetem Strajkowym w Szczecinie w dniach 21-30 sierpnia 1980r. według transmisji 
radiowęzła Stoczni im. A. Warskiego w Szczecinie (Szczecin, 1989), pp.100-102; K. Barcikowski, U szczytów 
władzy (Warsaw, 1998), pp.172-173.  
181 
 
and the establishment of telephone contact between both strikes, the most significant 
development was an agreement that neither MKS would end the strike without an agreement 
for the establishment of free trade unions and a guarantee of safety for those on strike being 
reached.
743
 This increased the likelihood of the workers achieving their main aim. If one 
group of workers succeeded in gaining free trade unions, it would be more difficult to deny 
the other group the same. However, it also carried a risk. If one strike could be forced into 
accepting a lesser agreement and ending the strike, the other could also be undermined. No 
agreement on the wording of point one appears to have been reached. This remained open 
for discussion. 
Further support came with the arrival of more experts. Despite being detained at the 
airport in Warsaw, where an officer from the Interior Ministry had attributed their detention 
to news that their flight was being utilised by people hostile to the state, they arrived 
safely.
744
 It seems that the security services had hoped not only to intimidate the experts, but 
also for them to help bring the situation under control. According to Tadeusz Kowalik, the 
MSW colonel wished them ‘useful work for the good of the “socialist state.”’745 They may 
have hoped that the experts would exert a moderating influence on the workers. Unlike 
intellectuals from the KOR milieu, these experts were associated with less radical 
independent initiatives outside the Party framework: the Society for Academic Courses 
(TKN), the Club of Catholic Intellectuals (KIK) and the Experience and Future (DiP). While 
it is true that the experts felt the demand for free trade unions could not be achieved, they 
did not interfere with the workers’ efforts to achieve this. They also made clear that despite 
their initial stance as mediators, they were very much on the side of the workers. Although 
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they were fish out of water at an industrial enterprise such as the Lenin Shipyard and were 
unused to dealing with workers, from the moment they arrived the experts were loyal to the 
MKS.
746
 Along with further experts from Warsaw and Gdańsk who came to the yard 
independently to aid the strike, they significantly bolstered the workers’ position.747 With 
discussions also beginning to take place in agricultural areas, which largely remained calm 
throughout August, concerning demands and support for Gdańsk,748 the MKS now enjoyed 
support from a broad cross section of Polish society. As the Party and the economy 
weakened, the workers gained in strength.  
It was in the midst of these shifting dynamics that the struggle over trade unions 
became the major point of confrontation. The main problem for the Party, as Jan Szydlak 
had announced in his last Politburo session as head of the official trade unions, was that the 
Party’s position on trade unions was in direct opposition to international laws they had 
signed on the matter.
749
 The workers only wanted what they were entitled to on paper. The 
Party did not wish to give it to them, however. This was made clear in a speech by Gierek 
televised nationally that evening. Alongside promises of wide-ranging economic reforms 
and admissions of mistakes, Gierek made promises regarding changes to the official trade 
unions similar to those presented by Jagielski at Gdańsk. New elections were to be 
considered wherever workers felt necessary and by implication representatives drawn from 
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strike committees could continue to represent workers within the framework of the official 
unions.
750
 Essentially it was a similar deal to that gained by workers at Lublin only now 
being offered nationally. It was unlikely to appease the coastal workers, however. Firstly, 
while the Party recognised genuine problems with the official unions and the need for 
workers to have an effective means through which to express their discontent, as with the 
similar agreement reached in Szczecin in 1971, any influence of newly elected 
representatives was unlikely to be permanent. It was also unlikely to be available to those 
associated with the opposition.
751
 Secondly, it fell far short of the demand for ‘free trade 
unions independent from the Party and employers’ made by workers at Gdańsk and 
guaranteed by ILO covenants signed by the Party. This was unlikely to be granted. As the 
sole representative of the working class in Poland, the workers’ state could not concede to 
such a demand without jeopardising their own position of power. As Gierek made clear in 
his televised speech, demands threatening the basis of the Polish state could not be agreed 
to.
752
 Socialism and the leading role of the Party had to be preserved. Poland’s ties with the 
Soviet Union must also not be threatened. 
25 August 1980 (Monday) 
As the military build-up for the forthcoming Warsaw Pact exercise began to take place in 
East Germany and Brezhnev returned from holiday, Soviet and Eastern bloc media sent out 
different messages. In East Germany where in an unusual step the previous day Gierek’s 
speech had been broadcast live to the nation on television, Poland was relegated to brief 
coverage on the inside pages of Neues Deutschland while radio and television remained 
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quiet.
753
 In the Soviet Union support seems to have been indicated for Gierek. However, 
other than in a comprehensive TASS summary, any sections of his speech concerning 
demands that may have had internal ramifications for Moscow, such as those regarding 
trade unions, were restricted. The Western response to Polish events meanwhile was heavily 
attacked in a TASS political commentary by Yurii Kornilov.
754
 This suggests three main 
elements to Soviet concerns at this time: the stabilization of the regime in Poland; the 
prevention of spillover; and the prevention of Western interference in its sphere of influence 
and attacks on the reputation of the Communist system. While regarding the latter the most 
vocal actor in the West was the media rather than politicians and diplomats, based on East 
German security service reports there appear to have been few signs of spillover in spite of 
public interest in events.
755
 The first point was arguably the most difficult to secure. While 
there was nothing to trigger Western alarm in the Soviet media, behind the scenes measures 
regarding Polish events began to be put in place. A Politburo level special commission on 
Poland known informally as the ‘Suslov commission’ was formed. 
 Chaired by Moscow’s chief ideologue Mikhail Suslov and featuring a number of 
other senior Politburo and Secretariat members, the main aim of the commission was to 
follow Polish events closely and inform the Politburo on their progress. They were also 
tasked with informing the Politburo ‘about possible measures on our part.’756 Although this 
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represented an escalation in Soviet concern, it was not out of keeping with the standard 
Soviet response to such situations. For example, as Mark Kramer has noted, prior to the 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 such a commission had also been established.
757
 
Media coverage on the day of its formation indicates that there was no immediate threat to 
Poland from its formation, however. Nor is it likely that the Polish leadership knew of its 
existence at this stage.
758
 Jaruzelski, for example, notes the formation of the Suslov 
commission only in September 1980.
759
 Indeed the Soviets appear to have been taking great 
care to do nothing to inflame the crisis in either Poland or in détente at this time. According 
to one Polish official cited in a U.S. embassy telegram sent from Warsaw the previous day 
the idea of Soviet military activity is so sensitive that Soviet troops in 
Poland have been confined to barracks, and […] troops scheduled to 
participate in [the] forthcoming exercise in [the] GDR will travel to [the] 
GDR through Czechoslovakia to avoid transiting [through] Poland.
760
 
 
This suggests that even before the authorisation of military preparations, the Soviet Union 
was already well aware of the potential risks of any military movements at this time. They 
could not act in a way that might inflame the internal situation in Poland. Nor could they fail 
to take their own domestic and international interests into account: an internal solution was 
arguably favourable at this stage. This is not to say that they would not pressure the Polish 
leadership, however. Overnight two Soviet naval vessels would appear briefly near Gdańsk 
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in an apparent signal to the leadership.
761
 Moscow had various means of applying pressure 
to Warsaw.  
 Steps toward an internal solution of events on the coast were outlined during a 
meeting of the Secretariat meanwhile. While the study of demands for wage increases and a 
calculation of their costs were agreed upon, a number of tactics for dealing with the coastal 
strikes themselves were also outlined. These included highlighting divisions within the 
workforce by organising a secret ballot concerning whether work should be resumed or the 
strike continued. Any refusal to undertake such a ballot by the workers was to be exploited 
for the purposes of propaganda as ‘undemocratic’. Even a favourable vote for the 
continuation of the strike could be exploited according to these plans, by making use of the 
figures to show how many workers wished to undertake work, for example. Ideally they 
would continue talks while the workers resumed work, so that the ports and shipyards began 
to function.
762
 Although many of these plans were ultimately not implemented, they 
demonstrate two important facts about the Party’s response to the strikes. Firstly, vital 
economic structures were given prime importance in tactics for managing the strikes on the 
coast. Secondly, propaganda was favoured over force as a means of resolving the 
confrontation. This suggests not only a continued desire for a resolution not involving force, 
but also that it was the economic importance of the enterprise rather than the scale of the 
strikes that was most important.  
Despite their desire for a peaceful settlement, it was made plain that new trade union 
structures would not be tolerated as a means by which striking enterprises could be got back 
to work. Reform was possible, but not efforts to establish a legally-sanctioned ‘opposition’ 
group. Noticeably, such concerns came second to those concerning economic matters. These 
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ranged from improved meat supplies and the reintroduction of a voucher system for sugar to 
approaching the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc states for aid in the provision of supplies.
763
 
With the economy apparently remaining a priority over the strikes, the Polish authorities 
needed not only to contain and extinguish the strike wave, but also to gain as much 
economic support from their friends and partners as possible. A significant development that 
day therefore appears to have been the announcement that the terms of the DM 1.2 billion 
($668 million) West German bank loan to Poland had finally been agreed.
764
 While this 
represented a positive development for the Polish side, not everything with regards to the 
loan was positive. Not only had the Poles secured DM 0.3 million ($168 million) less in 
loans than had been expected, the terms of the loan had also deteriorated since negotiations 
the previous week.
765
 It is not clear whether the prospect of a further deterioration in loan 
terms remained possible if the social and economic situation in Poland worsened, but it may 
have been a risk. The loan agreement remained unsigned.  
 A further deterioration in the international context may also have presented a threat. 
The new Polish team provided assurances to Western embassies that there would be no shift 
in Poland’s foreign policy following the Plenum. As the Polish Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Marian Dobrosielski reassured the U.S. ambassador, they remained committed to 
disarmament, the CSCE process, and the maintenance of détente.
766
 While at the White 
House an escalation of events was detected by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Dobrosielski was 
offered assurances that the U.S. position on Poland would not alter ‘unless there were some 
drastic development such as the use of force.’ He assured the ambassador that this was not 
the case although he was also keen to stress the importance of avoiding Western interference 
                                                          
763
 Ibid., pp.2-4. 
764
 ‘German Loan to Poland Is Set’, The American Banker, 25 August 1980. 
765
 Ibid. 
766
 DOS FOIA: Telegram from Warsaw to State, ‘MFA Deputy Affirms Continuity of Polish Policy: See Economic 
Reform in Party and Government Changes’, 25 August 1980.  Document No. 80WARSAW008451.  See also: 
TNA: PRO: FCO 28/4161, f176: Danish Delegation to NATO, ‘The Situation in Poland. Conversation with 
Foreign Minister Czyrek. August 25, 1980.’ 
188 
 
in Poland’s internal affairs.767 As well as threatening détente itself, due to the interlinked 
nature of the global economy, international as well as domestic instability could further 
damage the already weakened Polish economy. The West could be as responsible for that as 
the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc could.  
Economic concerns aside, it was domestic turmoil that presented the greatest threat 
to the Party. In addition to the coast, MSW reports highlighted problems in areas such as 
Toruń, Olsztyn, Tarnów, Rzeszow, Krosno, as well as Nowa Huta. Discontent was also 
evident elsewhere, threatening disruption.
768
 Although not mentioned in the reports, with the 
support of Bishop Ignacy Tokarczuk a hunger strike was also employed for the first time 
that summer by activists associated with an underground journal at a church in Stalowa 
Wola.
769
 Although not directly linked to the strikes on the coast, there was some overlap. 
One demand concerned the release from prison of Jan Kozłowski, a peasant self-defence 
activist whose case had long been adopted by KOR and whose name was one of three 
specifically stated in point four of the twenty-one demands regarding the release of political 
prisoners.
770
 
While such activities signified the severity of Poland’s plight at this time, it was the 
decision of the authorities to have Stanisław Kania approach Cardinal Wyszyński for a 
meeting with Edward Gierek that perhaps signified the authorities’ greatest concern with 
regard to the unfolding situation. At a private meeting with Gierek at the First Secretary’s 
residence five points were discussed, primarily the issue of ‘free trade unions.’ Although 
                                                          
767
 Ibid; J. Carter, White House Diary (New York, 2010), p.460. 
768
 G. Majchrzak, ‘Informacje sytuacyjne MSW z sierpnia 1980 roku’, Zeszyty Historyczne, 145 (2003), pp.65-
155 (p.105-106). 
769
 M. Bukała, ‘NSZZ “Solidarność” Region Ziemia Sandomierska’, in: Ł. Kamiński and G. Waligóra (eds.), NSZZ 
Solidarność 1980-1989, Tom.5. Polska Środkowo-Wschodnia (Warsaw, 2010), pp.641-694 (p.644); M. Choma-
Jusińska, Środowiska opozycyjne na Lubelszczyźnie 1975-1980 (Warsaw and Lublin, 2009), p.354; M. 
Dąbrowski, Lubelski Lipiec 1980 (Lublin, 2000), p.210. 
770
 For an overview of the case of Jan Kozłowski, as well as those of Edmund Zadrożyński and Marek 
Kozłowski (also named in point four), see: A. Kemp-Welch (ed.), The Birth of Solidarity: The Gdańsk 
Negotiations (London and Basingstoke, 1983), pp.183-184. 
189 
 
Wyszyński did not take sides in the dispute overall, Wyszyński spoke out in favour of 
independent unions while Gierek defended the official ones. Soviet intervention was also 
discussed.
771
 Lacking any prior preparation and taking place at Gierek’s home it was a 
meeting without precedent.
772
 It is hard to imagine that such a meeting would have taken 
place unless the country found itself in dire circumstances. Alongside Soviet intervention, as 
the discussion on free trade unions indicates, the Baltic coast remained at the heart of the 
Party’s concerns. 
Although awaiting negotiations with Jagielski, two strands of talks had taken place 
in Gdańsk since the previous negotiations: one between low-level government 
representatives and the MKS, the other between the MKS and their advisors. Regarding the 
former, with Jagielski in Warsaw and no fixed date for the next round of talks, the yard was 
in a state of limbo as the workers waited for news. In the meantime two preconditions were 
agreed for the resumption of talks: the immediate restoration of telephone connections with 
Warsaw and then Poland as a whole; the first twenty minutes of the next negotiations were 
to be broadcast live on local radio followed by an hour long edit of the meeting approved by 
the MKS. Initial talks were given a low priority by the government with an assistant of the 
Provincial Governor’s sent to negotiate. They dragged on without conclusion into early 
evening when Bądkowski assessed that the government were engaging in delaying tactics in 
order to grind down the workers. The MKS did not alter their position, however. They made 
clear that with their demands unfulfilled, negotiations would not resume. A late 
breakthrough with the authorities was ultimately made. Talks would resume the next day.
773
 
When they did so, it would be clear that their stance on new unions was as determined as it 
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had ever been. The previous day experts had raised the possibility of developing a ‘Variant 
B’ as a fall-back option allowing for the comprehensive reform of the existing unions. In a 
meeting between Presidium members and the experts held away from the BHP Hall, the 
Presidium rejected this suggestion out of hand.
774
 Tadeusz Kowalik claims that during his 
time in the shipyard he ‘did not meet a single striker or delegate who was willing to 
compromise on this issue.’775 It was a stance reinforced by the slogans ordinary workers had 
painted around the yard and in the crosses they had painted through the signs for the official 
unions.
776
 It was an issue over which they were not prepared to back down. 
26 August 1980 (Tuesday) 
The broader context in which the next round of negotiations at the Lenin Shipyard took 
place had shifted greatly since the opening round. In terms of the Polish context, the 
negotiations took place in the midst of a dramatic escalation of the strike wave. Both the 
scale of the strikes on the coast and the spread of strikes nationally were causing concern.
777
 
According to MSW estimates, 150 000 workers were on strike in the Gdańsk region, 80 000 
in the Szczecin region, 20 000 in the Elbląg region and 12 000 in the Słupsk region.778 
While this increased pressure on the authorities to extinguish the strikes on the coast, it was 
the spread of the strike wave nationwide that was of greatest concern.
779
 Strikes in Łódź and 
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Wrocław were most significant. In both transport strikes spread rapidly. In Łódź they acted 
as a trigger for various forms of discontent, including ‘occupation strikes’ and stoppages, 
throughout the city. In Wrocław similar events culminated in the formation of an 
Interfactory Strike Committee, which appealed for support for the coastal workers.
780
 It was 
a development which demonstrated that despite ongoing security service efforts at detaining 
opposition activists, both KOR and Radio Free Europe continued to play a role in the spread 
of information, including organisation and methods during the strikes.
781
 The further use of 
hunger strikes in solidarity with the coastal workers also continued to grow.
782
 The 
authorities were under increasing pressure from a variety of sources and methods as 
negotiations got underway. There was a growing urgency with which to extinguish the 
strikes.  
As well as greater pressure locally and nationally, the Jagielski Commission faced a 
more organised and strategically aware MKS. Unlike the first session, the MKS was acting 
under advice from the group of experts. At a meeting the previous day the strategy and 
tactics for negotiations had been discussed. According to one expert, the economist 
Waldemar Kuczyński, the MKS and the experts worked on the basis that the Jagielski 
Commission would begin with the less political and more easily achievable demands from 
the bottom of the list while avoiding point one. To counter this, the MKS were to insist upon 
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the fulfilment of point one prior to any discussion of further demands. They were to create a 
favourable context in which negotiations would take place in order to aid negotiations.
783
 
Opening the session Wałęsa illustrated the two main points of the experts’ advice. In 
terms of creating a favourable context, he expressed his hopes for a meeting ‘fruitful for our 
country.’ Then in keeping with the desire for fulfilment of point one he went on to highlight 
the importance of free trade unions to the workers. Amongst other things, he argued that 
Poland’s economic problems ‘came about because working people did not have their own, 
authentic union representation.’ Despite taking a firm stand on unions, he continued to 
create a favourable context, however. He went on to stress that such unions were neither a 
threat to the nation nor to socialism. They wanted what was best for the country and were 
only striking as a result of the failure of the authorities to keep their promises concerning the 
running of the country and of enterprises in the past.
784
 The experts’ advice appears to have 
been carefully implemented. Wałęsa was firm but reasonable throughout. 
Such an approach arguably continued throughout the session in the discussion of two 
main issues: communications and free trade unions. Regarding the former, delegates 
continued to conduct themselves both with firmness and with dignity, as they had done 
during the initial negotiations. This is demonstrated by the delegates’ responses to the 
claims of the Deputy Minister of Communication Stanisław Wyłupek. He wished ‘to state 
categorically and responsibly that telecommunications between Warsaw and the whole of 
Poland have been maintained throughout this period’ but that manual rather than ‘automatic’ 
connections had been used. The telephone exchange had quite simply been overloaded by 
the demands placed on it. Although under orders from Jagielski they had restored automatic 
                                                          
783
 W. Kuczyński, Burza nad Wisłą. Dziennik 1980-1981 (Warsaw, 2002), pp.43. 
784
 A. Kemp-Welch (ed.), The Birth of Solidarity: The Gdańsk Negotiations (London and Basingstoke, 1983), 
pp.69-70.  
193 
 
connections the previous day, the main telephone exchange had once again been placed 
under such stress that the situation had repeated itself.
785
   
The authorities’ explanation flew in the face not only of their experiences of the 
communication blockade and of logic, but was also made worse by the workers’ lack of 
trust in the authorities. This was made clear in the response of one delegate, who questioned 
the likelihood of such an occurrence ‘in the age of electronics and high technology in 
telecommunications’ and pointed out that neither the delegates nor ‘ordinary people’ 
believed the blockade to be anything other than intentional. As the authorities said 
otherwise, however, perhaps they could provide the MKS with a more reliable means of 
communication: television and radio.
786
 The workers were determined to have access to 
means that would allow them to present their version of the truth in order to counter the lies 
and propaganda of an official press untrusted by the workers. As another delegate 
immediately pointed out, they had only ever printed leaflets due to the isolation the MKS 
experienced as a result of the official press failing to publish the truth about events. Only the 
international press fulfilled this aim.
787
 It was a role they fulfilled only at Gdańsk, however. 
Whereas Jagielski had earlier protested at the presence of television cameras, in Szczecin 
the strike guard had detained Swedish journalists the previous day.
788
 Although other strikes 
were significant, it was the Lenin Shipyard strike that remained central to international 
coverage and the largest scale problem facing the authorities alongside the economy.   
While for the authorities the strikes and economic difficulties overlapped, for the 
workers the two appear to have been interlinked: the strike was a response to the economic 
crisis and nothing more. The workers wanted a long-term response to the crisis and not a 
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quick-fix. New trade unions would help to do so. They were not being demanded in order to 
challenge the authorities, but to avoid future problems. As Wałęsa put it: 
No one wants to come back every ten years to the same point. Something 
must be done about it. The fact is we don’t want political games of any 
sort. We want straight dealings like those of peasants or workers […]. Do 
understand us: we don’t want power. We don’t want more stoppages, more 
strikes. This is a last resort, a necessity.
 
 
 
New unions were vital if Poland were not to find itself in this position again. As Wałęsa 
concluded, ‘Even if we get the twenty points but not this one there will be no agreement.’789 
It was a point reinforced by Andrzej Gwiazda. When Jagielski simply reiterated the official 
line on trade unions, Gwiazda highlighted the most pressing problems with the Polish 
economy as well as the need for new trade unions. He placed the issue of trade unions not 
only within the context of Polish history and personal experience, but also within the 
relevant conventions of the ILO.
790
 There was no divergence of views at this time between 
Wałęsa and Gwiazda. Their approach might have differed, but their determination to 
achieve the twenty-one demands remained the same. This included with regard to freedom 
of expression. New trade unions would need their own press to publicise their beliefs 
irrespective of whether they were in keeping with those of the authorities. Such a move, 
Gwiazda believed, would cause the official press to abandon its attempts ‘to manipulate 
society.’ Although successful in the short term, they caused problems in the long run: 
‘Society realises in the end. Indignation flares up, ferment spreads and then the next 
explosion occurs.’ They were tired of all of the usual excuses that accompanied each crisis. 
They wanted to help identify such problems ‘before they grow to such proportions that it is 
almost necessary to make a revolution in the country.’791 It is clear that they wanted to avoid 
trouble not to make it. The existing unions could not be trusted to do this. As Bogdan Lis 
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explained, ‘The old trade unions are so discredited that even our joining the leadership 
would not restore them. We don’t want an infusion of new blood, we want a completely new 
organism.’792 As Wałęsa concluded, they were ‘not talking about cures or corrections.’ The 
creation of new trade unions was what they were discussing.
793 
This was a sensitive issue for 
the authorities, however. Aside from ideological concerns, desire for access to the press as 
well as the say that a trade union would have over economic management presented a major 
challenge to key areas of the Party’s control, the latter especially difficult at a time of 
economic crisis. 
The sensitive not to mention complex nature of negotiations over trade unions 
appears to have been the reason for further discussions on the issue not taking place in 
public. In a further difference from Szczecin, a private ‘working group’ made up of 
representatives from each side began work on the issue.
794
 The MKS was represented by 
Gwiazda, Mazowiecki, Kowalik, and Jadwiga Staniszkis, as well as Bogdan Lis and 
Zdzisław Kobyliński from the MKS Presidium. The Provincial Governor Jerzy Kołodziej 
represented the authorities, alongside Andrzej Jedynak and Krzysztof Kuczyński, with the 
assistance of the government’s newly arrived team of experts (Professors Józef Pajestka, 
Czesław Jackowiak and Antoni Rajkiewicz), which had already been handed relevant texts 
on trade unions, including the ILO conventions cited by the MKS.
795
 While such secrecy 
could have been considered an affront to the strike’s democratic principles, Wałęsa assured 
members of the MKS Plenum, as well as crowds at the gate, that no decisions would be 
taken by this group. Only the MKS as a whole could decide.
796 
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 Although due to the importance of the legal aspects of trade unions, the working 
groups’ talks were dominated by the experts and more technical in nature than those within 
the main negotiations, there was no significant change in position from either side. Both 
sides stuck to their previously established positions on trade unions, although Kowalik 
concluded that the government side did not really believe in their proposals and were simply 
repeating the line established by the Party.
797
 Some surprising inferences could be drawn 
from the government experts’ statements on certain issues, however. For example, although 
they ruled out the possibility of agreeing to a guarantee for all Polish workers to establish 
their own unions on the grounds that it would resemble the reforms brought about by 
Dubček in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Jadwiga Staniszkis claims that they were suggesting 
‘between the lines that they preferred to be forced from below.’798 While presumably such 
an outcome would be easier to sell to Moscow if it was clear that the Party really had no 
choice rather than because they genuinely wanted to, it was an outcome that apparently 
surprised the workers. Without a universal right to form new unions, it meant that any other 
workforce wishing to gain the right would have to go on strike to do so. Such an outcome 
would be catastrophic given Poland’s economic circumstances.      
While it would have been unthinkable for the government to infer that they would 
prefer to have their hand forced on the matter in public negotiations, it was not only the 
private nature of the talks that made such an inference possible. As both Kowalik and 
Staniszkis note, the intellectuals all shared a similar background in the Warsaw intelligentsia 
and knew each other either personally or by reputation. This contributed to a relaxed 
atmosphere in the group.
799
 The fact that ‘elements of truth existed already’ also helped the 
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negotiations.
800
 The two sides were able to come to a compromise by the time they 
concluded for the day. Although the MKS experts had rejected without question the 
possibility of registering the new trade unions as part of the official unions by the time the 
talks closed the government side had decided to find a way of registering the new trade 
unions independently of the official trade union body.
801
 Although it appeared to be a 
significant step forward and Rajkiewicz believed that a swift agreement was possible,
802
 
success was not assured. Security operations against the strike were still on-going. 
As a result of the on-going harassment of MKS delegates and supporters of the strike 
by the police and security services, an established part of the opposition’s repertoire, a 
‘Chronicle of Repression,’ was published as part of the strike bulletin. As well as detailing 
reported cases of harassment, it also appealed for further acts of repression to be reported to 
the MKS Presidium.
803
 While this did not lead to any change in the behaviour of the 
authorities, it did provide workers with some measure of empowerment. It provided a 
further means of organising and strengthening ties, while through openly sharing such 
experiences with others, it made them less isolated. It also provided a means by which 
information could be passed to the Western press. 
Day-to-day repression was the minimum that workers could expect from the 
authorities, however. More serious steps were less predictable, but were also underway. 
Under the auspices of “Lato-80” General Stachura announced the introduction of a ‘state of 
full readiness’ in the MSW. On his orders the riot police (ZOMO) were to be amongst those 
barracked, while officers were to have their leave cancelled or suspended.
804
 The “Lato-80” 
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staff team were also informed of a plan to blockade the shipyard in relation to which 15 
commandos were to be transported to Gdańsk as part of the assembled forces.805 In addition 
to this, a list of potential courses of action was drawn up for the use of the minister of 
internal affairs Stanisław Kowalczyk in the Politburo. As well as the blockade, amongst the 
possibilities suggested were the use of naval units to force open a number of ports on the 
Baltic coast, arrests and the reinstatement of the communications blockade. No reference to 
the eight point list was made at Politburo, however.
806
 Kowalczyk mentioned only the need 
to generate an atmosphere in society amenable to the intensified repression of ‘anti-socialist 
elements.’807 The opposition rather than the workers remained the target for repression. 
In terms of enterprises vital to the functioning of the Polish economy, it is clear that 
the ports also remained a sensitive area at this stage. Here as well the use of force was far 
from the authorities’ first choice of action. In the short term in Szczecin at least, an 
agreement had been reached between workers and management allowing for the unloading 
of goods that threatened to go off, so long as the action was not reported in the official 
media. Efforts to get public transport working in the city again by contrast were proving 
more difficult. They would not break the solidarity of the strike. Despite the fact that the 
entire city was effectively now engaged in a ‘general strike’ (strajk powszechny) with the 
exception of the transport strike, (for residents at least) the city functioned as usual. 
According to Barcikowski, the MKS was in charge of the situation. They could not break 
the strike through engaging in negotiations outside the MKS while the conduct and 
efficiency of those on strike also made such efforts problematic. Although those involved 
were ‘already tired’ they would not make any moves that would bring the situation to an 
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end. Jagielski reported a similar situation upon returning from Gdańsk. A key feature of the 
strike was ‘great determination.’ There was a ‘general strike’ that enjoyed the support of all 
society. Despite the scale of the coastal strikes in terms of both enterprises (in excess of 700 
thousand) and participation (approximately 180 thousand people), the MKS were entirely in 
command of the situation. Perhaps the only difference between descriptions of the two 
strikes was that Jagielski described the Gdańsk MKS as being engaged in an attempted 
‘political struggle.’808 That in Szczecin was not. While this final comment again points to 
the difference made in perceptions of the strikes by opposition and even intellectual 
involvement, it is clear that even without considering the demands, it was a combination of 
factors causing the authorities’ problems: the structures of power affected by the strike 
action and the scale and unity of both participation in and support for the strike. The 
question of course was of how to deal with it. Although there was a need for the isolation of 
Szczecin and Gdańsk, as well as for a decision on the coastal blockade and the closure of 
Poland’s borders with the West, Kania made clear at Politburo that despite the threat posed 
by the worsening of the situation on the coast and the spread of strikes across the country, 
‘political means’ were to be the only ones under discussion.809 The use of force or violence 
to resolve the situation was not under consideration.  
While the Politburo was clear on their decision to avoid a violent confrontation 
between the workers and the state on the coast, their approach to the central demand for free 
trade unions was far less certain. While Kania, who was aware of the potential political 
threat that free trade unions caused, indicated no change in stance on trade unions (i.e. a 
willingness to undertake a major renewal of the official unions) and calls were also made for 
the defence of the existing unions, the attitude of the coastal workers appears to have altered 
the stance of the lead negotiators. Barcikowski noted that in Szczecin, which had previously 
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accepted the Party’s role in trade unions, this was no longer the case. Having just returned 
from the coast meanwhile, Jagielski expressed the belief, ‘that we will have to express 
agreement on the establishment of free trade unions.’ It was the major point of contention in 
negotiations and all other matters hinged upon it.
810
 The Party appeared to have little choice. 
On the one hand it had already exhausted all other methods at its disposal and was unwilling 
to use force. On the other the workers were displaying no signs of conceding ground on the 
issue and were conducting themselves impeccably in a non-violent manner thus giving the 
Party no excuse for a crackdown. The nature of the enterprises affected by the strikes, as 
well as the scale of the strikes and support for them, were also providing the Party with little 
room for manoeuvre. They were faced with a difficult decision: even if they accepted the 
coastal demands and the strike came to an end, strikes elsewhere might continue. Any 
decision would need to apply to the country as a whole. Such a decision could not be taken 
lightly. As Kania stated, ‘One should be fully aware, that such a decision means the creation 
of a force significantly more important than the Sejm and the people’s councils put 
together.’811 While the Party claimed to be the representative of the working class, a free 
trade union genuinely would be. It would represent a significant threat to the Party’s leading 
role, therefore. It would also cause problems for other socialist states.
812
 Even if the internal 
situation was temporarily resolved through the acceptance of free trade unions, it was 
unlikely to be accepted by Poland’s allies for long. It could bring about similar 
developments in their own countries. With few options open to them, they appear to have 
turned to the Church. 
Following his meeting with Gierek, Cardinal Wyszyński delivered a sermon at Jasna 
Góra in which he primarily called for calm and a return to work for the good of the 
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nation.
813
 Although he had expressed his support for the workers’ demands to Gierek, he 
had also displayed understanding for the authorities. As such his sermon favoured neither 
side. One section in particular stands out in his homily not only for its resemblance to the 
official line of the authorities, but also because of its links between the nation’s debt crisis 
and the strikes: 
We know that when there is not good work then the best economic system 
will be unsuccessful and we will only multiply debts and borrowing. And 
all this will be eaten up straightaway because there is no prosperity 
without work. And even though man has the right to leisure, and even 
though, sometimes when there are no other means, man has the right to 
make his stance known – even if this is by refusing to work – we 
nevertheless know that this is a very expensive argument, an argument so 
expensive that they burden the whole national economy and affect the life 
of the nation, family and every person in some negative way or other.
814
 
  
Although overall responsibility for the economy lay with the Party, it would be work rather 
than strikes that would help to cure the Polish disease. They could not expect to borrow their 
way out of trouble. As MSW reports noted, amongst other things Western banks believed 
that a worsening of credit terms for Poland was the possible outcome of the continuation of 
a ‘high risk operation from Poland’.815 While this was an issue that ran parallel to the 
strikes, the economic nature of strikes meant that Poland’s economic dealings with the 
banks could not help but be affected by them. Even certain strike demands presented an 
economic threat. As such one Politburo member suggested publicising certain demands that 
could not be facilitated ‘if we don’t want to lead the economy to ruins.’816 
With the economy in crisis, as well as the risk of Soviet intervention, it was 
imperative that the Church acted to calm the situation. It appears to have been with this in 
mind, that the authorities took the unprecedented step of allowing the sermon’s radio 
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broadcast, something which had not been done since December 1956.
817
 While in 1956 this 
had taken place at the end of a period of major social unrest and political change, the fact 
that this took place in the midst of such a period only seems to underline the severity of the 
authorities’ concerns at this time. It was presumably such concerns that saw them attempt to 
take advantage of Wyszyński’s authority within the country. His homily was heavily 
censored and followed on from a broadcast in which, in keeping with a speech he had made 
at the IV Plenum, the Trybuna Ludu journalist Ryszard Wojna raised the spectre of the 
Soviet threat as well as Poland’s raison d’état in relation to a warning that the issue of trade 
unions were non-negotiable.
818
 The authorities had not switched tactics altogether. Threats 
and slander still accompanied calls for moderation. 
Neither speech appears to have made much of an impact at the shipyard, however. 
Not only did workers ignore Wyszyński’s message about the strikes, but according to 
Timothy Garton Ash at the Lenin Shipyard a message had been attached to an image of the 
Black Madonna of Częstochowa claiming that she had joined the workers’ strike action.819 
Although the Church was positioned between the workers and the state, those on strike 
continued to claim its iconography as their own. Perhaps noticeably, the home of the Black 
Madonna remained peaceful. Although pilgrims had spread news of the strikes to 
Częstochowa since mid-August, no strikes took place that summer.820 It was industrial 
rather than religious or rural centres that remained at the centre of the action.  
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27 August 1980 (Wednesday)  
Talks continued within the working group, but were less friendly than before. They had a 
clear political tone.
821
 This may have been due in part to the fact that Jagielski had informed 
his experts of discussions within the Politburo regarding the use of force. The experts 
remained in favour of a peaceful solution, but were of the opinion that with every day lost 
without agreement on trade union reform the situation deteriorated.
822
 The government’s 
stance on new trade unions was presented by Kołodziejski. Perhaps the most significant 
point related to the need to ensure both that Poland’s political system remained inviolable as 
well as the Party’s “leading role” without which a deal would never be acceptable to 
Warsaw (or to Moscow).
823
 It was a condition that divided the experts. Although for 
Mazowiecki and Kowalik it held little personal significance due to any declaration of this 
kind being decided by the MKS, Staniszkis rejected the need for such a statement.
824
 It was 
the moment the restrictions the authorities would place on trade union reforms became clear, 
albeit only the intellectuals rather than the workers were cognizant of this. As Staniszkis 
explains: 
We (experts) understood that the government side wanted us to introduce a 
formula that would subordinate one, spontaneous, representation of the 
working class (MKS) to another institutionalized, representation (the 
communist party). For the ruling group, and probably for Moscow, this 
was a solution to the political problem created by the existence of 
working-class representation on both sides of a negotiating table and to the 
ideological precedent created by that fact.
825
 
  
Unless the MKS accepted the dominance of the Party, it would create a classic case of dual 
sovereignty, a counter-revolutionary situation in which two groups struggled for overall 
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control. As Staniszkis explains, however, the authorities were unable to raise this directly 
with the workers due to the fact that highlighting the political importance of allowing an 
independent trade union that did not accept the Party’s dominance would only serve to 
strengthen the workers’ hand. The problem being that unless they could explain to the 
workers how important an acceptance of the leading role of the Party was, they would be 
unable to get them to accept it. The government expected the experts to act as a go-between 
in terms of smoothing over this deal. It was this that brought about a significant divergence 
of views between Staniszkis, who was an independent expert, and the core group of MKS 
advisers. While the former simply wished to tell the MKS the truth and allow them to make 
their own decision on the matter, the latter informed the workers that the formulation held 
little significance and that they should accept it. That they did so was due to a complex 
range of factors, according to Staniszkis. These included tiredness, ‘trust’, and ‘fear of the 
consequences of their own principal attitudes.’826 The workers were also simply distracted 
by other events.
827
 While apparently unimportant to the workers at the time, the issue of the 
leading role would prove to be a major issue later on. It would also lead to the departure of 
Staniszkis from the group of experts. 
While talks amongst the working group continued in Gdańsk, more and more strikes 
were breaking out in support of their action nationwide. Transnational support from 
Norwegian and French trade unions was also now in evidence at the yard.
828
 Although there 
were discussions at Politburo regarding a tightening of censorship following the publication 
of the 21 demands in the Party youth paper Sztandar Młodych, a number of strikes appear to 
have been unaware of what the demands on the coast actually were, but supported them 
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anyway.
829
 Noticeably by now there was also frustration evident amongst Polish journalists 
with their ability to cover the situation as events unfolded. While the Politburo was already 
aware of this,
830
 for the first time that day journalists had expressed their frustration publicly 
in the Solidarity strike bulletin. They complained that there was a serious discrepancy 
between what was being reported and the actual events that were occurring. They 
considered ‘the manner in which it has been commented upon’ particularly problematic. It 
stopped them ‘from honestly fulfilling [their] professional duties.’ They proposed providing 
society with a full account of events for the good of the nation in both the present and the 
future.
831
 The Party were struggling with one of their main sources of control. They were, 
however, prepared to take steps to restrict outside influences. Gierek ordered the restriction 
of Western journalists to the major crisis zone.
832
   
The issue of support for the strike was far from clear cut. A shift in the social 
atmosphere had also taken place. In some places where support for the strikes had initially 
been evident, people were becoming tired. They started to believe ‘that they increase our 
economic difficulties.’833 This presented a potential problem for the striking workers. It 
would be difficult to achieve their aims without a broader base of social support. The 
support of significant enterprises was also vital to maintain and relations between Szczecin 
and Gdańsk remained important. The Party seemed aware of this and attempted to 
undermine the latter. At Szczecin where negotiations were ongoing between Barcikowski 
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and the MKS, Barcikowski played a doctored tape recording of a BBC interview with Lech 
Wałęsa, which he clearly intended to discredit the MKS Chairman from Gdańsk in the eyes 
of the Szczecin MKS.
834
 Wałęsa was an easy target. After all it is easy to discredit people 
when no one actually knows them. Only his name was known, not his character or person.    
Barcikowski also discussed Poland’s economic situation, including Poland’s 
dependency on Western loans for imports and problems with Western economies. Amongst 
other things he noted America’s introduction of a 20 percent interest rate unprecedented in 
the post-war era as a result of its struggle with inflation. It complicated an already difficult 
situation in terms of receiving loans. At this time 120 dollars had to be paid back for every 
100 borrowed. He also made an explicit link between the broader international economy, 
Western banks and Poland’s debt. The banks were watching and the current situation was 
not likely to be helping events.
835
 This appears to be the only explicit connection between 
Poland’s internal situation and its relations with Western bankers on public record. While 
one would not expect such a connection to be made during sessions of the Politburo where 
economic dealings with capitalist countries were not discussed, it is perhaps notable that it 
came in negotiations with the MKS at one of the major strike centres in the country.  
Taken together this suggests that economic factors, alongside the issue of free trade 
unions, were a major factor in shaping the Party’s response to the strike. The same day 
MSW reports noted talks in NATO concerning the possible rescheduling of Polish debts 
towards the U.S., West Germany and Western banking consortiums.
836
 It was clearly an 
issue. If one considers the importance of exports to the West as part of Poland’s efforts to 
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pay off its debts, then it is also clear that trading links were being affected by the strikes. 
Footwear destined for export to the U.S., UK and Canada was being returned from the 
ports.
837
 Poland required not only the continuation of economic support and trade, but also 
much needed economic reform. The economy was arguably of equal importance to the 
strikes. Indeed it is noticeable that in a teleconference between the Polish leadership and 
regional Party leaders only Józef Pińkowski, in charge of the economy, and Stanisław 
Kania, in charge of security, gave speeches.
838
 This suggests that they both enjoyed equal 
billing at this time. Although the economic crisis pre-dated the social crisis that threatened 
Poland’s security, the two overlapped. They created a crisis in which each one fed into the 
other with neither being able to stabilise without the other. If neither stabilised, the state 
could collapse. For those with long-term interests in Poland, this was an undesirable 
situation. Destabilising the state could harm their long-term interests. If they misjudged their 
response, they might have to wait a number of years for such an opportunity for change to 
arise again. Stability was vital, therefore. As West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher stated in a Political Co-operation meeting of the Nine: 
the political landscape in Eastern Europe was in transition there was a 
significant movement towards national sovereignty and the establishment 
of civil liberties. The FRG had decided to continue to encourage financial 
help to the Polish government not-withstanding criticism that this was 
stabilising the present regime. The FRG thought that their attitude must be 
impartial i.e., giving no pretext for Soviet intervention.
839
 
 
The French Council of Ministers issued a similar public statement, stressing Poland’s 
‘fundamental importance for balance and peace in Europe.’ It was ‘a permanent principle of 
France not to intervene in the internal affairs of other states.’840 This was vital not only to 
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Poland’s survival and reforms, but also to the maintenance of stability in Europe as a whole. 
One was required for the other.  
Given the importance of Poland for peace and stability in Europe, as well as a desire 
to encourage liberalisation behind the Iron Curtain, there was a need for a co-ordinated 
Western response to events. At the suggestion of Brzezinski, Carter sent a letter to their 
allies in Western Europe.
841
 While the letter did not outline any concrete policies on Poland, 
it did seek to bring about a sharing of opinions on the situation with regard to long-term 
consequences in ‘East-West relations and even for the future of the Soviet Bloc itself.’ From 
the perspective of the U.S. the optimum ‘outcome’ of events would be a non-violent 
‘accommodation between the authorities and the Polish people.’ Economic affairs would 
continue to play a role in this and economic aid ‘should be designed to encourage the Poles 
to undertake a more fundamental and systematic reform of their economic system.’842 The 
Western economic role in events would be vital, therefore.   
Peace and stability in Poland did not simply hinge on Western economic support, 
however. There was also an additional factor to consider: that of Soviet intervention. 
Although the Soviet threat existed, all Western assessments indicated that there were no 
signs that the Soviet Union or Eastern bloc were about to intervene.
843
 Indeed a Soviet 
Foreign Ministry spokesman assured them that it was an internal affair for the Poles to deal 
with. They tried to reassure the West that they had no intention of interfering, but warned 
the West against doing so too.
844
 There was also an additional factor that made events 
difficult to predict: military manoeuvres in response to domestic instability. Although the 
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CIA predicted increased ‘Polish military activity’ as the month wore on, distinguishing 
between activity intended for internal Polish affairs and that for Warsaw Pact manoeuvres in 
East Germany would prove more and more problematic.
845
  
Although security measures were discussed at Politburo, these ranged only from the 
use of legal sanctions against the opposition to the use of force to ensure that two ports re-
opened. According to Pińkowski, this was a ‘very urgent matter’ due to the number of ships 
and goods waiting to be unloaded. The use of the army was ruled out although either they or 
the MO might be used for reconnaissance. It would not be an easy act to carry out. While 
the MO could force them open and had the equipment with which to do so, they lacked the 
skills to operate them. Experts would be needed.
846
 Equally although force was being 
considered, the use of violence was not. As with the rest of the summer, no one wished for a 
repeat of the past. They were also unclear of the repercussions. At Politburo Jaruzelski 
warned that its use could result in a ‘spontaneous solidarity movement’ in support of 
Gdańsk.847 As the General Staff realised at the time, and Ryszard Kukliński later reported to 
the CIA, there was a fear that the use of the army against the workers could make the 
strikers more determined and also make it more difficult to reach an internal solution to the 
matter.
848
 Although Kukliński’s information will not have been passed on straight away, 
having a trusted inside source who could relay information to the CIA will have been of 
considerable benefit at this time.   
The most pressing matter for the Politburo remained the issue of independent trade 
unions. It was the major demand facing them and the most popular amongst workers. 
According to Kania, ‘They think, that new trade unions will guarantee a feeling of strength 
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towards the authorities and the extortion of different demands through strikes.’ The demand 
was already attracting significant signs of solidarity.
849
 Arguably there were two different 
issues at stake. For the workers, it was one of independence. For the Party, it was one of 
dominance. Their leading role could not be challenged without their own power being 
undermined. There was still some indecision within the Politburo as to what approach to 
adopt. One Politburo member was still suggesting new elections to the old unions, for 
example. They would win in some places and lose in others, but it was a necessary risk. 
They were facing dual problems: strikes and the disintegration of the functions of the state, 
‘which are quickly widening and deepening.’850 The economy was also at great risk, 
something that needed to be stressed, according to Jaruzelski.
851
 The Party and the nation 
were threatened with catastrophe.  
To cap it all even some of the Church were unhappy following the broadcast of 
Wyszyński’s homily. The Press Office of the Polish Episcopate announced that not only was 
the published version of the homily ‘not integral’ and ‘not authorised’, but Wyszyński had 
not even been asked for permission to publish it.
852
 Individual priests, such as Hilary Jastak, 
were also angered by the homily.
853
 The end result of its unauthorised and censored 
publication was a clarification of the Church’s position by the Main Council of the Polish 
Episcopate. In a communiqué it stressed, amongst other things, the need for a swift 
resolution of the situation through ‘dialogue’ and declared that any agreement between the 
two sides ‘should be fulfilled […] in accordance with the principle: Pacta sunt servanda’854 
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– agreements must be kept. The following day Cardinal Wyszyński would also meet with 
workers from the Paris Commune Shipyard to offer reassurances over the broadcast of his 
sermon.
855
 
28 August 1980 (Thursday) 
As the third round of negotiations between Jagielski and the MKS got underway, some 600 
enterprises were on strike in Gdańsk.856 Tension throughout Poland also continued to mount 
as strikes spread to more and more regions and industries. A lack of resolution to events also 
raised anxiety.
857
 It was an anxiety not restricted to society. With mounting tension in the 
capital evident, the aktyw’s criticism of the Party leadership was also on the rise. Further 
domestic problems were also threatened due to worsening supplies of raw materials. 
Stoppages could be triggered simply because there were insufficient materials for an 
enterprise to function.
858
 Although there was potential for the situation to worsen further, 
there was already sufficient pressure for the situation to require bringing under control and 
Jagielski voiced his hope at the start of the meeting that it would lead to a constructive 
solution to the issues facing them. He wanted it to be the final one between the two sides in 
terms of actual negotiations.
859
 He was to be disappointed. Although the MKS and their 
                                                          
855
 See: ‘The Strike Committee of the Paris Commune Shipyard in Gdynia: Minutes of meeting in Warsaw with 
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński (28 August 1980)’, in: Paczkowski and Byrne (eds.), p.56. 
856
 L. Biernacki and A. Kazański, ‘NSZZ “Solidarność” Region Gdański’, in: Ł. Kamiński and G. Waligóra (eds.), 
NSZZ Solidarność 1980-1989. Tom 3. Polska Północna (Warsaw, 2010), pp.7-245 (p.27). 
857
 G. Majchrzak, ‘Informacje sytuacyjne MSW z sierpnia 1980 roku’, Zeszyty Historyczne, 145 (2003), pp.65-
155 (p.127). 
858
 ‘Protokół nr 27 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 28 sierpnia 1980r.’, in: Z. Włodek (ed.), Tajne 
Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a “Solidarność” 1980-1981 (London, 1992), pp.78-80. 
859
 A. Kemp-Welch (ed.), The Birth of Solidarity: The Gdańsk Negotiations (London and Basingstoke, 1983), 
p.88. 
212 
 
advisors had met that morning to prepare a draft text for point one,
860
 the MKS still had 
other major issue to discuss, including freedom of expression (point 3).   
Pointing to the disparity between Poland as it existed on paper and in reality, Lech 
Bądkowski made clear they were not looking to abolish censorship, only to ensure that the 
right to freedom of expression guaranteed in the Polish Constitution was actually met. The 
MKS fully appreciated ‘the security interests of Poland and the permanence of her alliance, 
the Warsaw Pact’ and was not looking to challenge them. They simply wanted to be able ‘to 
express their views in public and to produce books and journals.’ Although Jagielski was in 
full agreement with the MKS, he sought to add an additional point. While agreeing that 
censorship should still apply to issues that presented a threat to the Polish system and the 
Warsaw Pact, he sought to extend it to economic matters as well. He used examples from 
the West to support his argument, claiming that in countries such as the U.S., Britain and 
France ‘economic matters are sometimes even more secret than others.’861 As well as 
marking a further use of Western methods as a model by which Eastern bloc methods of 
censorship could be justified, it was one that was particularly significant given Poland’s 
economic circumstances. It indicates a clear desire to prevent society from obtaining 
accurate information about the true state of the Polish economy. They did not wish to lose 
control over economic information at a time of deep economic crisis. Doing so could only 
further serve to undermine their legitimacy.  
A further desire to protect the Polish economy also soon became evident, but this 
time from the workers. At a point during which negotiations threatened to head out of 
control following a suggestion from Jagielski that Article 182 of the Constitution be used as 
the basis for an agreement on point three (an idea rejected by the workers on the grounds 
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that this article had been in use for years, but ‘despite its wonderful provisions’ excessive 
censorship was still an issue and there was no means of appeal), Wałęsa emphasised that the 
workers genuinely wished to reach an agreement rather than to cause problems.
862
 In order 
to support this assertion, he offered to issue an appeal to other workforces to voice their 
‘solidarity’ with Gdańsk without actually halting work for the time being. Supported by 
Jagielski and Fiszbach such a move was designed to protect the economy and allow both 
sides time to reach an agreement.
863
 It served as a useful reminder that neither side had any 
interest in bringing about further economic damage to the nation. Although one Politburo 
member, while highlighting the Party’s own weak response, would accuse the opposition of 
ruining the Polish economy,
864
 this was far from being the case. Both the Polish opposition 
and Polish workers had as much interest in the economic survival of Poland as the Party. In 
their own ways all Poles were mutually dependent upon it. Although not discussed that day, 
they simply differed on notions regarding its reform and management. Following further 
discussions over the issue of political prisoners meanwhile and whether Poland could be 
considered ‘a police state or a democracy’ the meeting ended with no agreement. More talks 
over points one – four in the working groups were promised, while negotiations were 
scheduled to resume at 5pm that afternoon.
865
  
While on the coast the Party continued to find itself under pressure from the MKS, 
they also found themselves under increased pressure from Moscow. Gierek had received an 
official declaration from Moscow via the Soviet ambassador Boris Aristov. It expressed 
both their concern over the situation and their unhappiness with the Party’s ineffective 
‘counteroffensive’ against the strikes. Alongside complaints about the ‘self-critical or 
defensive’ nature of Polish press coverage and the presence of Western journalists on the 
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coast, Moscow also delivered a clear warning. In reference to the first worker uprising under 
Communism, Gierek had been informed ‘that today’s situation in Poland resembles the year 
1921 in the USSR – the struggle of the Bolsheviks with the anarcho-syndicalists.’866 It was a 
clear reference to the sixteen day Kronstadt naval rebellion of that year, when sailors issued 
a fifteen point resolution including calls for ‘freedom of assembly for trade union and 
peasant organizations’ only for their mutiny to be crushed in an assault by the army.867 
Faced with such pressure, Gierek defended the Party’s response, pointing to the use of 
prosecutor’s sanctions (carrying a three month sentence and that day introduced against six 
opposition activists, including Jacek Kuroń, Adam Michnik and Jan Lityński) as well as 
other repressive measures.
868
  
Gierek argued firmly against violence, however. If the army was sent in, little would 
be accomplished and blood would be shed. He cited Polish experiences dating back to 1956 
in support of this. He also drew attention to one key problem: it was not clear whether 
Polish soldiers would be willing to shoot Polish workers.
869
 Although not raised at 
Politburo, a further risk in the event of any crackdown would be that of military defections, 
raising the question of whether defectors would act passively as some had done in 1970 or 
ultimately use their weapons.
870
 Although contingency plans remained in place for the use 
of force, as made clear in talks with East Germany the previous day, they intended to 
resolve the situation ‘as far as possible without the use of violence.’871 Although tensions 
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were clearly evident within the leadership team Soviet pressure did not lead to any dissent 
from Gierek’s essential stance on this point. Nor if domestic Soviet coverage of events is 
anything to go by, did Moscow expect them to. That day the standard Soviet press line on 
“antisocialist forces” was reportedly balanced ‘with news that “special government 
commissions” or negotiating teams were operating on the strike torn Baltic coast.’872 This is 
not the kind of press coverage associated with a genuine push for a domestic crackdown and 
has actually been interpreted as hinting ‘at a peaceful outcome’ to events.873 It was a public 
line at odds with that privately presented to the Politburo, but also at odds with the actions 
of the Suslov commission. 
That day the commission authorised military steps to be undertaken in relation to the 
continuing strikes in Poland. It was requested that four divisions (three tank and one 
mechanized rifle division) be prepared for ‘full combat readiness […] in case military 
assistance is provided’ by 6pm the following day.874 Although with Soviet Politburo 
minutes for the final week of August unavailable it is impossible to judge how much 
discussion of a possible intervention in Poland took place at the highest levels, as Mark 
Kramer notes there is sufficient evidence to suggest that they might have been 
contemplating such a move. U.S. intelligence suggests that the preparations were certainly 
genuine.
875
 One factor which could indicate that in August at least, such developments were 
only for contingency purposes, is the fact that despite the apparent urgency with which the 
four divisions required readying, Brezhnev, along with Andrey Kirilenko (the CPSU’s 
deputy leader), made trips outside of Moscow. Brezhnev would not return until 31 
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August.
876
 Coupled with Soviet media coverage of the coastal negotiations, it seems that 
while preparations were genuine, military action was not imminent. While a more radical 
build-up of forces was also proposed in case the situation deteriorated, no timetable was 
given for such a development.
877
 In the short term at least, any potential intervention would 
be on a scale similar to that conducted in Hungary (1956) with the aim of either shoring up 
Gierek’s leadership or replacing him with an alternate leader.878 While not on a par with the 
crushing of the Prague Spring, this is not to say that such an intervention would have been 
ineffective at crushing the workers’ movement. According to Anders Boserup and Andrew 
Mack, an intervention on the scale of Hungary or even East Germany (which they dub 
‘massive repression’) is more likely to bring an end to widespread acts of civil resistance 
than more ‘limited repression’ such as martial law.879 If implemented, the plan may well 
have been sufficient to quell worker unrest. This is not to say that such an operation would 
be without risk, however. There was always the chance that non-violent resistance could 
turn violent. Poland certainly had a history of violence as the Soviet Union was well-aware. 
While such possibilities would need to be considered when deciding to intervene, the 
Soviet Union could also not act without international consequence. As a U.S. National 
Security Council (NSC) memorandum made clear, any Soviet intervention ‘would be 
politically very costly’ for the Soviets with serious ramifications for the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty (SALT) amongst other things.
880
 Given Brezhnev’s earlier message to 
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Carter, this would appear to have been a significant concern for Moscow at this time. The 
fact that Soviet and Western public statements were essentially following the same line, 
suggests that Moscow was keen to maintain peace and stability in Europe. Ensuring that the 
process of arms control, which Brezhnev is known to have valued (so long as there was 
parity), remained underway was perhaps the most significant factor in all of this.   
In spite of this, there were limits to how far the Soviet Union could stay out of Polish 
events. As the NSC memorandum acknowledged ‘if the situation were to show signs of 
spiralling out of control and threatening the leading role of the party, they could feel 
compelled to intervene.’ From the Soviet viewpoint ‘it would be better to act precipitously 
to arrest the rot, than risk the danger of its spreading elsewhere in Eastern Europe at a later 
date.’881 While there were no signs of contagion in the Eastern bloc, there was evident 
apprehension over Polish events.
882
 Moscow also continued to have its own problems to 
deal with in the borderlands as official criticism of Lithuanian trade unions indicated.
883
 If 
contagion were to become an issue, a harder line from the Soviet Union could be expected 
to develop. Equally had a planned call for railway strikes by KPN activists at the Polish-
Soviet border crossing of Medyka come to fruition, blocking raw materials from the Soviet 
Union, Soviet concerns may well have been further raised.
884
 
 It was not only Moscow that valued the survival of détente, however. The West did 
as well. This was made clear in a personal message of support that Gierek received from the 
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French President Giscard d’Estaing. In addition to sentiments made apparent in France’s 
earlier public statement, such as the importance of Poland for ‘stability and peace in Europe’ 
and a belief that Poland could resolve its own difficulties in a manner that fulfilled the 
desires of the nation, the concluding paragraph is also of note. It makes plain that Poland 
could continue ‘to count on the sympathy and active help of France’. This had been 
demonstrated a number of times before.
885
 It was a clear indication that much needed 
economic support for Poland would continue to be forthcoming from Poland’s major 
Western partner. Nor were France alone in offering such support. Although not read out at 
Politburo that day West Germany was equally supportive. While as with all Western states 
he was sympathetic to the workers, in a letter passed via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Chancellor Schmidt offered Poland further assistance in obtaining loans as well as general 
support for prospective IMF membership.
886
 He voiced similar sentiments in an interview 
that night. As well as welcoming the continued support of Western banks for Poland, he also 
indicated that the West German government would provide additional economic support for 
their Polish counterparts if matters were brought to a peaceful conclusion by the Poles.
887
  
In addition to the fact that Warsaw seems now to have had an added incentive to 
resolve matters peacefully, such support from Poland’s two major economic partners in the 
West was vital for Poland’s survival at this time. The more the economy worsened, the more 
social unrest was likely to increase. The more social unrest increased, the greater the risk of 
a crackdown with all of the attendant consequences this threatened for détente. Noticeably 
while Gierek enjoyed the support of Poland’s two most important economic partners in the 
West, that of its third was less forthcoming. The United States had prepared a letter to 
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Gierek, but an NSC memorandum recommended delaying its transmission ‘until the dust 
clears.’ They did not ‘want to send a letter in the middle of a crisis or to a lame duck.’888 
There was no alteration to the U.S. policy of non-interference in the affairs of a sovereign 
state however,
889
 only hesitation towards Gierek. 
29 August 1980 (Friday) 
Sixteen days into the Lenin Shipyard strike 643 600 workers at 653 enterprises in 27 regions 
were on strike throughout Poland. While six areas (Gdańsk, Szczecin, Elbląg, Wrocław, 
Bydgoszcz and Słupsk) were in a state of general or generalized strike,890 major strikes were 
also taking place in Łódź, Katowice and Wałbrzych with the prospect of the situation 
deteriorating further. There was a genuine risk that strikes could spread to all parts of the 
country bringing chaos to the Polish economy.
891
 Given its already catastrophic state, such a 
development would have been almost impossible to cope with. As such, each major strike in 
a vital industrial centre only added greater weight to the pressure on the Polish leadership. 
While the formation of an MKS in Bydgoszcz, where a strike now involving 24 enterprises 
had begun the previous day,
892
 marked another blow to their control over Poland, it was 
arguably the strikes in the mining regions that were most significant. Although strikes had 
already broken out at the “Thorez” mine in Wałbrzych on 26 August, the night of 28-29 
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August had seen an outbreak of strikes at the “Manifest Lipcowy” and “Borynia” mines at 
Jastrzębie in the Katowice region. An MKS had been established at the “Manifest Lipcowy” 
mine and further mines and enterprises throughout the region continued to emerge on strike 
throughout the day.
893
  
This represented another major threat to the Party just as negotiations on the coast, 
particularly at Szczecin neared their conclusion. Once again the Party was presented with 
another genuine working class challenge to their authority, rather than one rooted in the 
opposition.
894
 Once again it came in another vital industrial region. The significance of the 
coal mines was twofold. Firstly, coal was central to the success of the Polish economy. 
Under Gierek its production had increased dramatically with it making up 14 percent of 
Poland’s total exports.895 With only North Sea oil outranking Polish coal as ‘Europe’s most 
attractive hydro-carbon resource’896 it was both a major source of attraction for Western 
investors, but also of hard currency for debt repayments. As the loan agreement with Austria 
that summer demonstrated, Poland would struggle to attract new investment as well as to 
meet their repayments to the West, without coal production. Secondly, the Katowice region 
was Gierek’s heartland and also one that had not been involved in other major Polish worker 
protests under Communism (to the detriment of Silesian workers’ standing amongst other 
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Poles).
897
 The loss of the mines represented a double-blow to the Polish leader in terms of 
the economy and personal prestige at a time of acute crisis, therefore.  
While it would be vital to get the miners’ strikes under control, the miners would 
also be a difficult group to buy off. Although throughout the late-1970s they received higher 
than average wages, due to the economic importance of Polish coal they had also been 
amongst the most overworked groups in the country. The four-brigade system, which saw 
three brigades of miners working eight hour shifts six days a week in exchange for two days 
off on different days of the week, arguably provides the clearest example of this.
898
 In 
operation at over 40 percent of Polish mines (but not “Manifest Lipcowy”) by August 1980, 
the system brought about not only an increased rate of accidents at Polish mines during the 
late 1970s, but also seriously damaged miners’ family lives. It became the norm that they 
spent only one Sunday every month with their families.
899
 The significance of this should 
not be underestimated in a devoutly Catholic country. Although well remunerated, the 
miners were far from happy with their lot. As one miner summarised: 
You got a day off in the middle of the week, but your wife worked and 
your children were at school, so what was the point? […] People 
continually had to work overtime and with intensity, with no relaxation 
from 1975 on. Miners, who were overtired and overworked didn’t realise 
what was going on. Take myself: I felt I was making a lot of money, and I 
didn’t even realise that I worked every day – it was just work, work and 
nothing else. You can’t live like that. Anger grows in you.900 
 
Given such frustrations amongst coal miners and the fact that the 21 demands at Gdańsk 
included calls for compensation for those employed under the four-brigade system in the 
form of increased annual leave or extra time off work with pay, the emergence of an MKS at 
Jastrzębie arguably added significant weight to the coastal demands at a sensitive moment in 
MKS-government negotiations on the coast.  
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Having failed to return for negotiations at the Lenin Shipyard the previous day, the 
news came at midday that once again the Jagielski Commission would not be resuming 
talks. Within the MKS the news received a negative response. Ordinary workers in the 
shipyard were also unsettled by the news.
901
 Although talks would take place within the 
working groups, even this made workers nervous as unlike the main negotiations, these talks 
were never broadcast. Despite the efforts of Gwiazda to reassure them on this issue, there 
was concern amongst delegates that the Presidium was being cut out of negotiations.
902
 
After all they had no way of knowing what was going on. They were not alone in this. 
International actors also struggled to follow events as with the situation changing rapidly 
and no inside knowledge of events, making judgements was tricky.
903
 The sheer scale of 
hard to verify rumours spreading throughout Poland only confused matters further. The U.S. 
were not even sure if negotiations were taking place between Jagielski and the MKS that 
day due to conflicting reports on the matter.
904
 Misinterpretation was also an issue which 
presented problems for outside observers. In a harsh assessment of Wałęsa’s appeal for a 
temporary halt to strikes the previous evening, for example, the CIA warned that it was ‘a 
veiled threat that the strike leaders are prepared to call for a nationwide general strike if their 
demands are not met soon.’905 The opposite was actually true. He was actually attempting to 
calm the situation. With no prior knowledge of Wałęsa and no contacts with the MKS 
however, the U.S. were not to know this. Nor were they alone in having such problems. 
Although they naturally benefited from ties with the Polish security services, the KGB also 
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had no prior knowledge of Wałęsa before August 1980.906 Such a lack of information 
arguably made it difficult to do anything other than watch.  
 While foreign security services struggled to interpret events, the actions of the 
domestic security services continued. In addition to the extension of prosecutor’s sanctions 
to further opposition activists, including Leszek Moczulski (KPN), as well as road blocks in 
eight regions halting over 2250 vehicles,
907
 that day also saw the infiltration of an advisory 
group to the Szczecin MKS. While work continued at Szczecin amongst two sub-groups 
formed earlier in the strike (the Editorial Commission and the Commission of Legal 
Experts), including on the issue of trade unions, that morning also saw the arrival of a group 
of three advisors from Warsaw to work on economic and social matters. They were joined 
by a fourth who had travelled independently from Łódź, the sociologist Andrzej Mazur.908 
Unknown to the Szczecin MKS, Mazur’s presence was organised at the yard by the SB. 
With the agreement of the head of the SB in Łódź and with apparent help from a secret 
collaborator active within Szczecin’s opposition, Mazur travelled to the yard in order to help 
bring an early end to the strike through raising problems in talks. Amongst other things, he 
helped introduce the scale of the financial losses being brought about by the strike into 
conversations as well as highlighting the Party’s fear of trade unions as a parallel source of 
political authority in Poland into talks.
909
 Both were key areas of concern for the Party at 
this time. While it is difficult to assess Mazur’s exact impact on the outcome of the Szczecin 
strike, his role was interpreted favourably by the Łódź SB.910 It appears to be the most high-
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profile act of infiltration that summer and adds a further dimension to the SB’s other 
activities against the strikes, which also included efforts to infiltrate strikes and employ 
“disintegration” techniques.911 It was not necessarily the most unusual effort by the 
authorities to influence events, however.
912
  
At the Lenin Shipyard talks continued between working groups from both sides. 
Unlike those at Szczecin these appear to have been conducted entirely in good faith. On the 
government’s side Kołodziejski announced the need for clarification on several aspects of 
the demand for new trade unions and Professor Rajkiewicz then presented the authorities’ 
position on this point. According to Kowalik, Rajkiewicz’s speech contained three points on 
the matter of trade unions: 
1. Toning down the negative assessment of existing trade unions.  
Replacing the sharpest phrase about their being compromised with a 
statement that their conduct ‘had not lived up to the hopes and 
expectations of employees’. 
2. Attempting to blur the impression of a clear-cut choice between the old 
and new unions by listing a number of alternatives. […] 
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3. Regarding registration of the new trade unions […] the point of 
disagreement was: which court? We insisted on the Supreme 
Administrative Court, while their side favoured a public court.
913
 
 
All of these issues would need to be resolved before an agreement between the two sides 
could be reached. While the sudden need for the government side to clarify the exact 
phrasing of point one could be seen as a simple attempt to water down the content of any 
agreement, it was received positively by the MKS’ working group and viewed as an attempt 
to save face rather than to undermine the first demand. They felt as though they were 
nearing an understanding with the authorities over new trade unions according to Kowalik, 
and recognised that the authorities could not afford to be seen as having lost to the workers. 
The government team emphasised ‘that the Agreement was a victory for a particular line of 
policy, rather than one side.’914 While Gdańsk edged closer to an agreement on point one, 
Szczecin went one step further. Late that night Marian Jurczyk announced that agreement 
had been reached on point one of Szczecin’s demands: free trade unions. It would be the 
final night of the strike.
915
 Although the exact course of events leading to the end of the 
Szczecin strike prior to that in Gdańsk remained unclear even after the agreement was 
signed, despite the need for solidarity it seems that the Szczecin MKS were assured by one 
of their advisers following a phone call to Gdańsk that they should end the strike. On point 
one they had a good deal.
916
 After just under two weeks on strike, the authorities were 
finally nearing the point at which the Szczecin strike could be brought to a close. As 
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Politburo minutes for that day reveal however, it was unlikely to be the end of the matter in 
either domestic or international terms. 
 Based on Gierek’s introductory comments at Politburo it appears to have been a 
combination of factors rather than one particular strike that finally forced the Party’s hands 
on the issue of trade unions. Faced not only with increasingly widespread strikes and ever 
growing demands, along with a clear loss of support within the Party, Gierek appears to 
have been at a genuine loss as to what to do. They were already doing everything that they 
could. Under such circumstances and faced with a ‘general strike’ throughout Poland, 
Gierek felt that agreeing to free trade unions might be the only option in the short-term. 
Although he remained opposed to them, the Party might have ‘to choose the lesser evil, and 
then attempt to get out of it.’917 There appears to have been little immediate support for 
Gierek in the Politburo on this point. In part this may have been due to the origins of free 
trade unions in the opposition activities during the 1970s, a point noted again by Kania 
during that day’s Politburo session.918 A more pressing concern was the fact that such a 
decision could not be taken without consultations with Moscow. This was made plain by 
General Jaruzelski, while Stefan Olszowski also pushed for talks with Poland’s allies. They 
were needed, as one Politburo member observed, as ‘what happens in Poland, may have 
repercussions in the whole socialist camp.’919 Such repercussions were potentially 
significant. As a letter from the Ideological and Educational Department of the PZPR’s 
Central Committee to the Tri-city authorities warned, such a ‘structure […] would be a 
bridgehead for anti-communist western forces in our country.’920 Although Moscow’s 
precise response was far from certain, they were likely to hold similar views on the matter. 
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All Poles were well aware of what the worst case scenario would be, however. In a number 
of regions speculation was already mounting as to the possible impact of the strikes on 
Poland’s relations with neighbouring socialist states and a potential Warsaw Pact 
invasion.
921
 While unknown to the Poles, preparations for an initial deployment of four 
Soviet divisions were due for completion that day, internal action remained the most likely 
outcome if force were used. That day General Stachura informed Central Committee 
members of the department’s readiness to undertake the liquidation of the strike on the 
coast.
922
 
 Despite Gierek’s move towards accepting free trade unions, perhaps the most 
prominent discussions at Politburo that summer regarding the domestic use of force took 
place that day. They focussed on two possible uses of force in Poland. The first concerned 
the introduction of a ‘state of emergency’ (stan wyjątkowy). The second concerned its use 
against the port blockades. Both were ultimately ruled out, but for different reasons.  In 
response to a suggestion from one Politburo member that the introduction of a ‘state of 
emergency’ should be considered, the response from General Jaruzelski was clear. Under 
the terms of the Polish Constitution it was impossible for such a state to be introduced in 
Poland. Only martial law (stan wojenny) could be introduced.
923
 Even the introduction of 
martial law at this time would be far from straightforward, however. On a practical level, as 
Jaruzelski noted, there was the problem of introducing martial law at a time when all of 
Poland was out on strike. As Kania had remarked in response to a call from a regional Party 
secretary for the use of force, such notions were ‘a chimera’ (mrzonka) due to the scale of 
the strikes and possible repercussions of any crackdown.
924
 The risk of ‘backfire’ was 
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tremendous. On a legal level there were also difficulties as the necessary provisions for its 
introduction did not exist. As Andrzej Paczkowski later noted in his post-communist report 
for the Sejm Commission on Constitutional Oversight: 
While statute 2 of article 33 of the Constitution of the Polish People’s 
Republic […] at the time authorized the Council of State to “introduce 
martial law on part or the entire territory … if deemed necessary for the 
protection of the security of the state”, no executive acts were passed. 
Even the document submitted to the KOK [Komitet Obrony Kraju – 
Committee for the Defence of the Homeland – G.H.] on 19 January 1979, 
regarding “Martial Law in order to protect the state”, was not submitted to 
the legislative process. In fact, the work to complete a parallel act, that 
would enable the legal introduction of Martial Law “for reasons of state 
security”, was not even started.925 
  
Faced with such widespread strikes, as well as a lack of legal and military preparations, the 
introduction of martial law was not a possibility at this stage. Equally there were also 
international factors to consider. Firstly, discussions would be needed with Moscow. 
Secondly, they would need to take into account the impact of any such decision on their 
Western economic ties. As William Schaufele warned Henryk Kisiel (newly appointed as 
Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Planning Commission), 
while the U.S. was sympathetic to the Polish government’s situation and the problems 
caused by the strikes, ‘if there were a use of force in the present Polish crisis’, efforts to 
obtain new agricultural credits from Washington ‘would be very difficult.’926 Given 
Chancellor Schmidt’s remarks the previous day, as well as those of Giscard d’Estaing, it is 
difficult to see how Poland could introduce martial law without taking such ties into 
consideration. Domestic and international factors would come into play. 
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 The port strikes represented a problem of a different nature. Given that the issue of 
forcing the ports to re-open was initially raised by Prime Minister Pińkowski, it seems that 
concerns remained regarding the impact that these strikes were having on the fragile Polish 
economy as a result of their significance for imports and exports. Although he had discussed 
the situation with the Party Secretaries in Szczecin and Gdańsk, both had warned that it 
would result in a confrontation. As well as the apparent risk that it could provoke an attack 
on regional Party headquarters (as had happened on the coast in 1970, as well as at Radom 
in 1976), he had also been warned of the risk of bloodshed. Alongside this risk, a further 
problem raised again by Pińkowski and others at Politburo was that of who would operate 
the ports if the army or MO forced them open.
927
 They could not be operated without skilled 
workers. As such this also remained out of the question. The only options left open to the 
Party were to approach Moscow and to hold another Party Plenum concerning free trade 
unions. A combination of factors ranging from the scale of the strikes to the difficulties (and 
also reluctance to) crackdown appeared to have forced their hand.  
With limited options available and at the prompting of several Politburo members, 
most notably Olszowski, the decision was taken to enter into talks with the Soviet Union. At 
Gierek’s request, he would be joined in consultations with the Soviet Union by Olszowski, 
Jaruzelski, and Kania.
928
 While Gierek provides no account of the meeting in his memoirs, 
according to Kania’s recollections the original plan to travel to Moscow for talks with 
Brezhnev was vetoed by the Soviet Union, in part due to Brezhnev’s absence from Moscow. 
Talks with the Soviet ambassador to Poland Boris Aristov were suggested instead.
929
 
According to the Soviet account of the meeting provided by the Mitrokhin Archive, the 
Poles argued that they had no choice but to agree to new trade unions: 
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We must take a step back in order not to fall into the abyss, and agree on 
the creation of self-governing trade unions. We have no other political 
means of normalizing the situation, and it is impossible to use force. By 
staging a [tactical] retreat, we can prepare for offensive action.
930
 
 
It is a description that tallies well with Kania’s account of talks with allies throughout the 
second-half of August: they had no option but to reach an agreement.
931
 The difference this 
time appears to have been that the Poles were actively seeking approval from Moscow for 
their decision due to the ideological ramifications of allowing an independent trade union to 
exist. As the Poles realised, independent trade unions were a matter that affected all socialist 
states and not just Poland. As such they sought Brezhnev’s views on the matter.932 While 
Kania’s account contradicts this slightly in claiming that they did not wait for a response 
from Moscow as no questions were asked of them, it is clear from the following day’s 
Politburo minutes that a response was expected.
933
 In spite of the meeting, the Soviet 
response remained uncertain. 
30 August 1980 (Saturday) 
Between two and three o’clock in the morning on Saturday 30 August 1980 agreement was 
reached between the Barcikowski Commission and the Szczecin MKS on what became 
known as the Szczecin Agreement. The formal signing took place at eight o’clock that 
morning. On paper the demand for new trade unions had been met. As the relevant section 
of the agreement read: 
Self-governing labor unions, which will be socialist in character, in 
keeping with the Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic, will be 
established on the basis of the opinions of experts […]. As soon as the 
                                                          
930
 C. Andrew and V. Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West (London, 1999), 
pp.671-672. The Mitrokhin Archive dates the meeting to 27 August 1980.  However, given that the decision to 
hold a meeting was not made by the Polish Politburo until 29 August, it seems that the report in The 
Mitrokhin Archive is misdated. Although Aristov was in regular contact with the Party leadership, there is no 
Polish record of a meeting between the Soviet ambassador and the Polish leadership team on any other date.  
931
 Kania, p.30. 
932
 Andrew and Mitrokhin, p.672.  
933
 Kania, p.31; ‘Protokół nr 29 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 30 sierpnia 1980r.’, in: Z. Włodek 
(ed.), Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a “Solidarność” 1980-1981 (London, 1992), p.91. 
231 
 
strike is over the strike committees will become workers’ committees, 
which will organize – as necessary – general, direct, and secret elections to 
the ruling bodies of union organizations. Work will continue on preparing 
the law, the statutes, and other enactments provided for by Article Three 
of [International Labor Organization] Convention 87. A suitable work 
schedule will be devised for this purpose.
934
 
 
It seemed to be a major success for both the government and the workers. For the 
government after a thirteen day strike at Szczecin, they had finally extinguished the second 
largest strike in Poland. For the workers, they had gained their most important demand of 
independent unions. The agreement was welcomed in closing speeches by both Barcikowski 
and Jurczyk.
935
 Euphoria and relief was evident at the yard. There appears to have been a 
similar response from crowds (if not the MKS Chairman) once news reached the Lenin 
Shipyard.
936
 As the separate document drawn up concerning the legal basis for the 
establishment of the new unions suggested however, there were limitations on the nature of 
the new unions. Amongst other things, although they were described in the main agreement 
as ‘self-governing’, according to the separate legal document the new trade unions were to 
be registered through the Central Council of Trade Unions (CRZZ) in accordance with 
existing trade union laws.
937
 This provided significant scope for limiting the new union’s 
activities in the future (discussed below). In spite of this, news of the signing was not well-
received by the Party leadership.  
At Politburo Kania was particularly scathing in his assessment of Barcikowski. He 
described the signing of the Szczecin Agreement as an ‘act of great lawlessness’ by the 
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Deputy Prime Minister.
938
 There were two main reasons for Kania’s anger. The first 
concerned the difference between ‘initialling’ an agreement and ‘signing’ one. Barcikowski 
had been granted permission to do the former, but not the latter.
939
 The second concerned 
the lack of Party and Soviet approval for the signing. Despite efforts to contact both Kania 
and Pińkowski in the early hours prior to the signing, Barcikowski had been unable to do so. 
His third choice Olszowski had advised him to delay the signing, but had left the decision to 
Barcikowski alone.
940
 Gierek was not consulted. As such Barcikowski had lacked approval 
from Warsaw for his decision. Perhaps more importantly, the V Party Plenum that day had 
been meant to approve the agreement before signing, while the Soviet Union had also yet to 
respond following the Aristov talks. It was not clear when their response would come or 
what it would be. As both Olszowski and Gierek noted, a response might not come until 
early the following week. Alternatively, as Olszowski also pointed out the Soviet Union 
might simply take note of the Polish decision without providing a response at all.
941
  
As the Politburo awaited Moscow’s response, there was no public indication from 
Brezhnev as to his feelings on the matter. In his first public speech that August, he instead 
reported on the state of international affairs, focussing on the Soviet Union’s desire to 
normalise world affairs. A call for talks on the limitation of medium-range nuclear missiles 
in Europe was particularly important.
942
 No mention of Poland was made. It is clear that his 
priorities lay elsewhere at this time. The same is arguably true of Jimmy Carter. Although 
Edmund Muskie publicly re-stated Washington’s line of non-interference in Polish affairs 
that day,
943
 it seems that US priorities also lay in the sphere of arms control over and above 
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Eastern Europe. A response from Carter to Brezhnev’s earlier letter prepared for 
transmission that day suggested that talks on this matter would be far from easy.
944
 While 
with Polish workers beginning to garner limited intellectual support in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Bloc and the East German press taking a particularly critical line against a Polish 
leader they ‘privately considered […] weak and out of touch’,945 spillover would obviously 
be a factor in shaping any Soviet response, arguably arms control would be a more 
important consideration. With détente at serious risk of collapse, they would have to take the 
issue into account.  
With Moscow’s attention apparently elsewhere and no approval for the Szczecin 
Agreement from Kania or the Party Plenum, Barcikowski’s signing appeared to have left the 
Party leadership in an awkward position. The agreement had not been formally approved yet 
nor could it be withdrawn. Although Kania continued to make plain his unhappiness with 
the Deputy Prime Minister at the Party Plenum, Barcikowski defended his decision. 
Pointing to the response of Warsaw at the time the agreement was ready to be concluded, he 
noted the difficulties of explaining to striking workers in the early hours of the morning, 
when they believed that the agreement had been finalised and would be signed within hours, 
‘that we don’t have the right to sign, we only have [the right] to initial.’ As he put it, ‘a 
king’s ransom to whoever distinguishes for the shipyard what the difference is between 
initialling and signing.’ The only ‘legal difference’ that Barcikowski appeared aware of was 
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that the former took place at the side of the agreement, and the latter underneath.
946
 
Although Barcikowski realised he had erred in signing, he did not feel the criticism being 
directed his way was warranted. After all, the agreement on trade unions was not entirely 
unfavourable. For example, he pointed to the possibilities for exploiting legal weaknesses in 
the agreement, such as the registration of the new unions through the CRZZ and their 
‘socialist character’ to control the formation of the new unions if necessary.947 Although he 
was being criticised now, in the long-term the agreement still left the Party in a strong 
position. Differences in legal interpretation meant that in the future they could challenge the 
new unions legally (and therefore peacefully). The problem of resolving the situation in 
Gdańsk through peaceful means remained open, however.  
  Although there had been some concern amongst the government experts when they 
learnt of the Szczecin Agreement that it could prolong the strike in Gdańsk if the MKS 
decided to reconsider their own agreement, Jagielski was reportedly optimistic.
948
 Events 
appeared to justify his high spirits. Having listened to Andrzej Gwiazda read out all seven 
points on new trade unions during that day’s session, Jagielski initialled the text of the 
Gdańsk Agreement. Provisionally at least ‘new, independent, self-governing trade unions’ 
had been accepted subject to confirmation by the V Plenum in Warsaw that night. The text 
of point two concerning the right to strike and the safety of those currently striking or 
assisting the strike was initialled and accepted in a similar fashion.
949
 Although the 
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agreement was not yet fully finalised, it marked a significant achievement for the MKS. It 
also brought an end to a potential rupture within the MKS between those working with the 
experts in the belief that an agreement with the government was possible and those working 
alongside a group of lawyers to prepare statutes for the new trade union with the aim of 
swiftly establishing a new union and presenting the government side ‘with a fait accompli.’ 
A source of serious arguments within Presidium meetings since the previous night, these 
had only been halted when unofficial information had reached Gdańsk that the Party had 
accepted the wording of the agreement on trade unions.
950
 The initialling of the agreement 
finally put these divisions to bed.  
 This is not to say that talks went smoothly, however. Using the Szczecin Agreement 
as a model, Jagielski tried to rush through the rest of the agreement. He argued that the other 
demands could be sent to Warsaw so that ‘a definite programme for their implementation’ 
could be prepared. He suggested preparing a communiqué showing that a provisional 
agreement had been reached, as well as their desire to halt the strike and resume work. He 
would return from Warsaw with the final agreement that night. Everything could be 
finalised and they could enjoy a day of rest.
951
 The workers at Gdańsk would not be rushed, 
however. As Wałęsa reportedly commented once the meeting had closed, unlike Szczecin 
things would be done correctly at Gdańsk.952 Besides it would not take long to work 
everything out. They had already waited for quite some time, so there was ‘really no hurry’. 
They could work all weekend to get it finalised ‘in writing.’ As Wałęsa noted, ‘If all goes 
well, we really do want to go back on Monday. But we must have it down in black and 
white.’ The point was not lost on Jagielski: ‘When something is written down in ink, it 
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cannot easily be erased.’953 Any agreement between the two sides would be binding. As the 
possibilities for legal exploitation of the Szczecin Agreement demonstrated however, how 
binding would be a different matter. 
 Apart from a desire to ensure that the agreement was watertight, the MKS also had 
an additional reason to prolong the strike: the prosecutor’s sanctions against KOR members, 
news of which had reached the coast in a letter from Grażyna Kuroń the previous 
evening.
954
 Although those detained under prosecutor’s sanctions had been held since earlier 
that month, rather than for 48 hours they could now be detained for three months. More 
detentions had been made that day.
955
 Ewa Milewicz, a KOR activist involved with the 
strike bulletin, lobbied the MKS to secure their release: Andrzej Gwiazda agreed without 
question.
956
 Although some were less enthusiastic, it was an important point of principle. As 
Kowalik observed, ‘While the authorities declared that they intended to resolve conflicts 
within the framework of the law […] they were simultaneously acting outside the law.’957 
They were not acting in good faith. Trust could be undermined. Equally as Wałęsa argued 
when he called upon the authorities to stop the arrests, KOR was not responsible for the 
strikes. They had only assisted them. He did not want their detentions to derail negotiations 
when they were so close to an agreement. As such he did not push the argument too far. 
Jagielski barely acknowledged the issue and left for Warsaw with no agreement for their 
release.
958
 It remained a major issue for the MKS. The Party had more pressing concerns, 
however.  
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Although the Szczecin Agreement had brought an end to the majority of the strikes 
in Szczecin and had also brought about the immediate resumption of work at the port,
959
 it 
had done nothing to halt the spread of strikes throughout Poland overall. Although Kania 
was keen to stress that the majority of Polish workers (90 per cent) continued to work, 
figures he quoted at the Plenum that day illustrate that even since the previous Plenum a 
week earlier the situation had escalated dramatically. From strikes in nine administrative 
regions and the total paralysis of transport in four cities, the Party were now faced with 
strikes in thirty-four administrative regions and the total paralysis of transport in fourteen 
cities.
960
 Wrocław was now a major point of concern. So too were the Katowice and 
Wałbrzych coal mines as well as strikes at the Warsaw and Katowice steelworks.961 In 
addition to this problems with shortages of raw materials and evident dissatisfaction in 
many enterprises brought with them the possibility of further disruptions. Social tensions 
remained high during the ongoing negotiations. Amongst other things, there was an 
increasing fear that events would result in a worker-state confrontation comparable to that of 
1970 or a Warsaw Pact intervention.
962
 As such it was imperative that the Party gained 
control of the situation.  
Theoretically at least force remained an option for the Party. Within the MSW plans 
continued to be developed for the event of a general strike and ZOMO (riot police) were 
transferred to Gdańsk where they were to be used as part of plans to launch a raid on the 
MKS at the Lenin Shipyard.
963
 These were not discussed by the Polish leadership, however. 
As both Kania and Gierek made plain at the Plenum, the use of force was not under 
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consideration. As Gierek concluded, they had striven to avoid the use of force and the 
introduction of ‘tanks on the streets, or armoured vehicles.’964 It was a clear reference to the 
events of December 1970, when some 27,000 troops, 550 tanks and 750 armoured vehicles 
were amongst those involved in a violent crackdown on the coast that left 45 workers dead 
and 1,165 wounded.
965
 They wanted no repeat of this. The question then remained of how to 
deal with Gdańsk, which as Kania made clear was (alongside Szczecin) central to the 
calming of events in the country. Changes in the sphere of trade unions remained the only 
option. This was not a straight-forward issue due to the fact that although the slogan ‘free 
trade unions’ or as they were now referred to ‘self-governing trade unions’ had their roots in 
the post-1976 opposition in Warsaw, the slogan had now been taken up by workers across 
the country who were unaware of its origins and genuinely wanted improved trade union 
representation due to the problems with the existing ones. While there was an obvious risk 
that a relaxation of the trade union structures could lead to problems in one or two places if 
attempts were made to utilise them for opposition purposes (such as in Gdańsk, where Kania 
had already noted the involvement of the opposition), the Party had little choice. Unwilling 
to use force, as Kania observed, it was ‘better to take a step in law (krok w prawo), than into 
the abyss.’ The Party could then go on the offensive once the situation had normalised.966 It 
was the ‘lesser evil’ of which Gierek had spoken of before. It was also a development 
largely endorsed by Jagielski in his Plenum speech upon returning from Gdańsk.  
Although there was an opposition element in Gdańsk and behind the free trade union 
demand, as Jagielski emphasised, the Party and its members could not ignore the fact that it 
was faced with not only a city-wide strike, but an ‘authentic workers movement’ supported 
by society and directed against the Party’s mistakes. New trade unions were ‘for society – 
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for hundreds and thousands of shipyard workers and dockers, metal workers and transport 
workers’ considered to be ‘the only real guarantee’ for fulfilling their demands and 
resolving society’s problems. In order to resolve the situation the Party needed to employ 
political means. They also needed to allow for the creation of new trade unions along the 
following lines: 
Establishing independent and self-governing trade unions the MKS states, 
that they will abide by the principles defined in the Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of Poland, they will defend the social and material 
interests of the workers, not aiming to fulfil the role of a political party, 
they will stand on the basis of the principle of the social ownership of the 
means of production, the essence of the socialist system in Poland.  
 
In addition to promoting the genuine working-class nature of the movement to the Plenum, 
Jagielski also sold this final legal aspect of the future Gdańsk Agreement well. In many 
respects he downplayed any sense of threat to the Party that may have been considered to be 
inherent in the agreement. As he used the above quoted (alternate) passage of the agreement 
to demonstrate, the ‘leading role’ of the Party was assured and so too were Poland’s 
international obligations. In a victory for the Party, the limits of the union’s activities were 
also clearly defined. Finally there was a legal obligation to allow for the creation of new 
unions as they were in keeping with the ILO statutes, especially numbers 87 and 98, already 
ratified by the Party.
967
 There was little the Party could object to in the agreement. It would 
end the strike while maintaining the leading role and Poland’s alliances in accordance with 
Polish law. As such the agreement was approved. Both everything and nothing had changed. 
Only the response of the Soviet Union remained. 
Although Jagielski had presented the agreement as a positive solution for the Party, 
it was arguably also a victory for the workers. The use of the ILO statutes to justify the 
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agreement by Jagielski at the Plenum represented a line of opposition thought espoused in 
the Charter of Workers’ Rights upon its publication a year earlier and also at the Lenin 
Shipyard by the likes of Andrzej Gwiazda. In spite of this the mood was far from settled at 
the yard. While Anna Walentynowicz had described her happiness at the outcome of the 
negotiations and spoken optimistically to Western journalists of founding the new trade 
union and its own newspaper on Monday morning,
968
 by later that day divisions were 
evident at the yard. During a session of the working group to finish work on points three and 
four of the agreement in time for the deal to be signed that night, an opposition activist had 
stormed into the meeting, accusing the experts of selling the workers down the river and 
betraying them over the issue of the Party’s leading role in the agreement.969 According to 
Jadwiga Staniszkis, Jagielski’s emphasis on the new trade union’s accordance with the 
Polish constitution, the Party’s leading role and international obligations during his closing 
speech at the yard had drawn the attention of the workers to what their compromise with the 
government fully entailed.
970
 It raised the issue of whether the unions would be truly 
independent from the Party. It was at this point that solidarity at the yard most seriously 
threatened to breakdown.   
Harsh accusations of class betrayal were directed at MKS delegates in the working 
group, while the term ‘Judas’s hands’ was also heard to be used.971 The argument spread to 
the main hall bringing with it a dramatic shift in the mood at the yard. According to Neal 
Ascherson, then present at the yard, the ‘majestic self-restraint’ that the workers had 
displayed throughout the strike showed signs of strain: ‘their solidarity was cracking at 
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last.’972 It was a dangerous moment. The argument rapidly spread to different issues and the 
success of the strike was threatened. As Tadeusz Kowalik recalled: 
Not only was the proposed political compromise questioned and the 
freeing of prisoners loudly demanded, but also personal allegations were 
being made about the Presidium being too soft, isolating itself from the 
delegates and the strikers. Wałęsa was said to manipulate, conceal and 
even betray, and the experts were held to negotiate ‘behind closed doors’, 
to be ‘in collusion’ with the authorities. 
 
Ruptures even occurred within the Presidium itself over the issue.
973
 It took an appeal from 
a visiting worker from “Ursus” not to jeopardise ‘the greatest victory in thirty-five years’ to 
help calm the situation.
974
 While Lech Wałęsa sought to defuse events outside the 
negotiating hall,
975
 Andrzej Gwiazda appears to have had the most significant influence 
inside the hall. The Gdańsk Agreement was not the end of the matter. They would continue 
to fight their case once it had been signed. After all, ‘We have only one real guarantee, 
which is ourselves.’976 Although the situation at the yard was ultimately dampened down by 
the strike leaders, it had an obvious impact at the yard. With a fear of provocateurs in the 
yard and alcohol evident for the first time, not only did Wałęsa have the BHP Hall cleared 
by the strike guard of anyone who was not meant to be there, but the decision was taken to 
postpone the signing of the agreement until the following day. Under the circumstances, 
they could not guarantee the government delegation’s security.977 The experts were removed 
from the working group as it continued work on the final points. Only three MKS delegates, 
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including Gwiazda, were involved, however.
978
 With the end in sight, the strike still had to 
survive a final night. 
31 August 1980 (Sunday) 
At a Mass attended by some 7000 Tri-city residents that morning Father Jankowski pointed 
not only to the achievements of the strike, but also to the fact that there was still work to be 
done and solidarity to be maintained. It was clear that he was aware of the tensions that had 
erupted at the yard the previous night. In what may have been a reference to Poland’s 
unlikely victory over the Soviet Union during the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1920) as a result 
of the ‘Miracle on the Vistula’, Jankowski spoke of ‘a miracle of faith, a miracle on the 
Baltic.’ This miraculous victory it seems stemmed in large part from the conduct of those 
present. In a clear reference to the non-violent and dignified behaviour of all those who had 
participated in the strike, he pointed to the Christian path those present had chosen in 
accordance with Christ’s message ‘I am the way, the truth and the life.’ It was a path which 
all those gathered at the gates had witnessed. There was still work to be done if the 
agreement were to be concluded, however. Jankowski encouraged ‘behaviour of total peace’ 
and spoke of the need for ‘further dialogue’ by the MKS.979 If the workers wished for 
success, they needed to continue to support those representing them and to maintain the 
impeccable conduct of the previous two-and-a-half weeks.  
With MSW reports noting the previous day’s arrival of two emissaries sent by 
Cardinal Wyszyński with plans to undertake talks with strike representatives and conclude 
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an alternate agreement if that with the government failed,
980
 it seems that the Church was 
determined to ensure a peaceful end to events on the coast even if that meant higher profile 
acts of moderation such as these. Indeed the Bishop of Szczecin had made similar efforts as 
the Szczecin Agreement neared completion the previous day.
981
 With Cardinal Wyszyński 
receiving regular updates on events, including from Father Jankowski, such efforts are likely 
to have been made out of concern at the course of events both domestic and international. 
However, as a meeting of the Main Council of the Polish Episcopate demonstrated there 
was also a belief that not only the crisis, but also the moral troubles that accompanied it, 
needed resolving.
982
 The Church’s response to events arguably encompassed two areas 
therefore: the spiritual and the practical. In this regard it was arguably Mass that remained 
the single greatest source of the Church’s influence on events, as events not only at Gdańsk, 
but also Huta Warszawa, the “Thorez” mine, and Jastrzębie demonstrated. With Saint 
Barbara (the patron saint of miners) making a reappearance alongside images of John Paul II 
and the Black Madonna of Częstochowa at the latter, it is clear that Catholicism and its 
symbols continued to provide a major source of strength for those on strike.
983
 It was also a 
major attraction to observers. At the Lenin Shipyard, for example, only 4500 people were 
reported to be present at Gate Two when the final round of MKS-government talks got 
underway after eleven o’clock that morning compared with 7000 for Mass.984 
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 Despite this apparent fall in numbers, optimism remained evident at the yard as talks 
got underway. Wałęsa expressed his hope that agreement would soon be reached ‘to 
everybody’s satisfaction.’ Apparently taking into consideration the events of the previous 
evening and workers’ feelings of isolation from the negotiations, he suggested providing ‘a 
brief summary’ for those outside the hall of the points agreed upon by the two sides, a 
suggestion to which Jagielski agreed. First was the demand concerning press freedoms 
(point three). Although the text did not allow for the abolition of censorship, it paved the 
way for greater openness in Polish life, as well as for the broadcast of Sunday Mass. In a 
state in which the Party sought to control everything it marked a significant breakthrough 
for the workers and a major concession for the Party. Nonetheless, Jagielski promptly 
accepted, initialling the point.
985
 Not only would many of the techniques fostered during the 
years of underground publishing now become more prominent, but the workers would also 
be able to hold the Party to account more easily. The broadcast of Mass also marked a major 
spiritual breakthrough in a state in which formally God did not exist. It was an 
unprecedented step. 
Point four, concerning the reinstatement of those persecuted after the protests of 
1970 and 1976 as well as the release of political prisoners, proved more contentious. 
Although Jagielski accepted and initialled the text of the agreement ‘in the spirit of 
understanding the importance of this matter’, he was less forthcoming when it came to the 
matter of the KOR detainees.
986
 The call for the release of KOR activists, who had done 
much to help workers since the mid-1970s and had also supported the strike, continued to 
cause problems. As the U.S. ambassador William Schaufele observed, it was one of a 
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number of factors that marked Gdańsk out as ‘a more political’ strike than Szczecin.987 With 
their demand for the release of KOR activists they were pushing the authorities as far as 
they could. As Schaufele summarised: 
In playing this card they are attempting to exact a concession that the 
highest authorities in Poland will find difficult to grant. On the other hand, 
to prolong the strike could be more costly to the government than to find a 
face-saving device to free those arrested.
988
 
  
With the agreement nearing completion, including over free trade unions, the release of 
KOR detainees threatened to make or break the strike. It was primarily a question of 
whether the authorities could afford to cave in on this point or not. In the short term 
Jagielski did his best to avoid such a decision for the authorities. The MKS gave him little 
choice but to confront it. Adopting a tactic employed frequently by Gniech during the 
earliest rounds of negotiations at the yard, he denied responsibility for the matter. It was a 
matter for the public prosecutor, not for a government representative. However, he promised 
that if an agreement between the two sides were signed that day, he would inform Warsaw 
of the matter ‘just as it was presented here.’989 
As with earlier attempts to employ this tactic, it was not accepted by the workers.  
Anna Walentynowicz countered first. She stressed the importance of those detained to those 
on strike: ‘those now under arrest helped the families of workers sacked in 1976. Workers 
still remember it.’990 Although Andrzej Gwiazda also weighed in with similar arguments, it 
proved to no avail. Jagielski continued to stress the limits of this authority and to promise 
only to report the matter to Warsaw. As he argued, ‘I have no jurisdiction other than what I 
do on my own responsibility and conscience. No other jurisdiction. I am speaking to you 
frankly – that is all I can say.’ It was Wałęsa who concluded the argument bluntly. ‘If these 
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people are not released, we shall declare another strike.’ They should move on to discussion 
of the following point.
991
 The release of KOR activists remained a point of contention. 
As with this most political of demands, economic demands also remained 
controversial. While point six concerning economic reform and ‘wider public participation 
in discussing the reform’ was promptly accepted by Jagielski and even the issue of strike 
pay (point seven) was swiftly agreed to despite the fact that it was one of the few points on 
which the working group had failed to reach agreement, point eight concerning wage 
increases of 2000 złoty proved more contentious.992 Although he did not highlight Poland’s 
debt problem, it was clear from Jagielski’s response to this demand that at a time of 
economic crisis the impact of such increases for Poland would be catastrophic. He asked the 
workers ‘to consider what this would mean: not only for Gdańsk, but for the whole nation.’ 
In total such increases would result in ‘an annual expenditure of 12 000 million złotys.’ As 
Jagielski stressed, ‘Such a decision would cause instant inflation and completely ruin the 
economy.’ Although Jagielski’s assessment in this regard appears to have been sound, the 
argument was not accepted by the workers. They had different ways in which the money 
could be found. As Wałęsa stated: 
Prime Minister, we realise that money can’t be produced without 
something to back it. But we would like to suggest where the money is: in 
the swollen state apparatus. It can be taken from them – not all in a rush 
but by an acceptable date. […] We have our unions, free independent 
unions. They can deal with this, saying where the money is to be found, 
and how to take it.
993
 
While it was a response that highlighted a genuine desire on the part of the workers to help 
improve the Polish economy, it was also one that highlighted their (understandable given the 
lack of media debate) lack of awareness of the scale of the problems facing Poland at this 
time. With debts of over $20 billion and a debt-service ratio of almost 100 per cent, Poland 
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faced near impossible economic times ahead. From the Party’s perspective, the presence of 
an independent trade union wishing to help shape economic reform and with the right to 
strike to enforce their demands presented a difficult problem to grapple with at a time of 
major economic crisis. Ideological and geopolitical factors only added to this. With 
numerous economic conditions included in the Gdańsk Agreement, such as improvements to 
pensions and better supplies of meat and other consumer goods, future economic problems 
were being kept in store for the Party, the workers and the nation.
994
  
Although all such conditions were agreed to by the end of the session, Poland’s 
economic situation at the time meant that they would be almost impossible to fulfil. Under 
such circumstances, as Gierek’s chief economic advisor Paweł Bożyk later observed, ‘Well 
if someone were a magician, then he could conjure up the fulfilment of these sorts of 
demands.’995 There was no magician on hand however, and with the strike wave around the 
country not yet over, the economic situation was only likely to deteriorate further. Poland’s 
best hope at this time was further economic assistance from the West. Unsurprisingly 
therefore it was this aspect of events that was arguably of greatest interest to Poland’s 
Western partners. While socio-political developments in Poland held open the possibility of 
either liberalisation or repression depending upon the ultimate Soviet response, as a British 
Embassy telegram dated 30 August 1980 and ultimately seen by Margaret Thatcher 
demonstrates, a major interest lay in the economic turn of events. Despite attempting to 
predict the course of future Polish events and the political ramifications of the strikes, it was 
the strikes’ economic impact that took up most of the report. There were clear economic 
implications for the West. As the final section (frequently underlined by Thatcher) 
indicated, Poland’s economic future remained bleak with its debt crisis potentially 
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worsening and its dependence upon the West remaining. The final paragraph summarised 
the problems facing both Poland and the West at this time: 
A multi-lateral re-scheduling of Poland’s debts must be on the cards. In 
any case Poland will face great difficulty in securing further large hard 
currency loans from commercial sources. If this is so Polish pressure on 
national governments for new loans will increase.
996
   
Poland’s economic future was tied not only to its own domestic reforms, now due also to be 
shaped by its first ‘independent, self-governing trade union’, but also upon its relationship 
with Western governments and commercial banks. They would be unlikely to survive 
without the West’s help and if the banks withdrew their support, Western governments 
would be expected to shoulder a greater burden at a time when they had their own economic 
problems to deal with. Due to Poland’s lack of IMF membership any rescheduling would 
also be a major problem. 
 In spite of their economic demands, for the workers the primary issues remained 
being able to represent their own interests and the release of political prisoners, however. 
Regarding the former it was clear that they had achieved much, but would need to continue 
to fight both to protect and to build on their gains. As Wałęsa declared, they had ‘all fought 
like lions’ to get this far, but none of them would be excused from ‘further work.’ As he 
concluded, ‘If we mess up the next stage, we’ll be back to square one. That’s the truth.’997 
They still had much to do. While their gains had not been easily won, they could be easily 
lost. The authorities had undermined such agreements before. They knew this from 
experience. If the promised changes remained on paper only, then their victory would be a 
hollow one. Poles were well aware of this. As the warning towards the end of Man of Iron, 
Andrzej Wajda’s film based on the strike, made clear: ‘This agreement is meaningless. The 
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law doesn’t recognize agreements made under duress. It’s only a piece of paper.’998 While 
some within the Party at least would seek to undermine it, the true value of the agreement 
would come from the effort the workers put into enforcing it. This was a longer-term issue, 
however. In the short-term the release of KOR activists remained most important.  
Raised as an issue again by Alina Pieńkowska, the MKS would not let the release of 
the KOR detainees drop. Bogdan Lis called for Jagielski to agree the matter with Warsaw 
during a break. Retiring to the management building, Jagielski ultimately entered into talks 
with Kania. As he awaited a response, he spoke first to Wałęsa and following further talks 
with Warsaw to Gwiazda.
999
 During his private talks with Jagielski it was made clear to 
Gwiazda that Jagielski felt their release could be achieved (he would not be discussing it 
otherwise). The immediate release of the prisoners would take place, so long as the strike 
was brought to an end first. Doing so would strengthen Jagielski’s position in relation to this 
matter. Accepting Jagielski’s word ‘was a risk’, but ultimately Gwiazda placed his trust in 
him.
1000
 Although Gwiazda now faced an anxious wait to see whether his trust would be 
rewarded, in the short-term it meant that the Gdańsk Agreement could be concluded. At the 
start of that afternoon’s session Jagielski was able to read a statement declaring that the 
relevant authorities would decide upon the release of the prisoners by midday the following 
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day. With the agreement in place, Jagielski asked Wałęsa to sign the necessary documents to 
end the strike.
1001
 
 In front of MKS delegates in the main hall with a statue of Lenin to one side and 
posters on the wall bearing the slogans ‘Solidarność’ and ‘21 x Tak’ (21 x Yes), as well as a 
crucifix, the MKS Presidium and the Jagielski Commission signed the agreement into being. 
Wałęsa used a twelve inch souvenir pen of the Pope’s pilgrimage to Poland to do so.1002 As 
Wałęsa called an end to the strike, he recognised the role that the government side had 
played in its peaceful resolution. Not only had they avoided the use of force, but they (along 
with the MKS) had been willing to enter into dialogue and to compromise. As he observed, 
‘That is why this settlement is so truly great. There was no force used here. Everything was 
settled as it should be.’1003 Without such qualities being demonstrated by both sides, the 
outcome of events could have been considerably different as the workers were aware.  
Jagielski was slightly more cautious in his response. While noting that ‘we talked as 
Poles should talk to one another: as Pole with Pole’, he also used his speech to emphasise 
that the agreement should not be considered a victory for the workers (or perhaps more 
importantly, a defeat for the Party). ‘There are no winners or losers: no victors and no 
vanquished. What matters most is that we have reached an agreement.’ While the Party 
leadership could not afford to settle the strikes in any other fashion, given the pressure they 
faced from both Party members and their allies, nor could they be seen to have suffered a 
defeat at the hands of the very workers they were supposed to represent. Perhaps more 
importantly, and with the West German loan yet to be concluded, nor could they continue to 
suffer the economic losses triggered by the strikes. As Jagielski declared, ‘Only effective 
work can produce the goods which we then share out. The whole country is watching us. Let 
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us set an example of selfless, reliable work.’1004 The Lenin Shipyard, and indeed the entire 
country, needed to get back to work for the good of the economy. There were already some 
positive signs in this regard. MSW reports recorded improvements in twelve administrative 
regions prior to the conclusion of Gdańsk Agreement, while the resumption of work at the 
ports of Szczecin and Świnoujście and an appeal from the Szczecin MKS to make up for 
losses caused by the strikes were also of benefit to the Party. Problems still remained in the 
Katowice, Wałbrzych and Wrocław regions, however, particularly in the mines.1005 These 
needed to be resolved. 
While some enterprises did not have access to television and would wait until their 
own emissaries returned from the Lenin Shipyard and others would begin talks to conclude 
agreements with management as they awaited firmer news of events on the coast,
1006
 the 
live broadcast of the Lenin Shipyard’s strike on television and radio was a significant 
moment in Polish history. Normal programming was interrupted to provide the nation with 
their first glimpse of Wałęsa. Although the terms of the Gdańsk Agreement and the deal on 
prisoners were not broadcast,
1007
 it was a breakthrough moment nonetheless. Of greatest 
importance in the agreement that broadcasts showed Jagielski and Wałęsa to be signing was 
that of point one. Acknowledging the failure of the official trade unions to meet ‘the 
expectations of the workers’, the MKS and government commission had agreed to the 
creation of ‘new, independent, self-governing trade unions.’ As point two of seven relating 
to the new trade unions clearly stated: 
Establishing new, independent, self-governing trade unions, the MKS 
states that they will abide by the principles stated in the PRL Constitution. 
The new unions will defend both the social and material interests of the 
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workers and have no intention of playing the role of a political party. They 
are based on the principle of collective ownership of the means of 
production – the essence of socialism in Poland. Acknowledging the 
leading role of the PZPR in Poland, and not impairing the existing system 
of international alliances, the new unions wish to provide the working 
people with the appropriate means of control, freedom of opinion, and 
protection of their interests. 
 
Amongst other things they were also guaranteed non-interference in union affairs by the 
government and the new unions were to be established in accordance with ILO conventions 
number 87 and 98 as ratified by the People’s Republic of Poland. ‘Point 1 of the Law on 
Trade Unions of 1949, which says that workers and employees are guaranteed the right 
voluntarily to form free trade unions in Poland’ was also to be respected.1008 This 
represented a major breakthrough in the history of worker-state relations under 
Communism, never before had such a union been agreed to. With the role of the unions 
clearly defined in the agreement, it also represented what was arguably a better deal than 
that achieved at Szczecin. As David Ost has noted in his comparison of the two agreements, 
although the Gdańsk Agreement did not explicitly guarantee the creation of new trade 
unions throughout the whole of Poland, it did leave open the possibility (as the MKS 
intended) that they could be. By contrast under the terms of the Szczecin Agreement, which 
was often favoured by the authorities, this was ‘left extremely unclear.’ Indeed, Ost suggests 
that a valid interpretation of the Szczecin Agreement is that it assured ‘the subordination of 
the emerging unions to the old union structure.’1009 The significance of this should not be 
underestimated. As Benedykt Czuma has argued, without the Gdańsk Agreement the 
reference at Szczecin to the new union’s registration through the official ones would have 
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caused ‘serious problems’ in the establishment of new trade unions throughout Poland.1010 It 
would have made it significantly easier for the Party to undermine and control them in the 
future. The absence of experts at Szczecin has been pointed to as a possible factor by Ost in 
explaining the discrepancy between the two agreements. This could explain why, as Ost 
observes, ‘Where the Gdańsk Accord was an explicit, clear-cut agreement, the Szczecin 
Accord was a model of vagueness.’1011 While it would still take later strikes to explicitly 
guarantee the creation of ‘new, independent, self-governing trade unions’ for the whole of 
Poland, the Gdańsk Agreement left the situation far clearer than that at Szczecin did. Its 
language was also more difficult to challenge. Perhaps more importantly, not only did the 
Gdańsk Agreement hint at the possibility of new unions for all workers, it also left open the 
door for increased activity by rural activists and farmers.
1012
 Whereas the Party had 
generally only faced unrest in urban areas during the summer of 1980, the potential for 
problems in rural regions also existed. 
 While the Gdańsk Agreement bought the Party some breathing space in the short-
term, it far from solved their problems. With strikes ongoing in other industrial regions, the 
potential for further problems in both urban and rural areas, as well as an on-going debt 
crisis to manage, much would hinge on the response of their allies. It was difficult to read 
what it would be at this time, however. As the Soviet Politburo met with Brezhnev for the 
first time since his departure from the capital on 28 August, public signals were not 
promising. While the reproduction of an article by the American Communist Party leader 
Gus Hall, which had appeared in the East German press a day earlier, saw the phrase 
“strikes” being used in the Soviet press for the first time, it also included a sharp attack on 
the Polish leadership. In addition to this, while news of the agreements on the coast was not 
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publicized, an article published that night by TASS signed by the authoritative “A. Petrov” 
went further in attacking those leading the strike on the coast, as well as their links to 
emigres and Western media support. Noticeably, it was not only the political, but also the 
economic demands that were attacked. Claims were made that the economic situation had 
been exploited for political gain.
1013
 The unhappiness of Moscow both with events and with 
the Polish leadership appeared plain. It was a disquiet shared equally by their allies. Günther 
Sieber, the East German ambassador in Warsaw, provided a bleak assessment of events. The 
Party along with its allies had ‘suffered an ignominious defeat.’ The ‘political 
consequences’ of the accords reached on the coast went ‘further than those of 1956.’1014 
While this would suggest that a hard-line was forthcoming from Moscow and East Berlin, as 
well as Poland’s other allies, it seems that beneath the surface their response would be less 
clear cut than such assessments and media coverage suggested. As Sieber also noted in a 
passage heavily underlined by Erich Honecker: 
We have close, intensive contacts with friendly embassies, particularly 
with the Czechoslovakian and Hungarian embassies. We have contact as 
well with the Soviet comrades. They ask us, to show understanding in 
relation to them, since they in their opinion must be highly reserved, 
because too great attention focusses presently on their reaction.
1015
 
 
Despite the hostility of Soviet press coverage therefore, Moscow’s reaction (and with it that 
of their allies) was likely to be far more nuanced than the Petrov article or the negative East 
German assessment of Polish events suggested.  
For the West meanwhile what happened next was equally unclear. Although the 
Western media, which covered events extensively, recognised the significance of the 
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workers’ achievements, they were far less certain about what would follow. It was not yet 
clear if the workers would genuinely be allowed to form the ‘new, independent, self-
governing trade unions’ committed to at Gdańsk and to a lesser extent at Szczecin. Even if 
they did, as the New York Times so bluntly put it, it would then become a question of how 
long Moscow would ‘tolerate a bastardized system that could sow heresy in Eastern Europe 
and even inside the Soviet Union’.1016 This is not to say that intervention would be 
Moscow’s preferred course of action, however. As the British had already assessed, ‘The 
possibility of Soviet and Warsaw Pact intervention continues to be unthinkable. But when 
all other possible outcomes appear to be impossible, it may yet be the only way that this 
crisis is to be concluded.’1017 Moscow would only intervene under exceptional 
circumstances. Whatever the ultimate outcome of this particular aspect of the crisis, as 
Zbigniew Brzezinski had been warned prior to the signing of the coastal accords, ‘Poland is 
likely to be a festering sore within the Soviet bloc – and political flashpoint – for some time 
to come.’1018 The Polish breakthrough, as with the Polish crisis running in parallel alongside 
it, would not be resolved in the foreseeable future.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION 
In concluding one of the earliest accounts of civil resistance by Polish workers in the 1980s, 
Jan Zielonka observed that ‘nonviolence constitutes an important weapon of social struggle, 
provided that facts are not confused with fiction and that theoretical dreams do not ignore 
practical experience.’1019 It is a statement that offers a noticeable contrast to the more 
romanticised view presented by Robert Polet, who concluded the first such account on 
Poland by noting that, ‘the potential of the Polish people to defend themselves has been 
considerably increased – and this has been achieved without the purchase of any missiles or 
fighter planes!’1020 When placed fully in their domestic and international context, the strikes 
of 1980 arguably provide support for Zielonka’s line of thought as opposed to Polet’s. 
While there is no question that methods of non-violence employed consistently by Polish 
workers throughout the summer contributed to the peaceful conclusion of events, the 
manner in which such methods functioned was far from straightforward. Their success 
depended upon a number of factors, including the scale of protests and the structure of 
power affected by them. Domestic and international circumstance also played a significant 
part.  
There was significant variance in the way in which non-violent resistance operated. 
While at times it depended upon the scale of support for the strikes (either locally as at 
Lublin or nationally at Gdańsk) at others it depended upon the nature of the enterprise 
affected. It was enterprises of the greatest economic significance that proved to be most 
sensitive to non-violence, especially at a time of economic crisis, along with international 
structures of power. This explains why the ports, which were of both economic and 
international importance, were of greatest concern and most carefully considered as targets 
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for a crackdown. The fact that the skills and knowledge of those operating the ports as well 
as human resources required replacing made them a particularly problematic issue for the 
Party.
1021
  
Overall, non-violence was perhaps most significant in terms of avoiding a 
crackdown. The consistent application of non-violent methods by the workers coupled with 
a refusal to take to the streets meant that the authorities had no excuse for the use of 
violence against them. Particularly under the gaze of the Western media, such actions were 
only likely to backfire with possible implications for much needed Western economic 
support. Realistically only the opposition, limited in numbers but providing a vital 
information service for the workers, could be targeted for repression without attracting 
Western criticism and threatening new credits and loans. The same could not be said for the 
workers and their enterprises. Based on Politburo minutes and documents prepared for 
“Lato-80” during the summer of 1980, the use of such means by the authorities was only 
ever countenanced in relation to attacks on vital installations. The onus was therefore on the 
workers rather than the Party to maintain non-violence. It was the scale of the protests, as 
well as the difficulties of replacing vital skills at key enterprises, that provided the greatest 
barrier to any use of force by the Party, however. As numerous observations by the likes of 
Kania and Jaruzelski made clear, the use of force against such widespread discontent was 
simply impossible. They also lacked the legal means to do so.  
Circumstance also played a significant part in shaping the outcome of events, 
however. With a debt-service ratio of almost 100 percent even before the strikes began, it is 
clear that the Party had lost control of the structure of power central to their day-to-day 
survival. They were struggling to fulfil what many Poles considered to be their basic human 
needs, such as the supply of food, not to mention expectations. As such challenges to their 
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authority as well as their ability to respond to them consistently through tried-and-tested 
methods such as wage increases were limited. Combined with a reluctance to use force, this 
left them dependent upon a propaganda apparatus that vast numbers of citizens ignored or 
use of the law as a means of control. While the latter could be employed against the 
opposition in the short-term, any ability to restrain Polish workers through legal means 
depended upon the long-term struggle over implementation of the coastal agreements. The 
law could not be used to control strikes on such a scale. 
In international terms meanwhile with the Soviet Union limiting economic support 
for the Poles prior to the onset of the strikes and a Polish credit dependency on the West at a 
time of economic crisis, the West had significant influence over events. There is little 
evidence to suggest any real efforts at linkage between Poland’s desire for new loans and 
the peaceful outcome of events throughout the summer, however. Arguably there was no 
need. The Poles themselves appear to have considered the strikes unlikely to aid their 
negotiations for new loans and seemingly took this into consideration of their own accord. 
In addition to this, given Western support for economic reform and their high-levels of 
exposure to Poland at a time of their own economic difficulties, the extent to which the 
West could support the workers without damaging their own economic interests is 
questionable. Worker unrest was only likely to hinder Poland’s ability to pay-back the West. 
Peace and stability in Europe would also be damaged by interference in Polish affairs.  
Perhaps more importantly, the loans under negotiation mostly concerned banks 
rather than governments. There was little Western governments could do during the summer 
other than continue business as usual, while banks were motivated solely by economic 
concerns rather than by a desire to see liberalisation occur within the Eastern bloc. Even for 
governments the prospect of liberalisation did not encourage interference. As comments 
such as those by Lord Carrington indicate, they were well aware that if they did not refrain 
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from interference in Polish affairs nor could they expect Moscow to. Arguably similar 
considerations confronted Moscow at this stage. They had their own economic problems to 
consider. Any interference by either side was also only likely to damage peace and stability 
in Europe, and with it the process of arms control.   
Given the close association between Solidarity and non-violence throughout 1980-
1981, as well as later under martial law (1981 – 1983) and during the collapse of 
Communism in 1989, the question of the extent to which non-violence continued to operate 
effectively within the rapidly changing domestic and international context of the Cold War’s 
final decade requires an answer. While the role of the U.S. in influencing events in Poland 
and Eastern Europe is already subject to debate,
1022
 the roles of not only France and West 
Germany, but also commercial banks during these periods deserve further consideration. 
Indeed given the heavy exposure of Hungary, Romania, East Germany and Yugoslavia to 
Western finance during the 1970s and 1980s, the role of commercial banks and Western 
financial institutions such as the IMF in both the violent and non-violent collapse of 
Communism arguably requires exploration. So too does the Soviet Union’s role not only in 
military terms, but also in terms of economics, trade and energy politics with regards to the 
Eastern bloc.  
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